

**INFO-TÜRK**

**EXTREME-RIGHT**

**IN TURKEY**

**Grey Wolves'  
Pan-Turkism**

**Islamic  
Fundamentalism**

**Turco  
Islamic  
Synthesis  
(Holy Alliance)**

**Doğan Özgüden**

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## PREFACE

*Since the military coup d'état of September 12, 1980, Turkey has been under an authoritarian regime. Though the military handed over the government in 1983 to civilians, the anti-democratic 1982 Constitution and numerous laws decreed by the 5-man junta are still in force, military tribunals are carrying on their function to try and sentence the opponents of the regime, and military and civil prisons are still full of political prisoners.*

*The military coup was carried out on the pretext of "protecting national unity; guaranteeing security of life and property by eliminating anarchy and terror; re-establishing and protecting the State's authority."*

*In reality, the pre-coup political instability and violence were provoked and developed by the extreme-right organizations, mainly by neo-fascist Grey Wolves. This Pan-Turkist horde was encouraged and protected by the Counter Guerrilla Department of the Turkish Armed Forces, because the big bourgeoisie, incapable to cope with the rapid development of the working class movement, was envious of establishing an authoritarian regime. Only the rise of political violence might justify a military takeover.*

*With this end in view, the representative of the big bourgeoisie, the Justice Party (AP), did not hesitate to share political power with two wings of the Extreme-right: Grey Wolves on*

*the one hand, and on the other, Islam Fundamentalists supported by Saudi Arabia.*

*After the coup, while cracking down on left-wing forces, the Junta claimed to be equally repugnant with regards to extreme-right. But this was only for justifying the putsch and presenting itself as a referee above all kinds of extremism.*

*In a few years all extreme-right leaders were released and placed at the head of new institutions set up by the military.*

*While the putschist generals were pretending to be "attached to the Kemalism and to the European ideal" and knocking at the door of the European Communities, the consecutive governments of the post-coup period have done everything possible for Islam Fundamentalism to establish its political, ideological and economic hegemony in Turkey.*

*Prior to the coup, the two components of the Turkish extreme-right, Islam Fundamentalists and Pan-Turkists, despite their alliance against the Left, were not in a full entente, because while the former were rejecting any union on the race basis, the latter advocated the promotion of Turkish nationalism.*

*It is in the last 8-year period that, these two wings have, under the aegis of the military, been reconciled on the basis of Turco-Islamic Synthesis.*

*Today, the government party, Ozal's Motherland Party (ANAP) is under the domination of the Holy Alliance of Pan-Turkists and Islam Fundamentalists.*

*This work gives a historical background of the Extreme-right's rise in Turkey and exposes its links in political, economic and military plans as well as its submission to Saudi Fundamentalism.*

*We believe that such an exposé is indispensable for the European opinion as Evren-Ozal Tandem, hiding their real face behind a secular mask, resort to every means possible to present their regime as a European one and force an entry into the European Communities.*

## SAUDI-IRANIAN DUEL IN TURKEY

On October 25, 1988, Turkish public opinion had a terrible upset when it was announced that the Second Secretary of the Saudi Arabia's Embassy in Ankara, *Abdulghani Beddawi*, was assassinated outside his Ankara home.

"We declare our responsibility for executing God's death sentence on one of Saudi Arabia's secret service agents working under cover in the Embassy of the Saudi clan in Ankara," said a statement released in Beirut in the name of the pro-Iranian *Islamic Jihad Hijaz*. The group also threatened to carry out further attacks on Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti diplomats in Europe.

Saudi Arabia's Ambassador, *Abdulaziz Khojah*, said following the incident that they had received many threats during the Holy Pilgrimage. Iran boycotted this year's *hajj* (pilgrimage) after a clash be-

tween Saudi police and demonstrators in Mecca in 1987 left more than 400 mostly Iranian pilgrims dead.

Beddawi was second diplomat killed in Turkey in the last three years. The first secretary of the Jordanian Embassy, *Zid Sati*, had been assassinated by *the Islamic Jihad* on July 23, 1985.

Already one year ago, *The Times* of November 23, 1987, reported that the two opposite powers of the Islamic world, *Shiite* Iran and *Sunnite* Saudi Arabia had been trying to spread their Islamic ideologies in Turkey by resorting to every means. "For the most part Islam fundamentalism in Turkey is a moderate movement which shuns Ayatollah Khomeiny's revolutionary theology in favour of a revival of the kind of conservative Islam practices in the Gulf states.," said the British newspaper.

However, the Saudi fundamentalism is not so far innocent in Turkey.

On May 3rd, 1987, a university student was assassinated by the pro-Saudi *Guardians of Islam* in the eastern province of Van. That day a group of fundamentalists attacked the university students at a small restaurant near the Centenary University campus because the students were not fasting during the holy month of *Ramadan*. During this attack, *Mehmet Sirin Tekin* was stabbed to death and seven others were severely wounded.

This first hostile attack on students to have oc-

curred in Turkey since the military coup of September 1980 caused an increase in tensions in this eastern Anatolian town.

In fact, during the month of *Ramadan* in last years, Turkey undergoes an unprecedented atmosphere of intolerance created by fundamentalists. All those who dare to eat, to drink or to smoke in public places during the hours of religious fast are warned and very often harassed by Islamic militants.

According to the press reports, at the Centenary University in Van, many fundamentalist professors, appointed by *the Higher Education Council (YÖK)* after the military coup, indoctrinate young university students and provoke them to carry out *jihad* (holy war) against infidels. Those students who do not yield to this indoctrination are not promoted to a higher class.

On this killing, the Secretary General of *the Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP)*, Mr Fikri Sağlar declared that the rightist terror of the pre-coup period was rising again under the guise of propagating Islamic principles and accused the *World Moslem League* (Rabitat-ul Islam-ul Alem) and the Evren-Özal rule of instigating religious violence in Turkey.

According to a public opinion poll conducted during October 1988 by the daily *Hürriyet*, Turkish citizens are more afraid of Islamic fundamentalism than Communism.

29.6 percent of Turks polled believe that Com-



munists should be allowed to have a legal party, with 51.5 percent against and 18.7 percent expressing no opinion. When the same group was asked whether they would like to see a legal political party for Islamic fundamentalists, 58.4 percent answered "No."

### **"KEMALIST" SUBMISSION TO FUNDAMENTALISM**

The question of Islamic fundamentalism and the influence of the two opposite Islamic powers, Saudi Arabia and Iran, have been stirring Turkish opinion for a few years.

On March 13, 1987, the first page of the center-left daily *Cumhuriyet* violently shook up Turkey's political life. According to the newspaper, the Saudi fundamentalism was so influential in Turkey that even the Turkish Government had already received some funds coming from an international Islamic organization in favour of *the Shari'a* (the Islamic law).

*The Rabitat-ul Alem-ul Islam* (World Moslem League) had made donations of 20 million Turkish Lira for the mosque which should be built within the parliamentary complex, two millions for the mosque of Kocatepe in Ankara, and five millions for the restoration of damaged religious buildings in Adana.

*The Rabitat* also subsidized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC). According to the *Mil-*

liyete of March 26, 1987, the sum set for the administration of Denktash by *the Rabitat* rose to 988,949\$.

What is most important, from 1981 to 1982, this controversial organization had paid, by way of the *Islamic and Cultural Center* in Brussels, the salaries of the Turkish clergy employed by the Ankara government to assure the religious education of Turkish workers abroad, particularly in Belgium, the R.F.A. and the Netherlands. Over two years each Imam in the service of the Turkish Government received 1,100\$ per month from the ICC.

Below the decree of April 28, 1981, concerning the salaries of the Turkish Clergy, one can see the signature of *General Kenan Evren* who was then chief of the military junta.

According to *Cumhuriyet*, this submission to the *Rabitat* would in a word be a scandal without precedent in the history of secular Turkey. But the scandal did not stop there... A series of reports by the journalist *Mumcu* showed that the Evren-Özal tandem had given besides numerous concessions to Islamic institutions directed by the Saudi fundamentalism.

The polemics that followed these revelations showed once more the hypocritical politics of the Ankara regime: while they are pretending to be "*attached to the Kemalism and to the European ideal*", and knocking at the door of the European

Communities, its consecutive governments have done everything possible for *the Rabitat* to establish its political, ideological and economic hegemony in Turkey.

Following these revelations, the Minister of State *Hasan Celal Güzel*, in the name of the government, confirmed the revelation regarding the clergy: "The imams implicated exercised their ministry for Turks abroad between June 30, 1981, and January 1982. They received part of their salary from the *Rabitat*."

However, he tried to justify this affair with the usual demagoguery of the regime: "Shortly after the coup of September 1980, strong agitation against the State was developing abroad. Consequently, it was good for Turkey that clergy sent by the State could avoid having their co-religionists implicated in these subversive activities. The end justifies the means..."

#### **THE LEFT OPPOSITION ACCUSES EVREN**

Whereas, according to the revelations of journalist Uğur Mumcu, the most subversive activities would be those of *the Rabitat* which aims at overthrowing the secular system of the Turkish State and reestablishing a fundamentalist regime based on the *Shari'a*.

That is the reason that the Secretary General of the *Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP)*, Fikri

Sağlar asked purely and simply for the resignation of Kenan Evren and those responsible for *Rabitat* operation. In an interview to *the Turkish Daily News* of April 3, 1987, he explained why he asked for Evren's resignation:

"First, one must speak of the true nature of *the Rabitat*. This is not a religious organization as they claim, but a political foundation. Its aim is to promote the principles of *Shari'a*. In Turkey, they have poured in money. Now, whoever they are, they are linked and obey first those who pay them. It is a universal law. If an Islamist organization pays the envoys of the Turkish Government, it would be absolutely normal for the envoys in turn to work for the organization. Furthermore, another fundamental principle is that the State absolutely should pay its envoys itself. What has it done in this affair? It has sold its authority in the matter to an Islamist organization whose ideals are contrary to their own."

Q: *But does this "skid" warrant only the resignation of the president of the Republic?*

A: What counts is not whether Evren personally signed or not but who was the chief of government having implemented this policy. You say "*the president of the Republic*", but do not forget that he was the real executive chief in Turkey between 1980 and 1983 and that he personally made decisions.

Q: *Kenan Evren, however, is considered one of the ardent defenders of Secularity.*

A: People believe that. It is false. May be the president, personally, believes in the principles of Secularity, but in no case has he matched his acts with his thoughts.

Q: *You sincerely believe that fundamentalism is a real threat to Turkey?*

A: Let's look at the facts since September 12, 1980. Secularity has been slowly but surely eroded in Turkey. Since that date, religious affairs have little by little been entering state affairs. For example, for the first time in a constitution one brings up and admits the question of religious courses in national education. The head of the State begins certain of his speeches with verses of *the Koran*. The religious foundations are multiplying. The number of religious schools has remained the same, but the number of students has also increased. The president, ostensibly, remarks that he does not observe the obligatory fast because he is on official travel, etc.

Q: *What explanation would you give for the re-growth of Islamic sentiment?*

A: A part of the Right and of those who took power on September 12, 1980, wanted to use the force of religion against the left-wing forces. To counteract the popular influence of the communists, the social-democrats, the socialists, the religious card was played against them. That's why fundamentalism has reappeared in Turkey. Moreover, one must not neglect external factors. Turkey is the only Mos-

lem country under a secular regime. Certain people do not like that. In *the Rabitat* affair, it has been said that Demirel was the first to contact *the World Moslem League*. But at the time, Özal was his advisor. Since that time, Özal has had ties with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia in fact is ready to grant aid to Turkey in exchange for concessions to Islamism. Let us not forget Iran obviously, which seeks to safeguard its western border by having as many friends as possible in Ankara. These two countries constantly pour oil on the fire, even if the fire is not very strong. The leaders of 1980 and afterwards should have seen that. They did not see and did not react.

*Q: Do you think that the people in the government and the politicians of the Right are in favour of a return to fundamentalism?*

*A: To obtain 92% of the votes for the constitutional referendum of 1982, it was necessary to make concessions. Since the foundation of the Republic, there has remained in Turkey those who are nostalgic for the *Shari'a* and who await their day. The danger is real. After our statement requesting the resignation of President Evren, the parties of the Right reacted unanimously against us. It is the proof that our fight bothers certain people."*

Furthermore, the SHP, has lodged a motion with the National Assembly to open a parliamentary inquiry into the *Rabitat* affair and the resurging of fundamentalism in Turkey. But putting this motion on

the agenda was refused by the government majority in the Assembly.

### **GENERAL EVREN ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY THE SUBMISSION**

The reaction of *General Evren* against criticism of the opposition was as demagogic as that of the government spokesman. During a press conference held on March 27, 1987, at the Association of Journalists of Turkey, General Evren said:

"I know under which circumstances the *Rabitat* had been authorized to pay the salaries of Turkish clergy in Europe. The country was at a financial bottleneck and had no money to pay these people. I know that *the World Moslem League* is an organization which aspires to establish the order of *Shari'a* in Islamic countries, but no Turkish clergy has been influenced by this organization. Moreover, why is this affair considered so important? They also criticize the fact that the Turkish Ambassador is a part of the administration council of *the Islamic and Cultural Center* in Belgium. What could we do? The Belgian state has recognized Islam as one of the official religions of the country and has attributed all power to designate religious teachers. If we had not been a part of this center, the clergy for the Turkish community would have been named by strangers. If we had participated in the direction of this center, it was so that

we ourselves could designate our clergy. I believe that this campaign was started for subversive reasons because just after publication of the story of the *Rabitat*, several European radio stations have begun anti-Turkish broadcasts. The underground organizations in Europe which lead a campaign against Turkey are paid for that by certain communist countries. Besides, if *the World Christian League* had paid this clergy, there would have been no reaction."

Nevertheless, he did not say one word about the revelations regarding the other acts of submission to the *Rabitat*. During his monologue—the journalists participating in the press conference were forbidden to forward questions to the "President of the Republic"—Evren claimed that he would be the only guarantee of State secularity.

But it is during Evren's rule that the fundamentalist powers have gained their peak in Turkey and the secularity of the state is compromised more than ever.

In fact, during his stay in Istanbul on the occasion of the Islamic bankers' meeting, Deputy Secretary General of *the World Moslem League*, Amin Akil Al-Attas, said that his organization was very grateful to General Evren of his firm stand against the Turkish press' criticisms on the *Rabitat's* influence in Turkey.

According to the daily *Cumhuriyet* of May 4, 1987 Atlas said: "Recently, left-wing and communist



newspapers have launched a campaign against the relations between the Turkish Government and *the Rabitat*. But Evren has defended this relation and declared that, if necessary, he can conclude a new agreement with the *Rabitat*. At his press conference, Mr Evren drew attention to the activities of Christian churches and communist organizations in Turkey, but the Turkish press has not given heed to these activities. Evren's stand regarding the *Rabitat* is very appreciable for us."

Earlier, in another interview to the Turkish press, Amin Akil Al-Attas said: "The propagation of the *Shari'a* is our duty. God said it. If you are Moslems you should devote yourself to the strengthening of Islam in the World". (*Hürriyet*, March 29, 1987)

### **ISLAM IN THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY**

A question which comes up very often: Does Islamic fundamentalism constitute a serious danger in Turkey such as it produced in Iran?

At the beginning of the years '80, a Dutch sociologist, Mr. Martin van Bruinessen who did several studies on this problem in Turkey, said "No" to this question in the following terms:

"Up to now, Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey has remained a marginal phenomenon. The press ex-

aggerates it sometimes, but it is not a serious political danger. An Islamic revolution as in Iran is unimaginable in Turkey for different reasons. It seems well that in the immediate future, more people will concentrate more and more on Islam as essence of their cultural identity. Obviously the growing criticism of the *materialist* West and the *Communist* East will make Islam more attractive as a symbol of proper identity. And if the activities of left-wing political organizations and trade unions are still impossible, it is not at all out of the question that social protest will be made under the banner of Islam."

After the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, Islam had been eclipsed in Turkey for two decades.

Atatürk's reforms were aimed at making Turkey an industrial state as quickly as possible, socially and economically developed, modern and independent. All the obstacles to development which were associated with Islam had to be beaten down. Most of the *Kemalist* measures were not immediately directed against popular faith but against the political aspiration of Islam.

First of all, the *Caliphate* (Succession of Prophet Muhammed) was dismantled. Almost at the same, the function of *Seyhulislam* (Islamic spiritual chief in Turkey) was suppressed, and with the latter disappeared the illusion that the State's decisions would first of all be controlled by the *Shari'a*. In its place, the *Kemalist* power founded the *Directorate of Relig-*

*ious Affairs*, an instrument which was going to allow the State to control religion, and not the reverse.

After several Western reforms, Islam became a simple individual affair. Furthermore, to avoid possible resistance in the future, an ambitious secular education programme was put in practice.

According to the Turkish Constitution, the State should remain above all the religious affairs by looking after the safeguard of equality between different cults of the country.

Whereas, respect to the equality of cults has never existed in Turkey. First of all, the non-Moslem minorities are subjected to a discrimination not only from the point of view of having access to higher position in public services, but also in the field of religious education.

The neutrality of the State in regards to different cults does not exist even for an important part of Moslems.

Islam is not monolithic in Turkey and the two principal sects of Islam, *the Sunnite* and *the Alevite* live side by side in Turkish and Kurdish communities. While the *Sunnite* constitute absolute majority within a population of 50 millions, the number of the *Alevite* rises to ten millions .

*The Alevite* sect can be compared to the messianist movements which, at the end of the Middle Age in Europe, wanted the ideal State on earth. They are more open and more progressive than *the Sunnite*. In

spite of their parenthood with *the Shiite* of Iran, the *Alevite* of Turkey do not share conservative and authoritarian stand. That is probably because they have always been in minority status and subjected to a permanent repression in Turkey, while *the Shiite* have always been in ruling position in Iran.

In modern history, *the Alevite* first supported the Kemalist reforms and afterwards left-wing movements. However, they have always been discriminated, like Christian minorities, even during the periods of power of the Kemalists and the Social-democrats, because they have not any representation within *the Directorate of Religious Affairs*. Official authority on religious affairs is completely given to the majority sect: *the Sunnite*.

Notwithstanding the state was secularized and many Islamic institutions were suppressed, these changes have not been accompanied and supported by socio-economic reforms which could improve the conditions of life for people.

Moreover, the banning of left-wing political parties, trade unions and democratic organizations pushed the discontented masses into clandestine religious groupings and superstitious practices.

So, by the side of the officially recognized religious structure, other Islamic tendencies which completely reject secularism and ask for a return to the source survived clandestinely during the years of Kemalist dictatorship.

## REBIRTH OF THE ISLAM AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

After the Second World War, when political pluralism was introduced, the masses' wishes suddenly took on enormous importance. Though a pluralist system was introduced, a few months later the left-wing political parties and the trade unions were once more banned. So, Islam remained the only alternative current against Kemalism. In the rural areas, where 75 percent of the population lived, restoration of Islam was the most emotional desire. From this moment, all the political parties speculated on Islamic sentiments. Even the Kemalist party in power, *the Republican People's Party (CHP)* set aside its secularization programme, trying in vain to keep some Moslem votes.

The first anti-secular movement of this period which gave rise to talk of it by some spectacular actions was the order of *Ticani* dervishes. Towards 1950, *the Ticani* exploded several busts of Atatürk.

In 1950, when the *Democrat Party (DP)* took the power, one of the first measures was the re-introduction of the prayer call in Arabic. The DP also introduced religious broadcasts on State radio, and stimulated the construction and restoration of mosques. The authorities became much more tolerant with regards to the order of faith.

Temporal barriers within the labyrinthine Turkish

bureaucracy as well as the military have prevented any major incursions by religious interests at that time. Article 163 of the Turkish Penal Code prohibits the formation of a religious state, hence all proponents of *the Shari'a* were compelled to remain within the confines of Turkish law.

The officers who overthrew the DP under the banner of a return to Kemalism in 1960, let it be understood, some months later, that their action was not against the liberalization on the religious scale.

The practice of religio-political linkage was furthered in the '60s by Süleyman Demirel's *Justice Party (AP)* with its links to the *Nurcu* and the *Nak-sibendi* orders.

### **THE RABITAT-UL-ALEM-UL-ISLAM**

The foundation of *the World Moslem League* (the *Rabitat-ul-Alem-ul-Islam*) was a turning point in the rise of Saudi Fundamentalism in Turkey.

*The Rabitat* was founded in 1962 by Saudi Arabia in Mecca, with the support of the United States which was ambitious to politicize Islam in the Middle East so as to counteract the progressive and anti-imperialist movement in the region. The financing for the *Rabitat* was assured by the American company *ARAMCO*, exploiting petrol from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates.

Two members of the Turkish National Assembly, Salih Özcan and Ahmet Gürkan, took part among the 41 founders of the *Rabitat-ul-Alem-ul-Islam* (World Moslem League) in Saudi Arabia.

According to its statutes, the *Rabitat* had as a goal:

- to select accomplished Moslems among the pilgrims to Mecca and to form them into missionaries of Islam;

- to subsidize Islamic publications in all countries;

- to organize meetings between men of State.

In conformity with its objectives, *the Rabitat* began to select accomplished Turkish Moslems during their *hajj* (pilgrimage) to Mecca.

Meanwhile, in Turkey, an Islamist association of "academic" appearance began to recruit young intellectuals and to train them for important missions in the future. It was *the Association for the Propagation of Science* (Ilim Yayma Cemiyeti). The word "science" is used, not in the sense of "positive sciences", but in the sense of *Shari'a*.

In 1976, counting on financial and economic power of the oil-exporting countries, the *Rabitat* organized in Pakistan an audacious international meeting with the purpose of increasing its influence over other Islamic countries: *The International Congress of Shari'a*. This congress adopted the following programme:

- to make the constitutions and legislations of all Islamic countries conform to the *Shari'a*;

- to make obligatory in all Islamic countries teaching of the language of the *Koran*;
- to reinstitute the *Caliphate* (abolished in 1924 by the Republic of Turkey)
- to publish a catechism of the *Shari'a*;
- to make obligatory the teaching of the first five chapters of the *Koran* in primary school and all of it in secondary schools;
- to proclaim Friday a holiday;
- to apply strictly the prohibitions imposed on women by the *Koran*;
- to open places of prayer in all official buildings;
- to found Moslem organizations and unions.

Turkish Moslems were represented at *the International Congress of Shari'a* by the Minister of State Hasan Aksay, a leading member of *the National Salvation Party (MSP)*.

#### **THE RABITAT AND MOSLEM IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE**

The fundamentalist indoctrination programme imposed by the *Rabitat* was put in practice not only in Moslem countries, but also in European countries employing Moslem migrant workers. The opening of the *Islamic and Cultural Center* in Belgium, just by the side of the buildings of European Communities, was one of the first initiatives taken by *the Rabitat*.



After the installation of more than 200 thousand Maghrebin and Turkish immigrants in Belgium, the Belgian Government decided, on July 9, 1974, to recognize Islam as one of the cults existing in the country such as Catholicism, Judaism or Protestantism.

Though this decision was presented to public opinion as a sign of Belgium's respect to the religious beliefs of Moslem immigrants working in this country, the real motive behind this hasty decision was the pressure put on the Belgian Government by oil-producing Arab countries just after the start of oil-crisis in the world.

This recognition was so hasty that even the particulars of Islam had not been studied profoundly. For this reason, despite the fact that Islam is not monolithic and has no hierarchical authority, the Belgium government committed the error of recognizing *the Islam and Cultural Center (ICC)* as the only spiritual authority for Islamic affairs in Belgium. In reality, behind this center was *the World Moslem League* (Rabitat-ul-Islam-ul-Alem) led by Saudi fundamentalism.

The administration council of this center was made up essentially of representatives of the *Rabitat* and ambassadors from Islamic states represented in Brussels, namely Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Morocco, Senegal and Pakistan.

In a further step, the Belgian government decided

in June 1975, to offer, experimentally, to Maghrebin and Turkish students courses in Moslem religion. But, the power to designate the religious teachers too was conferred, by a circular of December 10, 1982, on the Director-Imam of the ICC.

### **POLITICIZATION OF ISLAM IN TURKEY**

Already in 1968, the socialist revue *Ant* revealed, with a very explicit table, the penetration of the *Rabitat* in Turkey through the *Association for the Propagation of Science (IYC)*.

At this time the IYC already placed its militants in several ministries and public enterprises. With the purpose of coordinating different anti-communist, religious and nationalist organizations, the IYC launched several publications including two daily newspapers and started Koranic courses.

What is most remarkable is that the present prime minister *Turgut Özal* figured at the very beginning in the hard core of this Islamist movement.

*Ant* revealed the names of three young Islamist engineers who had reached at that time very important positions in the public services. *Turgut Özal*, president of the State Planning Organization (DPT), his brother *Korkut Özal*, president of the State Oil Company (TPAO) and *Necmeddin Erbakan*, secre-

tary general of the Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Stock Markets of Turkey (TOBB).

In Turkish intelligentsia, they stand out with their religious practices such as praying five times a day, even at the workplace, and making frequent pilgrimages to Mecca. For that, this group was called *Takunyalılar* (the sabot people). (*Ant*, March 19, '68).

Of these three engineers, *Turgut Özal* would first become deputy premier, then prime minister; *Korkut Özal* minister of the interior, and *Erbakan* first president of *the National Salvation Party (MSP)*, then deputy prime minister.

The second military intervention of 1971, except for the banning of a small Islamic party, brought no restriction to the process of Islamisation, although it subjected all left-wing organizations and publications to an unprecedented repression.

After the return of the military to barracks, two extreme-right parties, *the National Salvation Party (MSP)* of Necmeddin Erbakan and *the Nationalist Action Party (MHP)* of Ex-colonel Alparslan Türkeş rapidly organized themselves and became partners of the coalition governments ruling the country in the second half of the Seventies.

The MSP advocated the Islam's superiority over the Christianity. Opposed to the country's occidentalization and association with the European Communities, Erbakan raised the idea of taking part in the

World Moslem community. He developed these views under the name of *Milli Görüs* (National Vision).

Thanks to its participation in several governments and, the MSP could make assemble many Islamist tendencies within its ranks and develop privileged relations with *the Rabitat*. It is at that period that Islamist movement turned into one of the most important components of the country's political life.

#### **ISLAMIC NATIONALISTS: GREY WOLVES**

While the MSP was advocating the union of all Moslems of the world under the same banner, *the Nationalist Action Party (MHP)* claimed first of all the superiority of the Turkish race over all other races and envisaged the foundation of an empire, *Turan*, uniting all the Turks in the World. Though a union on the race basis was incompatible with the idea of *Umma* (community of all Moslems), the MHP pretended also to be a defender of the Islam in Turkey.

It is this movement that was the instigator and author of the political violence of the Seventies. Exploiting anti-Communist, anti-Western and anti-reformist prejudices, the MHP could pit a part of the Islamic population, *the Sunnite*, against the progres-

sives, even against the adherents of the minority Islamic sect, *the Alevite*.

MHP leader Ex-colonel *Alparslan Türkeş* had, already been distinguished as one of the leading figures of the Pan-Türkist movement in the years of the Second World War. Together with 22 other people, he set up a secret society and advocated the Nazi expansion in the World. They hoped that Hitler, after the occupation of the East, would let the Pan-Türkists to annex the Soviet territories inhabited by the peoples of Turkish origin and to set up the empire *Turan*. During the war years, the Pan-Türkists received several million gold marks from the German Foreign Ministry, and greatly stepped up their propaganda. Under the personal order of Goebbels, and with financial aid from Berlin, the Pan-Türkist organization *Turan* was established. In a letter dating from 1944, Himmler advised German intelligence to strengthen its bonds with Pan-Türkic groups in Turkey. He singled out *Alpaslan Türkeş* as a particularly reliable man for carrying out Germany's plans for the country. On the defeat of Hitler, the "action of the 23" was foiled and *Türkes* was arrested. However, in the years of the Cold War, *Türkes* regained his post in the Army.

At the end of the Fifties, he was the chief of the NATO Department of the Turkish General Staff and in close relations with US military circles in Turkey. Benefitting from his key position, he took part

among the authors of the 1960 military coup. But after a few months, he was expelled from the Junta for his authoritarian tendencies and exiled to India.

After his return from exile, in 1965, Türkes seized a centrist little bourgeois party, *the Republican Peasant Nation Party (CKMP)*, and turned it into *the Nationalist Action Party (MHP)* afterwards.

The nine principles of the party were expressed as "nine rays", namely *nationalism, idealism, moralism, corporatism, scientism, populism, progressivism, technologism* and *defense of freedom*. The party advocated corporatism and the solidarity between all the social strata of the society. Under the authority of a "strong state", private, national and public sectors should co-exist.

*Grey Wolf*, a legendary animal in the Turkish race's history, was the unofficial symbol of the party, though officially *three crescents*, the symbol of the Ottoman Empire's flag, was being used on the party banners.

At the beginning, the MHP was supported by small-town craftsmen and tradesmen as well as by racist leaning youth, to be organized later on within parallel organizations called the *Ulkü Ocaklari* (Foyers of Ideal).

After Türkes claimed himself *Basbug* (führer) and formed para-military *Grey Wolves* commando units, the MHP drew the attention of the reactionary wing of the big bourgeoisie as well. Some finance

groups supported the MHP with a view to intimidating the developing democratic forces and working class movement in the country.

### **THE THESIS OF TURCO-ISLAMIC SYNTHESIS**

At the beginning of the Seventies, the principal preoccupation of the hard core of the Islamist Fundamentalism was the contradictions between the two components of the Turkish extreme-right: on the one hand, the Islamist MSP which rejected any union on the race basis, and on the other, the neo-fascist MHP which advocated the promotion of Turkish nationalism without rejecting Islamic "values".

To reconcile the Pan-Türkists and the Islamists, the Association *for the Propagation of Science* (IYC) had to take some radical decisions.

First of all, in 1970 the IYC decided to become an association open to nationalists as well and changed its name into *The Foyer of Intellectuals* (Aydınlar Ocağı).

The new association, to satisfy all the right-wing tendencies, launched the thesis of "*Turco-Islamic Synthesis*". This thesis called all the components of the Extreme-Right to conciliate Islamic Fundamentalism and Turkish Nationalism in a view to making the State more powerful.

It is this same association that were to play an important role in the formation of *Nationalist Front* coalitions between the different right-wing groups in the second half of the Seventies.

In 1975 the MHP had only three deputies in the National Assembly. Thanks to the new strategy of the AO, it was allowed to take part, together with the Justice Party (AP) and the National Salvation Party (MSP), in the "*Nationalist Front*" coalition governments and to place many fascist-minded activists in key State posts.

So the rise of fascist terror gained impetus in the country.

### **BLOOD BATH OF GREY WOLVES**

"The role of the smallest government partner and its *Foyers of Ideal* in political murders became obvious with irrefutable evidence. The *Justice Party (AP)* depends on political bandits in order to remain in power and to continue the ordering exploitation since it has cut all hopes of keeping the power through popular votes," said social-democrat Bülent Ecevit, chairman of the *Republican People's Party (CHP)*, in February 1977.

CHP deputy *Süleyman Genc* said on February 28, 1977: "Multinational companies and the CIA have used paranoiacs as a legal indicator in continu-



ing their activities and protecting their interests everywhere in the world. Türkes has stuck to our democracy, national peace, the future of our society, to the young bodies like a vampire and keeps gnawing." He claimed that among the people killed were also some MHP supporters who had refused to continue working within that party and they were murdered in accordance with Türkes' order: "Kill anyone who reneges on the movement."

Genc referred to an order by *Foyers of Ideal* Chairman Ali Batman who asked that, "because of certain hazards, members of the organizations be listed in two different books: one official and the other unofficial."

In retaliation, on March 8, 1977, Ali Batman issued a communiqué in which he said: "The idealist youth regards it a main duty to keep the Turkish State on foot. If the State forces close their eyes to this necessity, the idealist youth will bust its fist so hard on the head of traitors that, even Moscow and Peking units cannot prevent their fate. The head of the communist mob, the source of anarchy must be crushed."

Prior to the June 5, 1977 elections, Türkes openly declared that *Grey Wolves* were to establish order at the polls without hesitating to shoot if necessary. The aim was to prevent the left-wing voters from going to polls.

As a result of these elections, the MHP showed an important increase both in the number of votes and seats in Parliament: While the number of its votes was climbing from 362 thousand in 1973 to 942 thousand in 1977, its seats in Parliament rose to 16 as it was only 3 in 1973.

In the second *Nationalist Front* coalition, formed by three right-wing parties, the MHP received five cabinet posts and Türkeş kept his position of deputy prime minister. So, more key posts in the State apparatus were attributed to *Grey Wolves*.

A few months later, the returns of the December 11th, 1977 local elections manifested further gains for the MHP. Entering the polls without any municipalities, this party won mayorships of 58 municipalities of which five were provincial centers. So, the MHP became the third biggest party the country.

Nevertheless, thanks to the big loss of the Justice Party (AP), principal partner of the Nationalist Front, the *Republican People's Party (CHP)* came out as the real winner of these elections, and the 2nd Ecevit Government replaced the right-wing coalition government.

In retaliation, *Grey Wolves* launched a terror campaign throughout the country. Türkeş said in a speech at a party rally in Adana, on March 9, 1978 that Turkey was on the eve of a *civil war*.

On April 18, 1978, a parcel-bomb sent by unidentified persons exploded at the home of Hamit

Fendođlu, right-wing Mayor of Malatya city in eastern Anatolia and killed him and his three relatives.

On this assassination, angry mobs stoned and pilaged shops, set fire to buildings and threw fire-bombs. The attacks were focused on the Alevite and left-wing people. Ecevit said that this was a rightist provocation, since the parcel-bomb was produced at the nuclear power center which was under the control of *Grey Wolves*, appointed there during the period of *Nationalist Front* Government.

In the meantime, new right-wing terror organizations were born under the names of *Liberation Army of Enslaved Turks (ETKO)* and *Turkish Thunderbolt Commandos (TYK)*. Many members of the *Foyers of Ideal* took part among the founders of these new organizations.

Although the Public Prosecutor of Ankara province appealed to the Criminal Court of the same city to obtain a decision to outlaw the *Foyers of Ideal*, the court turned down this request.

On September 3, 1978, the Sugar Holiday, which is supposed to be an occasion for Moslems to reconcile differences, turned into a nightmare for the citizens of the Central Anatolian provincial center of Sivas. A simple fight among children in the market place first turned into a political brawl and then went further to end up in sectarian clashes leaving 10 dead, 105 injured and 68 in custody. Clashes were provoked by MHP commandos putting the believers

of two hostile sects of Islam against each other. The leftists in the area were known to be *Alevite* and reportedly attacked by right-wing *Sunnite*. The *Alevite* dominating the Sivas population, rightists brought in reinforcements from the nearby provinces.

On October 2, 1978, the MHP's administrative board called for military rule and for setting up state security courts to cope with "anarchists".

Prime Minister Ecevit accused Türkes of trying to drive the country towards a totalitarian regime and unveiled a secret report prepared by intelligence services in 1970 which indicated that the MHP, training para-military commando troops under the name of *Foyers of Ideal*, organized a striking force.

After his return from a series of contacts with Turkish and German extreme-right circles in the West Germany, on November 19, 1978, Türkeş called upon the people to unite in a "national alliance" against Ecevit's Government and to begin "national resistance."

#### **A POGROM ON RELIGIOUS SECT BASIS IN KAHRAMANMARAS**

The massacre of 107 people in *Kahramanmaraş* on December 23, 1978 was the most important link in the chain of bloody provocations carried out by the neo-fascist movement with the purpose of forcing the government to proclaim martial law.

Civil disorder was sparked by the murder of two left-wing teachers by unidentified gunmen. During the funeral of the two teachers, right-wing groups attacked those praying at the town mosque by chanting "*Moslem Turkey*" and "*Death to the Communists*".

The events in *Kahramanmaraş* developed as an ostensibly sectarian conflict between the *Alevite* and *Sunnite* Moslems, with the latter reportedly in the role of aggressors.

Despite an indefinite curfew clamped on the city, rightist mobs, estimated at a couple thousand, began roaming the town, burning and ransacking progressive party buildings, shops and houses.

Most of the victims were killed with long range rifles or two-sided swords. The aggressors also attacked the state hospital and ambulances carrying wounded people. Even the car of Health Minister Mete Tan came under attack.

The MHP leaders claimed that the incidents were provoked by the leftists who "placed a bomb in a theater where an anti-communist film was being projected". But later on, January 16, 1979, a *Grey Wolf* named Ökkeş Kenger admitted that he and others had placed the bomb in the theater with a view to provoking *the Sunnite* people against the leftist and *Alevite* people.

Press reports said many members of the rioting mobs were masked and led by MHP deputy Yusuf Özbaş. It is also significant that former general Faik

Türün, deputy of *the Justice Party (AP)* and one of the former chiefs of the sinister *Counter-Guerilla Department* had visited this area one week earlier.

Unable to suppress bloody fightings in this south eastern city, the Ecevit Government had to call in the military, and *martial law* was declared in 13 provinces of Turkey.

Without calling names, Ecevit blamed those who had been "indoctrinating and training Turkish youths for genocide and provoking sectarian rivalries." In fact, before and during the incidents, Türkeş and former Premier Demirel had insistently demanded the proclamation of martial law and overthrowing the Ecevit Government until the end of 1978.

With the proclamation of martial law, the neo-fascist party has apparently attained one of its objectives. Then it mobilized all its commandos to help to the martial law commands. As a first step, the *Foyers of Ideal* declared that they had suspended their activities with the purpose of facilitating the implementation of martial law.

### **GREY WOLVES' RAMIFICATION IN EUROPE**

In fact, it was a new manœuvre to avoid any danger of being closed down by the martial law commands. The evidence concerning the criminal acts of *Grey Wolves* were so abundant that it would be very

difficult for any tribunal to keep *the MHP* and its *Foyers of Ideal* open.

Two young *Grey Wolves*, Veli Can Oduncu and Mithat Simsek, both 17-year old, confessed after their arrest that they had assassinated 7 and 8 progressive people respectively.

Already some tribunals, admitting the responsibility of *the MHP* in the rise of political violence, appealed to the Chief Prosecutor for proceeding against this neo-fascist organization. But the Chief Prosecutor, a sympathizer of *the MHP*, did all possible in order to delay dealing with these files.

As *the MHP* and its accomplices were trying to gain time, those *Grey Wolves* who were involved in terrorist acts began to flee the country and take asylum in Cyprus and in European countries. The facilities for fleeing the country were provided by the Turkish Army's *Counter-Guerilla Department*.

Juridical assistance in obtaining the right to stay as political refugee in the Federal Republic of Germany was provided by some extreme-right minded German lawyers, namely *Werner Beckmann* and *H. Haun Volker*.

In reality, *Grey Wolves* were already organized for more than ten years in Europe. They had first constituted local sections of *the MHP*, but at the time, the Constitutional Court of Turkey had warned the MHP that it would definitely be banned if it did not suppress these sections abroad. Despite the deci-

sion taken by the Constitutional Court, the MHP did not close its organizations in West Germany. A week later, Türkes, who was appointed vice-premier in the second rightist coalition headed by Demirel, sent a note to the presidency of the MHP's executive committee in West Germany, asking them to work under cover of association to avoid curiosity from the authorities and to benefit from the collaboration with the NDP on this subject.

From 1977, *Grey Wolves* organized in parallel associations such as *Ulkü Ocagi* (Foyer of Ideal) or *Turkish Cultural Association* (Türk Kültür Derneği).

After several visits by Türkes to European countries, all these *Grey Wolves* associations in Europe were regrouped in 1979 under the direction of the *TURK FEDERASYON*, seated in Frankfurt (FRG).

#### **RELATIONS WITH GERMAN EXTREME-RIGHT**

During this evolution, Türkes had close relations with *Adolph Von Thadden*, the NPD leader, and *Josef Strauss*, the CSU leader... All activities by *Grey Wolves* in European countries have been covered by local neo-fascist organizations.

"Being so anti-communist, Franz Josef Strauss has contacts with the ultra right and all kinds of fascists all over the world, not only as an adviser but



also supplying funds... Strauss had an appointment with the extremist Türkes in München on April 28, 1978," reported German weekly *Der Spiegel* in February 1980.

The following letter written by *Von Thadden* to Türkes was unveiled by the daily *Cumhuriyet* on September 19, 1979:

"Dear Türkes,

"I enjoy receiving your letters. I thank you for your appreciation of me and my party. Even more, I am glad to learn of your position concerning the identity between both our parties(...). There are common basic principles we share. I am sure that you wish to expand and reinforce these friendly relationships. So, I accept enlarging the relations between both our parties. We decided unanimously to do an exchange of youth sections groups(...) Would you be kind enough to accept the invitation as my personal guest. It would be nice to have an exchange of views on both our countries and to scrutinize the means of mutual assistance."

Excerpt from a report written by *Enver Altayli*, general inspector of the MHP in the Federal Republic of Germany, to Türkes, April 28, 1976:

"...Dr. Kannapin will be in Köln on may 4, 1976. He intends to introduce me to the president of the Turkish section of the organization. According to Dr. Kannapin this person is a member of the CDU

and a former officer in the German Army, a real anti-communist."

Excerpt from Enver Altayli's report to Türkes, Köln, June 24, 1976:

"At the end of May 1976 we had nearly 20,000 DM on our bank account... My target is to get 40,000 DM before the end of September... Our relationship with Dr. Kannapin protects us against investigations by the German security organizations; he uses every means so that those organizations do not shackle our work, but support hem."

Excerpt from the letter written by Türkes to Enver Altayli, July 22, 1976:

"Having that in mind, each month you can withdraw 2,000 DM from my personal account at the Köln BFG for your needs."

According to the military prosecutor's indictment after the military coup, "Türkes had an account in Germany, opened in the Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft in Köln, Account No: 10243246-BLZ 47010111- 5 Köln. (...) Moreover, 15 American-Express money orders issued by *the San Diego Trust-Saving Bank* were seized. They were drawn in the name of Alparslan Türkes and sent to the seat of the MHP. Proof was obtained that the money transfer was made from California by a certain W.J. Pferisch, Jr. with a card mentioning the National Fascist Party."

Meanwhile, Grey Wolves activities in Belgium were being directed by a group established in the city

of Namur, who had a very close relationship with Turkish intelligence officers at NATO Headquarters near Mons.

**MEHMET ALI AGCA  
ON THE SCENE**

On February 1st, 1979, *Abdi Ipekçi*, one of Turkey's leading journalists, was assassinated in Istanbul by a *Grey Wolf* named Mehmet Ali Agca. The planners of this assassination sought furthering the atmosphere of political violence, pushing the martial law authorities into taking more repressive measures against the democratic forces and weakening the position of the Ecevit government. Ecevit said: "This premeditated murder of Ipekçi, a journalist respected both at home and abroad, is aimed at destroying Turkey's credibility and democracy."

Though Agca was arrested, thanks to the MHP's accomplices within the Army, he succeeded to escape from a military prison in Istanbul and came to Europe. In the meanwhile, in a letter that he sent to the daily *Milliyet* on the occasion of the Pope's visit to Turkey, Agca had revealed his intention to assassinate the spiritual leader of the Catholic world.

*Info-Türk*, in its December 1979 issue, reported: "There are some indications that extreme-right terrorist *Mehmet Ali Agca*, since his escape from a Turkish prison, is operating among the Grey Wolves in

Europe. Recently, on December 15, 1979, during an incident between leftist and rightist Turkish students in Paris, gunmen opened fire on the leftist students in a coffee-house, wounded five of them as well as three French waiters. There are rumors that this ambush was planned and directed by Agca. But this claim was not confirmed yet by the police authorities."

The subversive activities of *Grey Wolves* in Europe worried not only Turkish migrants, but also local authorities.

According to the daily *Milliyet* of December 8, 1978, an official of the Belgian BSR (the equivalent of the American FBI) declared that he was aware of the growing importance of Turkish extreme-right activities in Belgium. Insofar as they proved harmful both to Turkish and Belgian communities, necessary measures should be taken, he added.

In its May 1979 issue, *Info-Türk* reported a series of aggressive actions by *Grey Wolves* against progressive workers in European countries.

On November 27, 1979, two progressive migrant workers were assaulted and injured by *Grey Wolves* in Frankfurt, as they refused to accept fascist leaflets.

Following this incident, the German police searched the headquarters of the *TÜRK-FEDERASYON* in Frankfurt and arrested the chairman of their local association and another suspect.

The West German Metal Workers Union (*IG Metall*) published in its periodical (*Metall*, No.2 of January 23, 1980) an overall survey on the Grey Wolves' organization, strategy and tactics in West Germany. Under the headline "*Grey Wolves calling to the Holy War*", this article, which was published shortly after a Turkish member of IG Metall, Celalettin Kesim, had been assassinated in Berlin on January 5, 1980 by extreme-rightist assailants, highlighted a great many other bloody incidents provoked and perpetrated by the "Grey Wolves" in West Germany.

*Hürriyet* reported on December 15, 1980: "The Department of the Interior Ministry in Baden Württemberg is scrutinizing the files concerning the rightist extremists trained in Germany. A Turkish group of 18 persons is being trained in the foothills of the German Alps."

#### **GREY WOLVES IN POWER FOR A THIRD TIME**

The parliamentary by-elections of October 14, 1979, resulted in the defeat of Ecevit Government due to its failure to curb inflation and to stop political violence. The right-wing opposition parties obtained a clear majority in Parliament. As for the MHP, it raised its votes from 5.20% to 6.60%.

The new Demirel Government, supported by the

MHP Group in the Parliament, failing to find long-term solutions to crucial economic and social problems of the country, resorted to repressive measures for cracking down on the progressive opposition. To this end, the Interior Ministry delivered to the MHP officials licence for carrying fire-arms.

Encouraged by the government, *Grey Wolves* intensified their bloody attacks and the monthly rate of political assassinations approached 330.

On April 13, 1980, the cadets of the War College, brainwashed by the extreme-right, were also involved in the political terror. Hundreds of them raided the Park of Youth in Ankara, shouting anti-communist slogans, and beat the members of a folklore group working there. Moreover, the Martial Law Command of Ankara, issuing a communiqué, justified the cadets attack.

In July 1980, *Grey Wolves* staged another pogrom against *Alevite* people in the town of Corum, by killing more than 50 persons. Similar massacres were perpetrated also in the provinces of Ordu, Ankara, Urfa, Adana, Gaziantep, Samsun, Bursa, Diyarbakir and Mardin.

In the course of the escalation of fascist terror, in addition to journalist *Abdi İpekci*, many distinguished public figures of Turkey such as university professors *Bedrettin Cömert*, *Cavit Orhan Tütengil*, *Orhan Yavuz*, *Bedri Karafakioglu*, *Necdet Bulut*, *Fikret Unsal*, *Umit Doganay*, writer *Umit Kaftancio-*

*glu*, a leading member of the Union of Turkish Doctors, *Sevinc Ozgüner*, DISK leader *Kemal Türkler* and public prosecutor *Dogan Öz* were assassinated by Grey Wolves. University professor *Server Tanilli* and socialist party leader *Mihri Belli* too were attacked by these right-wing terrorists and the former became half paralyzed.

In brief, between 1974 and 1980, a total of 5,188 people lost their lives in politically-motivated killings. Of these 2,109 were left-wing victims and 1,286 were rightists. The first 10 people killed were left-wing people. Of the first 100 to lose their lives 76 were leftists; and of the first 1,000, 721 were people of the left.

#### **"WAIT AND SEE" POLICY OF FUNDAMENTALISTS**

Contrary to Grey Wolves, the Islam Fundamentalists preferred to behave with extreme caution to put in practice the decisions of *the International Congress of Shari'a*, though they had a strong influence over the Nationalist Front governments. They were afraid of provoking brutal reaction from certain officers who were still attached to the principle of secularity. Furthermore, the left-wing forces were powerful enough to resist against any fundamentalist initiative.

For the Fundamentalist hard core, in order to put in practice the decisions of *the International Congress of Shari'a*, it would be wise enough to wait until the installation of an authoritarian regime by the military rather than taking risks of a direct seizure of power.

With their January 1980 Ultimatum, the Army generals already manifested their intention to seize the power.

Moreover, the two important external phenomena of the period, the world oil crisis on the one hand, and on the other, the Iranian revolution paved the way for an Islamist resurrection in Turkey. The consecutive governments of the period, whatever their ideological or political tendency, were obliged to give concessions to Islamic countries in exchange of oil imports.

Up to 1980, *the Rabitat* men in Turkey concentrated all efforts on strengthening the economic power of Islamist circles.

Following the example of *the Christianity Holding* and *the Ambossiano Bank* of the Vatican, the men of *the Rabitat* in Turkey, thanks to the revenue from their trade with Islamic countries, began to set up a series of holdings, foundations and enterprises.

Several important figures of *the Foyer of Intellectuals* were already at the head of public economic enterprises or institutions.

One of these figures, Turgut Ozal already headed



the State Planning Organization (DPT) and the Union of Turkish Employers' Union (MESS). At a conference organized on April 28, 1979 by the *Foyer of Intellectuals* (AO), he exposed his views on development as follows:

"Though the right-wing population in Turkey is more numerous than the leftist, the former have not been able until now to raise a common policy on the subject of development. We can find the principles of this policy within the Islam. Our progress should be based on the accentuation of conservative values. For example, the Turkish banks should adopt a new system in which the sharing profit will replace the interest."

He had also underlined at the same conference that "his views would sooner or later in force."

In fact, a few months later, at the end of 1979, Ozal would be appointed under-secretary to prime minister Demirel. And after the military coup, he would be the Vice-premier of the military government.

### **MILITARY COUP AND THE ISLAMISTS' HOUR**

The military coup d'état of September 12, 1980 which would lead to an unprecedented State terrorism in Turkey was carried out by five top generals on the pretext of "protecting national unity; guaran-

teeing security of life and property by eliminating anarchy and terror; re-establishing and protecting the State's authority."

So, Grey Wolves, the terrorist wing of the extreme-right, accomplished their mission.

The Junta which took power on September 12, 1980, while aiming at left-wing and democratic organizations, claimed to be equally repugnant with regards to chauvinist or fundamentalist extreme-right. But this was only in the end to justify its putsch in presenting itself as a referee above all kinds of extremism.

Though premier Demirel was immediately arrested, his Islamist under-secretary, *Turgut Ozal*, was nominated as vice-premier charged with economic affairs in the military government.

Everyone knew very well that he was one of the leading figures of the *Takunyalar* (Sabot People). But he was also the *man on the spot* of the international finance institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. He was particularly charged with putting in practice the drastic economic measures imposed on Turkey by the *International Monetary Fund (IMF)*, and considered by the Western press as the "*economic czar*" of Turkey.

Just after the coup, *the Financial Times* of September 13, 1980, wrote: "Both the IMF and the World Bank negotiations had been conducted with a small number of former Prime Minister Demirel's

advisors, in particular Mr. Turgut Ozal. Mr. Ozal's fate will be a pointer to whether IMF and World Bank relations will continue smoothly with Turkey."

Although Erbakan and other leaders of the MSP, including the brother of Özal, were arrested, it was only a scenario put on by the junta to show themselves "attached to the principles of Atatürk." Some months later, all Islamists were freed.

At last, it was the Islamists' hour!

Since the military coup of 1980, the rise of the *Rabitat's* influence and the putting in practice of the decisions of *the Congress of the Shari'a* have been going full speed ahead.

Prior to the coup, during *the 8th Islamic Congress* which met in Cyprus on March 24, 1980 the President of Religious Affairs Tayyar Altıkulaç had asked for financial assistance from *the Rabitat*. The Secretary General of the Rabitat had immediately promised:

- funding of the religious service of Turkish workers abroad;
- a donation of 20 million Turkish Lira for the construction of a mosque on the grounds of the National Assembly of Turkey;
- assistance for the Direction of Religious Affairs.

It is General Evren that signed the decree regarding the payment of salaries of Turkish clergy abroad by the *Rabitat*.

General Evren, in all his speeches, alluded to the

Koran's texts to justify his anti-democratic arguments. The military regime accelerated opening towards Islamic world in view of developing economic and trade rapports with the Islamic countries. General Evren, his prime ministers and ministers participated very often in meetings of Islamic countries and commute between many capitals in the Arab world.

And it is the first time in the history of the Republic that a chief of State, General Evren, participated in the Islamic Conference in Morocco in 1984.

No doubt, developing bilateral relations, including with Moslem countries, was indispensable for Turkey, but she was not obliged at all to resurrect medieval trends 60 years after the proclamation of the Republic and to submit to the Saudi fundamentalism.

### **FUNDAMENTALIST ACQUISITIONS WITHIN EIGHT YEARS**

One of the reasons which explain the full Islamist expansion in last years is no doubt the exclusion of left-wing movements from the political scene. Above all, young people who suffer social injustice, lack of educational opportunities and employment, socio-cultural upheaval brought about by the changing of production rapports, adhere, in the absence of a left-wing alternative to Islamist tendencies.

Concretely, since the arrival of the military in power:

- Religious teaching in secondary schools has been made obligatory by the new constitution. Even Christian students are forced to take Islamic religion courses.

- The number of mosques has risen to 60,161 throughout Turkey, while the number of schools remains at 56,000. Of these mosques 2,545 in Konya, 2,292 in Ankara, 1,936 in Samsun, 1,829 in Zonguldak, 1,770 in Kastamonu and 1,720 in Istanbul. Each year more than 150 new mosques are constructed, while this number for new schools is less than 100. It should be reminded that the number of mosques in Turkey was only 12,036 at the beginning of the Republic.

- The number of religious school students multiplies. One out of five students in secondary education go to religious schools: In the 87-88 school year, there were 258,038 students in 734 religious schools (170,066 at 351 religious secondary schools and 87,972 at religious high schools). 11,800 teachers are charged at these religious schools. New religious schools are being opened particularly in the provinces inhabited by Kurds.

- The number of *Koranic courses* has reached in 1988 to 5,600 of which 4,518 work with official authorization. During the ANAP power, 346,000 youths have been educated at Koranic courses. In

1987 there were 130,874 pupils (78,354 girls and 52,520 boys) in these Koranic courses. Moreover, in the half of 60,161 mosques there are so-called "temporary" Koranic courses. According to the *Cumhuriyet* of January 28, 1987, the Minister of State Kazım Oksay declared that five thousand new Koranic courses might have been opened in the two years.

- While left-wing publications are banned, the number and circulation of Islamist publications multiplies rapidly. The number of the titles of religious books published in one year increased by 226% (from 267 to 637 in absolute figures) in nine years and by 71% in six years. The numbers of Islamist reviews climbed from 15 in 1980 to 27 in 1986. Four daily Islamist newspapers have a total circulation of 200,000 (*Türkiye* 150,000, *Milli Gazete* 30,000, *Yeni Nesil* 8,000, *Zaman* 11,000).

- Certain big newspapers in Turkey also benefit from the *Rabitat* subsidies. The *Hürriyet* announced on March 27, 1987, that the dailies *Tercüman*, *Milliyet*, *Türkiye* and *Yeni Asya* had received newsprint valued at a billion TL, paid by the *Rabitat* banks.

- Religious practices in official places are more frequent. Following the decision of the *Congress of the Shari'a*, each State department opens a room to prayer. With the help of the *Rabitat*, mosques are being built at the National Assembly, at universities and in other public places.

- Recently, a deputy of Özal's party proposed a motion to the National Assembly for public services to be shut down for two hours on Friday so as to hold the prayer of the "holy day" of Islam.

### **FUNDAMENTALISTS DOMINATE THE BUSINESS**

While the Turkish Government was introducing to the European Communities the demand of adhesion, many observers, considering Özal's yielding to the Saudi fundamentalism, voiced doubts about the sincerity of this hasty application. There were rumors that Özal prematurely introduced this demand though he knows all possible obstructions, because he hopes that Turkey, as a Moslem country, would have to seek a closer cooperation with the Islamic world in the case of being refused by the European Communities.

In fact, Ozal Government is an ardent partisan of the creation of a Moslem Common Market. The daily *Hürriyet* of March 9, 1988, reported that a further step was taken towards this target with the Istanbul meeting of the Standing Committee for Economic and Trade Cooperation of the Islamic Conference in March 1988. The meeting concluded a declaration announcing the resolution to establish a System of Commercial Preferences among the member coun-

tries. This meeting was concluded with a speech by General Evren.

After the military coup, Saudi finance groups like *Faisal Finance* and *Al Baraka* were allowed to set up in Turkey several commercial and industrial enterprises.

The propaganda of Islamic banks is based on the replacing of interest by the share of profit. As a matter of fact, the Islam considers getting interest as a sin, and many believers never place their savings in the banks. For this reason, Arab banks promise their clients share of profits instead of interests.

Among the Turkish partners of Saudi groups are members of the Özal family and several leaders of the government party, ANAP. *Faisal Finance* and *Al Baraka* are linked to Saudi financial group *Dar Al-Maal Al Islam*, headquartered in Geneva. The founder of *Faisal Finance* in Turkey is the former deputy Salih Özcan who was among the 41 founders of *the Rabitat* in 1962. As for *Al Baraka*, its principal partner is Korkut Ozal, Premier's brother.

*Dar Al-Maal Al Islam* of Prince Faisal is also interested in the savings of the Turkish workers in Europe. For that, it has set up *Islam Tekaful Kurumu* of which propaganda is spread among the immigrants by way of Turkish mosques in Europe.

*The Turkish-Saudi Investment Holding*, founded with capital from the Turkish private and public sectors and from Saudi Arabia, started operations at the



beginning of November 1988. Holding officials said the capital, currently worth \$20 million, may be increased to \$500 million. The company will select its first investment project after studying a report prepared by the Turkish Development Bank which covers the financial situation of eight companies.

*The Congress of the Union of Turkish Industry and Commerce Chambers and Stock-exchanges (TOBB)*, held on May 23, 1897, showed once more that the majority of the Turkish businessmen are attached to the Islamic world and this organization is one of the mainstays of Islam Fundamentalism in Turkey.

The most spectacular event of this congress was the opening ceremonies held with prayers and religious rituals. The Congress was attended by many ministers of the Government, three army generals, the President of the Court of Cassation, the Deputy Councillor of the State Planning Organization and many figures of the Turkish Right.

The majority of the Administrative Board is composed of the businessmen renowned for their sympathy for *Turco-Islamic Synthesis*. Chairman Ali Coskun is an active figure in *the Foyer of Intellectuals (AO)*.

The TOBB's yielding to Saudi fundamentalism has given rise to anxiety as well in the left-wing opposition as among a group of businessmen who remain attached to the idea of integration in the Euro-

pean Communities. The only representative of this group in the Administrative board, Mr Dündar Soyer, resigned from this board by declaring that the TOBB had been put in the service of a campaign aiming at dragging Turkey to a medieval darkness. He also said that the press organ of the TOBB is full of articles voicing the propaganda of Saudi fundamentalism.

Parallel to increasing fundamentalist control on the business, Islamic foundations too have registered an unprecedented growth during the Evren-Özal period. While the annual number of the new constituted foundations was 30 in the '70s, this annual rate rose to 200 since 1986.

Out of 1,838 foundations in Turkey 472 are directly related with religious affairs. 70 out of 301 educational foundations too are in the service of religious groups.

According to the estimation of the daily *Hürriyet* of March 20, 1987, the revenue of these foundations should be 2,000 billion TL (5 billion DM). Annual profit of *the Turkish Foundation of Religious Affairs*, thanks to the organization of the pilgrimage to Mecca each year, largely surpassed those of the most powerful industrial enterprises of the country.

Moreover, the important figures of *the Foyer of Intellectuals* have arrived at setting up a series of Islamic foundations and holdings. While Premier Özal figures among the administrators of *the Foundation*

*of the National Culture of Turkey*, his brother Özal presides over *the Foundation of Fertility*.

### DIFFERENT RELIGIOUS ORDERS IN TURKEY

Though the Islam Fundamentalism is getting stronger and stronger thanks to the Evren-Ozal tandem and Saudi Arabia, contradictions and inner conflicts among different sects and religious orders continue to exist.

As underlined in previous chapters, Islam has never been monolithic in Turkey.

First of all, the two principal sects of Islam, *the Sunnite* and *the Alevite*, have been a permanent quarrel of power for centuries in this country. *The Alevite*, the minority sect, with a view to having a political protection against the possible Sunnite attacks, endeavor to gain influence over the *Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP)* and to place their representatives in this party's board and parliamentary group.

As for *the Sunnite*, the majority sect, it is divided into different religious orders (*tarikats*). Each of these orders tries to increase its own influence over the Sunnite majority and, in this end, entrust its militants and propagandists with the task of being active in all new founded right-wing parties.

Gencay Saylan, a veteran observer of *tarikats* in Turkey and the author of a book on religion and politics in Turkey, believes that the ancient *Shiite* institution of *takkiye* serves as an appropriate metaphor for many Turkish politicians with links to *tarikats*. *Takkiye* had been utilized by *Shiite* religious leaders before the formation of a *Shiite* state in Iran in 1500 for the purpose of making advancements in a politically hostile domestic environment.

As has historically been the case, the basis for the relationship between the political parties and *tarikats* has been secrecy. Even though most observers are aware of the linkage, it is extremely difficult to find out what the exact purpose of this relationship is. Both sides benefit: the *tarikats* are able to function almost out in the open, spreading their religious message, while the political parties utilize the grassroots network of the *tarikats* during elections which brings them the all-important conservative, Islamic vote.

### ***The Naksibendi:***

The *Naksibendi* is one of the oldest religious orders of the country. Although rejected by most *tariqat* members as heretical, some *Naksibendi* members are practicing *takkiye* by supporting the continuation of a secular Turkish state on the surface while secretly working for the eventual realization of the *Shari'a*

in Turkey. In the Seventies, they supported Necmeddin Erbakan's *National Salvation Party (MSP)*.

Today they support mainly the *Motherland Party (ANAP)*, but are influential also in the *Welfare Party (RP)*, the *Correct Way Party (DYP)* and the *Nationalist Labour Party (MCP)*.

Many members of ANAP's inner circle and even the Prime Minister himself are reported to have links with the powerful underground tarikat of *Naksibendi*.

This tarikat gets the lion's share of large amounts funnelled by Saudi Arabia. *Korkut Ozal*, the brother of the prime minister, is known to be actively involved as a conduit of sorts for Saudi money to be distributed to various religious sects.

### ***The Süleymanci:***

An order issued from the Naksibendi. Disciples of *Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan*, dead in 1959, they believe very strongly that the end of time is near. The road that Suleyman showed will be the only way to deliverance. The fact that the *Justice Party (AP)* offered them a number of seats in Parliament in 1977, in exchange for their support, can be an indication of their popular basis.

*The Suleymanci* have never openly pitted themselves against the secular State system, perhaps so as not to endanger their representation in the Parlia-

ment. However, they are especially very active against every thing of Left, whether it concerns trade unions or Alevites. The latter are considered renegades, worst than atheists, and worse still than Communists.

At first glance, it seems paradoxical that *the Süleymancı* are also opposed to the Iranian Revolution. The reason for that comes from their anti-communism feelings and the anguish the Soviet Union bring them. They believe that a strong America is the only guarantee against Communism. In that, they are very close to Saudi conceptions.

The Koranic Courses are the most important activity in which Suleyman was occupied during his life. They have their own religious education. Suleyman and his disciples hardly liked secularized Islam as it is propagated by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, and they boycotted all the official religion schools. *The Süleymancı* indoctrinate youths by thousands of courses of the Koran and student dormitories that they have opened throughout the country. Currently, they support the ANAP.

### *The Işıkçı:*

It has recently reinforced its influence thanks to its daily newspaper *Türkiye*, which has a daily circulation of 150,000 copies. This order too supports only the ANAP.

### ***The Nurcu:***

This movement is based on the ideas of *Saidi Nursi*, dead in 1960. He was a Kurd, brought up in *Medreses* (religious schools) and in dervishes orders. He was also active in Kurdish nationalist movement to 1923. He wrote the *Risale-i Nur* (the Pamphlet of Light), a work from which the Nurcu take their name. This movement, which according to its own saying, has some millions of disciples, is composed of groups of persons who study the *Risale* together, they read almost nothing else. In the past, *the Nurcu* supported the MSP and the AP.

Currently they are divided in two factions: While the *Yeni Asyacı* are supporting the Correct Way Party (DYP), *the Fethullahcı* are partisan of the ANAP.

*The Fethullahcı* work recently among young cadets of military schools with a view to seizing political power by the means of a well Islamized army. Although the attempt was thwarted by the expulsion of scores of these students by the military headquarters, it does reflect the confrontational and politicized ambitions of Fethullah Hoca, founder of the order.

### ***Radical Islamist Groups:***

After the Iranian Revolution appeared in Turkey some new tendencies, mainly *the Group of Young Radicals* and *the Group of Cemalettin Kaplan* which

voice the idea of seizing political power by following the example of Khomeiny. Their common characteristic is to be against all kinds of relations with political parties.

### **A SUI GENERIS TENDENCY: THE NATIONAL VISION**

Among the Islamists there are also those who wish to introduce deep social changes in the society. They, too, refuse secularism and want Islam to be the basis of social order; however, they reject all the reactionary interpretations of Islam. For them, Islam is the religion of social and economic justice, in which there is no place for exploitation of one person by another. Islam is the source of inspiration for revolt against oppression, and thus also against imperialism. They desire to restore a very idealized past.

This is strongly linked to the social basis of their fraction, which consists especially of people who feel threatened by socio-economic developments (little bourgeoisie) or those who already feel lost and are seeking stability (villagers who went to big cities or even to industrialized countries).

*The National Vision* (Milli Görüş), developed prior to the coup d'état by *the National Salvation Party (MSP)*, is the principal representative of this current.



After the ban put by the military on *the MSP*, the National Vision movement founded a new political party, with the active support of Erbakan: *The Welfare Party (RP)*. While the MSP obtained about 10% of the votes prior to 1980, the new party obtained during the 1987 legislative elections 7.1%.

The Welfare Party is supported also by a mystical order, *the Kadiri*.

Since it lost its privileged position in the Islamist movement, *the National Vision* develops in last years a new image: "A movement open to all dialogue with other democratic forces of the country on the basis of national independence, respect to human rights, lifting the restrictions on Islamist and Communist parties."

With this new identity, it refuses any collaboration with the authoritarian regime of the military and enters in common actions, especially in the FRG and the Netherlands, with Turkish migrant organizations near to Communist or Social-democrat movements.

The Secretary General of *the Turkish Communist Party (TKP)* has declared during his talks with Turkish journalists in Paris in 1987 that his party is very satisfied with its collaboration with the "*rational Islamists*".

However, it is too early to give a judgement on the success of this new overture of *the National Vision*. The right-wing press in the Rabitat's pay has already launched a campaign with a view to discre-

ditioning this movement's leaders, by claiming that "they are manipulated by the agents of Moscow." This is an argument that may incite many Islamist sympathizers of *the National Vision* to rebel against the leaders and may oblige the latter to yield to the sinister authority of *the Rabitat*.

### INDEPENDENT MOSLEM INTELLECTUALS

While the incursions of *tarikats* into Turkish politics may be attributed to their arcane nature as well as foreign funding and grassroots organization, a fledgling Moslem intellectual movement has evolved on its own, in the open and independent of the organization and financial support of the *tarikats* network.

In fact, the intellectuals maintain no links with political parties. They disseminate their message of a return to the original Islamic principles and way of life through rare Moslem intellectual journals such as *Dis Politika* and *Girisim*. To the uneducated Islamic populace in Turkey their writings are elitist and esoteric; however, to their followers, these men are seen as the vanguard of a new and radical direction for Islam in Turkey.

On the surface, the philosophy of the Moslem intellectual is atavistic and simple: throughout history, Islam has been polluted by Western concepts and for

Islam to reach its true potential, a return to the 7th century Islam of the prophet Mohammed is essential.

They refute attempts by Islamic reformers to make Islam compatible with Western technology and culture and emphasize that Islam has been in a period of progressive decline ever since attempts were made in the 18th and 19th century to fuse Western concepts with Islam.

Although highly critical of the West, many of these intellectuals are all products of Western-based, secular educations and many of them speak a second Occidental language.

Michael Meeker, an American professor of anthropology currently residing in Istanbul, has been researching the phenomenon of the Moslem intellectual in Turkey and has found they have developed a unique ideology, exclusive of Turkish Islamic thought that dates to the early republican era.

"In fact," Meeker points out, "traditional (20th century) Turkish Moslems are suspicious of the Moslem intellectuals. For this intelligentsia, Islam is represented solely by the *Koran* and the *hadith*, the original practices and sayings of the prophet. According to them, one cannot turn back to Ottoman institutions or traditional Turkish society to find the true Islam." Thus, despite a common belief that *Shari'a* is necessary in Turkey, the intellectuals and traditionalists differ significantly about the means to be used to achieve *Shari'a*. The Moslem intelligentsia is

breaking with past practices of joining political parties, and instead offers other options.

"There is a new aspect to these people's thinking," Meeker contends. "They have set aside the question about how to achieve a synthesis between Islam and the West and instead have addressed the problem of how to renew true Islamic values in the 20th century." As this ideological reformation has reached fruition, the Moslem intellectuals have found themselves alienated from traditional Turkish Moslems who support the Turco-Islamic synthesis, or as the press has labeled it, the "Holy Alliance."

Evidence of such a schism was provided earlier 1988 when one of the leading Islamic dailies in Turkey, *Zaman*, underwent a publicized change in editors. The previous editor, *Nabi Avci*, had allowed many Moslem intellectuals and even leftists of various stripes to present their disparate views on the paper's editorial pages. Observers believe that it was a break-away faction of the *Nurcu* tarikat, led by Fethullah Hoca, that forced *Zaman* to forego its open perspective in favor of the more conservative Islamic-nationalist stance.

The Moslem intellectuals have ironically intersected at certain points with the Turkish Left. They both share the same intellectual bent, as well as an aversion to Western cultural and political imperialism. Meeker points out that their periodicals handle such

topics as class conflict, environmental destruction and the absence of spiritual values.

Although the Leftist and Moslem intellectuals may converge philosophically on some issues, the Moslems do not share the Marxists belief in a class struggle.

### **PROSECUTION OF RELIGIOUS ACTIVISTS**

Though the *Turco-Islamic Synthesis*, or in other word the *Holy Alliance*, is in power, still many believers are subjected to judicial pursuits in Turkey. Those who are subjected to prosecution are either members of the religious orders such as the *National Vision* contesting the present regime, or individuals having no relation with any religious order near to the political power.

*Amnesty International* issued on November 10, 1987 a detailed report on the prosecution of religious activists in Turkey. The number of people prosecuted for their religious activities in Turkey increased substantially during 1987, according to AI.

"At Istanbul State Security Court alone 44 trials of 128 defendants began during the first seven months of 1987. (According to the daily *Cumhuriyet* of July 30, 1987, the State Security Court of Istanbul, since its foundation in 1984, has, in 7 different cases, sentenced 10 defendants to 32 years' and 11

months' imprisonment, to seven years' and eleven months' compulsory residence and to 20,380 TL fine in total).

"Secularity (separation of religion and state affairs) is one of the founding principles of the Turkish Republic and anti-secular tendencies have been prosecuted under Article 163 of the Turkish Penal Code since its introduction in 1926. This article has never been used to prosecute those using violence and these defendants should not be confused with members of militant Muslim groups operation in Turkey and other countries.

"In 1983 the maximum sentence for an offence under Article 163 was more than doubled to 15 years' imprisonment. In February 1987 a draft amendment to the Penal Code provided for a maximum punishment of life imprisonment.

"Those on trial include participants in peaceful demonstrations, members of legal political parties, journalists and writers as well as members of Islamic brotherhoods. A main target for persecution were leading members of Islamic associations among Turkish workers abroad, mainly based in the Federal Republic of Germany. Although these associations are legal outside Turkey their members are prosecuted once they enter the country.

"For example, Hasan Damar, Secretary General the association *Milli Görüş* (National Vision) in the FRG until 1982, was arrested when he entered Tur-

key on October 27, 1986 and sentenced by Ankara Criminal Court to 25 months' imprisonment with bail set at 500,000 TL (\$500). Although the sum was paid, Hasan Damar was not released because in the meantime Ankara State Security Court had issued an arrest warrant on similar charges.

"Amnesty International considers all people imprisoned for the non-violent expression of their beliefs to be prisoners of conscience."

#### **GREY WOLVES AFTER THE COUP**

On the contrary, the principal responsables of the extreme-right terror prior to the coup, namely *Grey Wolves*, are again freely getting organized.

What is more, this time, under the umbrella of *Turco-Islamic Synthesis*, they develop their action by putting accent on Islamic rebirth and recruit many believers.

After the military coup, the generals desperately tried to present themselves before domestic and international public opinion as being determined to crush the right-wing extremist organizations as well as left-wing ones, and, as "proof" of this "even-handed" policy, put Türkes on trial along with a few hundred members of the MHP and its side organizations.

The events that took place in the MHP trial from its beginning strongly indicate that it is only a show, whatever its outcome may be. All leaders of the MHP, including Türkes, were released after a short time.

Türkes, in a letter he addressed to Junta head General Evren, said that the policies of the Junta since it came to power had for many years been put forward by the MHP; and the "ideology" and "spirit" announced by General Evren in the September 12 "operation" were the same as the "ideology" and the "nationalist-Atatürkist principles" of the MHP. He went on to say that they would continue to support the Junta to the end.

During the trial Türkes repeated these views and added that many of generals in the top echelons of the Armed Forces or in the 5-man Junta, were his old friends, class-mates and colleagues. He said that he could not understand at all why he and his party were put on trial. The friends he referred to included the commanders of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Armies and last, but not least, General Evren himself...and General Ersin, another member of the junta.

Vice-president Agah Oktay Güner, also, said, "The seven principal economic decisions taken by the new power were in reality formulated by us. While our ideas are in power, we are kept in prison."

Somuncoglu, another top defendant in the MHP trial, added: "We are accused of advocating the idea



of measuring the skulls of citizens in order to determine their races. But it is a fact that Atatürk, too, measured skulls. At Anitkabir (mausoleum of Atatürk), among the personal belongings of Atatürk there is also a compass used for measuring skulls."

There was a possibility that the MHP leaders might reveal their connections within the Armed Forces, secret police and various State organizations. In fact, Türkeş used this as a threat during the trials. To prevent this happening, the military prosecutor, *"in order not to put the security of the State in danger,"* demanded some court hearings to continue in secret. It is also known that some written documents related to the relationship between the army, secret police and the MHP have not been included in the prosecution's case.

Two years later, On April 8, 1987, Türkeş was condemned to a 11-year prison term by the military tribunal of Ankara. But he was already released on April 9, 1985. The military tribunal acquitted 148 Grey Wolves, including all the members of the party's administrative board, and condemned only some party activists for their armed actions: Five to death sentence, nine to life-prison and 219 to different prison terms.

As all left-wing party leaders and militants, even if they had never been involved in political violence, were being condemned for "political actions aimed at overthrowing the constitutional regime," Türkeş and

his companions were not considered liable to this charge and were condemned only for having committed "common crime" by setting up armed gangs. That is to say, contrary to the case of left-wing leaders and militants, Türkes and other Grey Wolves are not deprived of their public and political rights.

After his release, Türkes immediately took part in political life by actively supporting *the Nationalist Labour Party (MCP)*.

When Türkes came to the first congress of this party, on April 19, 1987, in Ankara, nine sheep were sacrificed for symbolizing the *Nine Rays*, the neo-fascist principles of his defunct party. Five thousand delegates sang the *Basbug* (Führer) march as he was entering in the hall. They shouted also slogans "We are on the way of God, together with Basbug."

At this congress Türkes made elected a renown fundamentalist, Abdülkerim Doğru, to the party chairmanship with the purpose of picking up more Islamists to his own movement. His son, Tuğrul Türkeş too was elected to the Administrative Board of the MCP.

When political bans imposed in 1982 on 242 former political leaders were lifted after the referendum of September 6, 1987, Alparslan Türkes placed himself at the head of the MCP.

However, as the outcome of the last legislative elections showed it, Türkes can no more gather all his former companions in the new party. While the

MHP could get 6.6% of the votes prior to the coup, the new MCP hardly obtained 2.9% of the votes at 1987 legislative elections.

One of the principal reasons of this failure lays in the fact that many notorious *Grey Wolves* had already been placed in key posts in the military administration after the coup and took part later on within the Turco-Islamic hard core of the governing party, the ANAP.

#### **GREY WOLVES IN THE HOLY ALLIANCE OF ANAP**

On September 11, 1984, *The Times* reported:

"In particular they have taken effective control of the State Radio and TV Corporation (TRT), whose new director was formerly a senior figure in the MHP. Another former MHP member is secretary of the Ministry of Employment. The last development, even more sinister, is the appointment of two deputy directors of the National Police Force, one of whom was in charge of the torture center in Ankara during the previous military regime in 1971 and has since then been kept out of sight, while the other's name was found among the secret documents of the MHP as the future director of the National Police Force had the MHP captured power. Such appointments raise the question whether the 1980 intervention was

really a comprehensive defeat for terrorism as its authors claimed."

When Ozal founded his ANAP in 1983, a former MHP sympathizer, Mustafa Tasar was entrusted with the function of Secretary-General.

Within the first Ozal government, well-known sympathizers of the defunct MHP were numerous: State Minister Halil Sivgin, State Minister Kazim Oksay, State Minister Mesut Yilmaz, Minister of Communication Veysel Atasoy and Under-Secretary Hasan Celal Güzel.

Besides, former neo-fascist activists were elected mayors in many important cities, such as Ankara, Erzincan, Erzurum, Adapazari, Bingöl, Elazig, Yozgat, Gaziantep, Antakya and Kastamonu.

And all these former companions prefer to develop their actions within a party in power like ANAP instead of wasting their efforts within a minor party like MCP.

There are also some other former leading *Grey Wolves* such as Nevzat Koseoglu, Yasar Okuyan, Sadi Somuncuoglu, Agah Oktay Güner and Taha Akyol, who, instead of supporting Türkes, talk of developing a "contemporary right" movement. Behaving so, they are implicitly carrying water to Ozal's mill.

But the more serious challenge to Türkes' authority is coming from the *Grey Wolves* organized in West European countries.

### SCISSION IN THE GREY WOLVES MOVEMENT IN EUROPE

After the 1980 military coup, following the dissolution of the MHP and the arrest of their leaders in Turkey, the *Grey Wolves* in Europe reduced their public activities for passing this period without disturbances.

However, the attempt on the Pope's life by a Grey Wolf, *Mehmet Ali Agca*, in 1981, and the implication of the names of several MHP and *Türk-Federasyon* leaders in this obscure affair, became a stain on this movement.

During this period, *Grey Wolves* organizations devoted themselves to the organization of religious services such as mosques or Koranic courses and the recruiting of Turkish believers to swell their ranks.

To deceive public opinion, many Grey Wolves organizations have rebaptized themselves "*The Association of Turco-Islamic Culture*".

Though they placed black wreaths before Turkish diplomatic missions on August 19, 1981, for protesting against the opening the MHP Trial, *Grey Wolves* continued to benefit from the support of Turkish diplomatic missions.

According to the report given by the monthly *Demokrat Türkiye*, the chiefs of the *Türk-Federasyon* organized a meeting in Hannover on May 8, 1982. The Turkish Consulate allotted them the Turkish

House (Türk Evi) for the meeting. But thanks to protests by Turkish and German progressives, the meeting could not be held.

The 4th Congress of the Türk-Federasyon was held in May 1984 in Koblenz. Serdar Celebi, Ali Batman and Enver Altayli, who were accused by the military prosecutor of having organized Grey Wolves abroad, addressed the congress. At the end of the meeting, Serdar Celebi, who would be arrested later in connection with the Agca Trial, was re-elected chairman of the federation.

After this congress, *Grey Wolves* in Europe showed their teeth again. On January 7, 1985, they displayed their force by injuring in Hannover a Turkish migrant worker, Zeki Sonraci. This active member of the West German trade union *IG Metall* had refused to accept a leaflet edited by the Türk-Federasyon.

On January 12, 1985, 24 Turkish and German associations staged a demonstration in München in protest against a meeting due to be held at Schwabingbrau Hall the next day on the Grey Wolves' initiative. These associations sent a letter to the mayor of München, Social-Democrat G. Kronawitter, calling for a ban on the Grey Wolves' meeting. This letter included a statement that München was increasingly becoming a center for the Grey Wolves' drug trafficking and arms dealing...

When the 5th Congress of Türk-Federasyon was being held in Castrop-Rauxel, West Germany, on May 18, 1985, Chairman Celebi was already arrested for his relation with Mehmet Ali Agca. Held just on the eve of the opening of the Rome Trial, the congress adopted a resolution in support to Serdar Celebi. Ali Batman was re-elected chairman.

Next day, the Grey Wolves passed a further stage at the opening of the trial in Rome: about fifty members of the Türk-Federasyon managed to get into the courtroom chanting slogans in favour of their former chairman.

In 1987, Alparslan Türkeş, despite his condemnation for the extreme-right violence acts he led prior to the military coup of 1980, was allowed by the Government to go to Europe.

As for the German authorities, despite protests, the Federal Interior Ministry annulled the ban on Türkeş' entry in the FRG.

Welcomed by thousands of Grey Wolves in Frankfurt (FRG), Türkeş attended the 10th Grand Convention of the *Türk-Federasyon*, held on May 6, 1987, in Hamm.

Before and during the congress, hundreds of Turkish and German anti-fascist groups held protest demonstrations in front of the congress hall and called up the German authorities to ban this meeting.

Addressing to the convention, Türkeş said that despite the ban on *the Nationalist Action Party*

(MHP) and the arrest of its leaders, the party's *Turco-Islamic Synthesis* was victorious, because it was adopted by the State. "Sooner or later we will be in power, because our cause is just", he added.

At this congress attended by 5 thousand MHP sympathizers, Retired Colonel Hasan Yildizhan, on Türkes' proposal, was elected chairman of the Türk-Federasyon, replacing Ali Batman.

A month later, Türkes addressed another extreme-right meeting in Vienna on July 5, 1987. However he was not allowed to come to Berlin by the Senate.

Seeing the European reaction against his movement, Türkes, with a view to clearing himself, stated that he was no more in collaboration with some former leaders of the Grey Wolves in Europe, and mentioned particularly the names of Serdar Celebi and Ali Batman.

This declaration provoked a furious reaction among Grey Wolves in Europe. Finally, about 70 associations in Germany quitted Türk-Federasyon and set up, in the course of a meeting in Nieder-Olm, *the Union of Turco-Islamic Cultural Associations (TURCO-ISLAMIC UNION)*. Serdar Celebi was elected chairman of the new union.

After this scission, Turkish diplomatic missions in Europe manifested their choice in favour of *the Turco-Islamic Union*.



One of the main pillars of the new union was the *Federation of Turco-Islamic Cultural Associations in Belgium (Turco-Islamic Federation)*. The 5th Congress of this anti-Türkcs federation was held on April 2, 1988, in Beringen in the presence of Serdar Celebi, some ANAP deputies as well as Turkish Consulate Orhan Türeli. Many ministers of the Ozal Government, Turkish Ambassador Ecmel Barutcu, Belgian Prime Minister Wilfrid Martens, Deputy-Premier Guy Verhofstadt and Justice Minister Jean Gol sent the Congress sent the congress messages of sympathy.

A month later, on May 21, 1988, the 1st Congress of *Turco-Islamic Union* in Germany was held in Koblenz. Ozal's chief advisor Mustafa Tasar, seven ANAP deputies as well as some former MHP leaders, Sadi Somuncuoglu, Necati Gültekin and Yasar Okuyan, attending this congress, credited the new union. Celebi was re-elected chairman. The daily *Hürriyet* described the congress as an "Anti-Türkcs coup".

Türkcs riposted to this challenge by attending the congress of his sympathizers in Belgium. After the scission, the remaining pro-Türkcs *Grey Wolves* in this country had set up another organization under the name of *the Federation of Turkish Associations of Ideal in Belgium* (Belcika Ulkücü Türk Dernekleri Federasyonu).

Though the Mayor of Charleroi M. Emile Henry,

on the protest coming from democratic organizations, annulled the permission for this federation's congress to be held on June 4, 1988, a local tribunal invalidated this decision and let Türkes to address the meeting. However, the Turkish diplomatic missions refused to attend this pro-Türkes meeting.

A few weeks later, on June 25, 1988, pro-Türkes *Türk Federasyon* held its 11. Congress in Iserlohn. This time the German authorities did not delivered visa and prevented Türkes from attending this congress. This was a real strike for Türkes and his partisans. At the Congress, a former youth section leader of the defunct MHP, Türkmen Onur was elected federation chairman. Besides, the congress decided to nominate country representatives in a view to exerting a strict control on remaining pro-Türkes organizations.

While two fractions of the Turkish neo-fascist movement are quarreling with each other, European judicial authorities started new proceedings against its leading figures.

Despite the acquittal of Celebi and his companions at the 2nd Rome Trial, the Public Prosecutor announced on November 27, 1987 that he would open a third trial by indicting some leading Grey Wolves such as Serdar Celebi, Oral Celik, Abdullah Catli, Omer Bagci, etc.

On the other hand, the Public Prosecutor of Frankfurt, Dr. Harald H. Korner declared on Sep-

tember 27, 1987 to the daily *Hürriyet* that he would indict a group of Grey Wolves in Germany for smuggling, attempting to kill, blackmailing and sabotage. Among the accused was also a former MHP Youth Section Chairman, Rifat Yildirim. He had already been arrested as smuggling one and a half kilogram heroine.

### **ORGANIZATION OF ISLAM IN THE TURKISH IMMIGRATION**

As we have detailed it above, Islamist orders are very well established among the people who already feel lost and are seeking identity and stability (villagers who moved to large cities or even industrialized countries).

Forming a part of this last category, Moslem immigrants from Turkey constitute fertile ground for all Islamist seeds as well as for the neo-fascist movement which exploits well the religious and nationalist sentiments of people outside their countries.

Once must recall that Turkish immigration is the most recent in Europe, compared to other immigrant communities. It first of all began to organize in the form of initiatives aimed at construction of mosques and assuring the repatriation of the bodies on the dead. In the beginning, this was where lay the most

urgent initiatives for Turkish nationals in a country whose religion and customs were quite different.

With the arrival of the second generation, these associations began to organize Koranic courses by bringing "imams" or "hodjas" from Turkey. It is in this way that Islamist and nationalist tendencies seized the occasion and began to send their propagandists to European countries. In fact, the massive arrival of Turkish immigrants to Europe coincides with the rise of neo-fascist and fundamentalist movements in their country of origin.

Currently, four Islamist movements have a widespread ramification within the Turkish immigration in Europe:

1. *The National Vision* (Milli Görüş): Organized in Europe under the appellation "*The National Vision Organization in Europe*" (AMGT), this movement controls more than 150 mosques. It assembles youths within the *Islamic Youth Union in Europe* (AIGB). The daily newspaper *Milli Görüş* of this movement is sold in all European cities inhabited by Turkish migrants.

2. *The Süleymancı*: Organized in Europe under the appellation "*The Union of Islamic Cultural Center*" (IKMB), it controls 147 mosques, 300 cultural centers and hundreds of courses of the Koran. Though the *Süleymancı* voices that a Moslem should not be the friend of Christians or Jews, their repre-

sentative in Europe, Harun Resit Tüylüoğlu is always in very close relation with the Cardinal of Köln Höffner, and with a CDU member of Parliament, Albrecht Hassinger.

3. *The Nurcu*: Though they have not any organization like those of the three others, the *Nurcu* exert a considerable influence on Turkish immigrants, mainly in the FRG, Belgium and the Netherlands. The *Nurcu* do not refuse a dialogue with the secular people. The main work in Europe is to propagate Saidi Nursi's ideas among Turkish immigrants.

4. *The Khomeinysts*: Led by Cemalettin Kaplan in Köln, they organize in Europe under the appellation of "*The Union of Islamic Associations and Communities*" (ICCB). They control about 120 mosques. According to the daily *Cumhuriyet* of March 13, 1987, Cemalettin Kaplan visited Teheran and enjoys a complete support of the Khomeiny regime.

#### **TURKISH IMMIGRATION AND THE RABITA**

As explained in the previous chapters, *the Rabitat-ul Islam-ul Alem* has resorted to every means in order to put under its influence Moslem immigrants and their associations.

It is the *Islamic and Cultural Center*, founded by the *Rabitat* that undertook to pay the salaries of the Turkish clergy in Belgium. During a briefing given to the National Security Council on November 26, 1982, it was reported that the number of the Turkish Clergy's members named and paid by the ICC rose to 86. (*Milliyet*, March 26, 1987).

With a view to increase its influence on Moslem immigrant workers, the *Rabitat* decided in 1980 to attribute 50,000 dollars to any Islamic association, Turkish or Maghrebin, that wishes to found a mosque in Europe. According to the weekly *Yeni Gündem* of May 19, 1986, these funds were paid by the means of *the Mosques' Committee in Europe*.

So, many of the Turkish Islamic associations had, in a way or another, relations with *the Rabitat*.

However, this administrative and financial submission to a Saudi center gave rise to a certain uneasiness in the Turkish Moslem community.

"Turkish Islam in Belgium was going to be disturbed by Arab influence, especially Saudi influence, a great financial power, exercised on the organization of the Moslem religion. The position assigned to ICC will be from the start violently contested by the Turkish Community. The majority of Turks see it only as the mosque of Arabs." (Robert Anciaux, *Tribune Immigrée*, January 1987, pp 64-65).

## **THE MILITARY REGIME AND IMMIGRATION**

This uneasiness well coincided with the launching, by the military government, of the project of assembling all the right-wing associations under the absolute control of Ankara.

The military junta, taking account of the fact that all the political objectives of the neo-fascist party were identical to the ones of the military, had ordered rassembling all the associations of the Right, including those of the Grey Wolves, within a single federation for each country.

Let's see the experience in Belgium, a country where all extreme-right currents of Turkey are well represented in the Turkish immigrant community:

By order of the military government, the Turkish Embassy in Belgium imposed to the leaders of the association it had recognized, the idea of setting up a federation on a country level. First, the leaders of several associations were summoned to the Turkish General Consulate in Brussels in March 1982. Next, the official of the Turkish Embassy in charge of social affairs Ahmet Ersoy, three officials in charge of religious affairs and two teachers of Turkish language and culture -all of them commissioned by the Embassy- held a constituent congress in Brussels on May 30, 1982. With this in view, they called on all associations which have been recognized by the Em-

bassy, to take part in this constituent congress. Although this congress was given quite a lot of publicity by the Turkish newspapers on sale in Belgium, it did not result in setting up a federation, because of differences of opinion in the religious circles.

After the first attempt at setting up a federation ended in failure, a second attempt was made in the city of La Louvière in April 1983, by another official of the Turkish Embassy in charge of social affairs, Osman Kurt, who is at the same time chairman of the Turkish Workers Cultural and Mutual Assistance Associations in La Louvière. But it remained a regional initiative grouping together only four associations in Hainaut province (South-west Belgium), although it was named as *Federation of Turkish Workers Associations in Belgium*.

At the same time, a second federation was set up by the religious associations in Antwerp and named as *Federation of Turkish Islamic Cultural Associations in Belgium*.

Furthermore, in addition to these two federations, a third one was set up in early April 1984, grouping together the Grey Wolves associations: *The Federation of Turco-Islamic Associations* with ramifications in Antwerp, Ghent, Brussels, Liège and in Limburg province (Heusden, Zolder, Beringen, Eisden).

All further steps to create a single federation led to a failure due to political differences among the Islamic organizations.



That is why Turkish Ambassador Faik Melek did not conceal his disappointment in an interview with the daily *Hürriyet*, published on April 21, 1984: "I would like to say with regret that, despite our efforts so far it has not yet been possible to achieve a union."

At the present time, Turkish right-wing associations in Belgium are grouped in four different federations: *The Northern Federation of Turkish Worker's Associations*, seated in Antwerp; *the Southern Federation of Turkish Worker's Associations*, seated in La Louvière and led by Osman Kurt; *Turco-Islamic Federation*, seated in Eidsen and led by the anti-Türkes Grey Wolves; and recently the *Federation of Turkish Associations of Ideal in Belgium*, founded by pro-Türkes Grey Wolves.

#### **TURKISH ISLAMIC FOUNDATION IN EUROPE**

On the failure to unite right-wing associations, the Turkish Government counted on another initiative aimed at assuring a control at least on the religious activities of these right-wing associations. On December 29, 1982, the setting up of *the Turkish Foundation for Islamic Religious Affairs* ( Türk İslam Diyanet Vakfı) was announced by the Turkish press. Among the founders of this foundation which

groups about 60 mosques were the President of the Directorate of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Tayyar Altıkulaç, and several religious advisors of the Turkish embassies in Europe. The Turkish Ambassador in Brussels is named honorary president.

On May 11, 1985, during the inauguration of the seat of this foundation on Boulevard Général Jacques 38-1050 Brussels, costed at 18 million BF, the Turkish Minister of State Kazım Oksay said: "In the heart of Europe, within one of the most important Christian Communities in the world, you carry on activities to promote our values. All the other ideas are inferior in comparison to ours and they are condemned to disappear in the future while Islam will live forever."

On the same occasion, the Foundation officials made the inauguration of new Turkish mosques in Heusden, Zolder, Winterslag and Waterschei.

While the four above mentioned federations are taking part in this government guided foundation, the *National Vision* organizations in Belgium, contesting the legitimacy of the military power, have refused to join this foundation.

In the last years the salaries of the Turkish clergy named by the Turkish Government are paid by this foundation. However, some imams and religious teachers who refused to obey to the Turkish foundation are being paid by the ICC. The substitution of

the ICC for the foundation has given rise to an uneasiness within the Turkish Moslem Community. On October 26, 1986, the chairmen of the two Turkish federations suggested to the parents not to send their children to the courses given by the teachers named and paid by the ICC.

However, the ICC announced, for calming the Turkish community, that the chairmen of the two Turkish federations, Irfan Güneş and Osman Kurt, had been "selected" for *the Supreme Council of Moslems in Belgium*. (*Tercüman*, Nov. 18, 1986).

The Saudi hold on the present government is so powerful that at the end, the chiefs of the right-wing associations in the pay of the regime had to yield to the Rabitat's authority without taking heed to the opposition against the ICC within the Turkish Moslem community.

#### **TRIUMPHAL CONGRESS OF THE FOYER OF INTELLECTUALS**

While Islam fundamentalism is getting more and more influent, the principal promoter of the Turco-Islamic Synthesis, *the Foyer of Intellectuals (AO)*, grouping in its ranks as well *Islamists* as *Grey Wolves*, after a 7-year period of conquest of power, organized in Ankara *the 4th Grand Scientific Convention of Nationalists*.

Opened on April 24, 1987, the 3-day convention was attended by three ministers of Ozal Government, many deputies from all right-wing political parties and renowned right-wing intellectuals. What is more, Prime Minister Ozal, his ministers, Commander of Land Forces Necdet Ozturun sent their best wishes to the convention.

Addressing the convention, the State Minister Kazim Oksay related what his government made for promoting religious services.

Chairman of *the Foyer of Intellectuals*, Prof. Suleyman Yalcin described, in his speech, the *Turco-Islamic Synthesis* in the following terms:

"Turco-Islamic Synthesis is the expression of a fact existing for over 1,200 years. It promotes both the conscience of being Turk and the faith in God and Islamic values. Our foyer describes a Turk as a Moslem speaking Turkish."

During the convention, many speakers drew attention to the "danger of being Europeanized and of losing all national and moral values" in the case of adhering to the European Communities.

Just after this convention, on April 27, 1987, the University of Ankara, under the control of Turco-Islamists, held a symposium on the subject of "*Turks in the World*".

The university rector Tarik Somer, at his opening speech, reminding the existence of 100 million Turks out of Turkey, claimed that all of them are subjected

to the danger of assimilation or annihilation and pointed out to the necessity of "the Turkish Republic's solidarity with all these Turks."

It should be reminded that Prof. Tarik Somer is also one of the leading members of *the Turkish Foyer (Türkocagi)*, opened in Ankara on May 29, 1986, on the occasion of the anniversary of the conquest of Constantinople (Istanbul) by Turks in 1453.

The inauguration of this foyer was attended also by Premier Ozal and his ministers.

#### **TURCO-ISLAMIC ALLIANCE WITHIN THE ANAP**

The last Congress of the *Motherland Party (ANAP)*, held on June 20-25, 1988, in Ankara, reaffirmed the preeminence of the Turco-Islamic Synthesis within this party.

Although Prime Minister Ozal has presented his party to the West as a liberal, pro-Western party, this profile cannot hide the fact that the ANAP's hard-core derives from former Neo-fascist or Islamist politicians who are currently united within a "*Holy Alliance*". Despite the predictions that Ozal would not let the Islamist-Nationalist alliance sweep out the Liberals from the party's executive board, party members known as Liberals failed to be elected to the 50-strong Central Executive Council.

Both *Mehmet Kececiler*, head of the Islamist group, and *Mustafa Tasar*, the head of the Nationalist wing, received standing ovations from the delegates whenever they appeared in the congress hall.

Speeches by the majority of the delegates with their strong religious tones, left no room for the expression of liberal trends. There were calls for opening the *Ayasofya* (Haghia Sophia), the Byzantine basilica in Istanbul now used as a museum, to Islamic worship, and prayers were recited from the rostrum with the participation of nearly 1,000 delegates.

Though seemed dissatisfied with the spectacular success of *the Holy Alliance* at the party congress, Ozal himself did not delay to make a religious demonstration on the occasion of *hajj* (holy pilgrimage) in July 1988. He had completed the Islamic ritual twice before, in 1968 and in 1975. But this was the first time he was making the pilgrimage as Turkey's prime minister.

Ozal's meeting with the religious leaders of the Turkish pilgrim groups in Jeddah sparked off a controversy back home. Some of the religious leaders present in the meeting where no reporters were allowed said Ozal told them the state in Turkey is secular but he is not.

In addition to making the holy pilgrimage, Ozal also met with King Fahd bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia and the presidents of Gambia and Bangladesh.

After this visit, the Saudi ambassador to Ankara, Abdelaziz M. Khojah, said: "Ozal's pilgrimage will strengthen Moslem unity. The importance of Ozal's visit comes from the fact that he is the first prime minister since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey to perform hajj while still in office." (*Date-line*, July 30, 1988).

In the meantime, in an interview with the Luxembourg cable television network RTL, Ozal defended the following views concerning Atatürk, founder of the Republic: "He was a good Moslem and as such he struggled with fanatics. Atatürk opened the first session of the National Assembly with a religious ceremony. He was a good Moslem who also had modern thoughts. The claims that his principles are violated in Turkey today are groundless."

#### **"HOLY WAR" OF THE TURKISH ARMY**

But what is most remarkable, the Turkish Army for the first time in the history of the Republic, openly calls itself "the Army of Islam".

In the course of the Turkish history, since the adoption of Islam in the 9th Century until the beginning of the 20th Century, Turkish armies had always been in the service of religion and qualified themselves as *the Army of Holy War* (Cihad Ordusu).

During the period of Ottoman Empire all conquests were made in the name of Islam against *infidels* (kâfirler).

It is after the proclamation of the Republic that the Turkish Army was reshaped by Chief Commander Mustafa Kemal and charged with the protection of Kemalist reforms. New breed Army officers were educated at military schools according to Kemalist principles.

Kemalism was, in its substance, the ideology of the rising Turkish bourgeoisie.

Prior to the proclamation of the Republic, an Economic Congress organized by Kemalists in Izmir announced that the new state was to adopt a capitalist development line, and accordingly would grant full control of the country's economy to the alliance of the new rising national bourgeoisie and big landowners.

Decided to eliminate all obstacles before a rapid development of Turkish capitalism, Kemalists, first of all, declared themselves hostile against socialism and crushed even during the national war, all left-wing organizations. After the victory, they assaulted on Islamists.

In the ideological plan, Kemalism was based on Turkish nationalism which claims the superiority of Turkish race over all other races.

The Kurds who had actively taken part in the liberation war and never raised a national independence



question, realized after the proclamation of the Republic that the chauvinist stand of the Kemalist power was to deprive them of their most fundamental rights such as education in their mother tongue. As a reaction against this chauvinist policy, Kurds had to revolt against the Ankara Government several times, but all of them were brutally suppressed by the Turkish Army. During decades, Turkish governments, claiming that there was neither Kurdish people nor Kurdish language and that inhabitants of Turkish Kurdistan were "highlander Turks", resorted to every means for assimilating Kurds into Turkish nation.

After a long period of repression and intimidation, it was after 1960 that Kurds began to claim their national identity and to organize in their proper cultural and social organizations. But, after the military coups of 1971 and 1980, they were subjected again to Turkish Army's repression.

Since all pacific means of democratic struggle were refused by Ankara, Kurdish opposition groups began from 1983 to organize armed guerrilla groups. So, the Turkish Army suddenly found itself in an armed confrontation in the south-east of the country.

But it is no more possible to cope with Kurdish guerrillas in the name of Turkish nationalism. Today, more than ten million people of Kurdish origin are living on the entity called Kurdistan, united through a link of language, culture and economic factors. Moreover, they have close links with the

Kurds of the neighbor countries such as Iraq, Iran and Syria.

So, the Turkish Army chiefs, counting on the fact that Kurds too are Moslem, decided to play on the card of Islam. With this purpose, a group from the Foyer of Intellectuals (AO) was sent to the operation area. And on the suggestion of this group, planes and helicopters of the Army began, during the raking operation against Kurdish guerrillas in the East, to throw on Kurdish villages tracts of *jihad* (holy war).

The weekly *2000'e Dogru*, in its January 4, 1987 issue, published the clichés of these tracts.

Here are some quotations of these tracts:

"Citizen! Listen well to what Islam orders to you:

"Fight in God's way against those who fight against you!

"Separatist groups try to snatch from you your religion, your children, your wife, all values such as fatherland, flag and moral.

"It is your duty to fight against them!

"Don't forget! The Turkish Army which is in progress of wiping out these traitors is the latest powerful army of the Islamic world. Collaborate with it."

It is this army which knocks now, through its "civil" government, at the door of the European Communities.

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