

TURCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AFTER THE COUP



INFO-TÜRK

**TURCO-AMERICAN
RELATIONS
AFTER THE COUP**

INFO-TÜRK

Brussels, January 1988

INFO-TÜRK is a working group founded in 1974 by a number of progressive people with a view to informing world opinion of the political, economic, social and cultural life of Turkey and of Turkish immigration.

Denouncing the repression in that country, it contributes also to the struggle for democracy in Turkey.

INFO-TÜRK has the honour of publishing the only bilingual periodical on Turkey which has been appearing abroad without interruption for twelve years:

The monthly newsletter INFO-TÜRK.

Copyright: Info-Türk 1988

INFO-TÜRK

*Rue des Eburons 38
1040 Brussels - Belgium
Tel: (02) 230 34 72*

*Composition and layout:
Atelier Graphique du Soleil*

D/1988/2198/63

TURKEY'S IMPORTANCE TO THE USA

"Turkey's strategic importance to the United States lies in the country's military forces committed to NATO, its vital geographic position, and the facilities and bases it makes available for American use. Turkey, a member of NATO alliance since February 15, 1952, maintains the second largest military force in the North Atlantic alliance... Because of its strategic geographic location and possession of the Straits -the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles- which control transit to and exit from the Black Sea, Turkey is in a unique position to constrain passage of hostile vessels into the Mediterranean during a war. By virtue of its key geographic position, Turkey also controls the most direct air and overland routes between the Soviet Union and the Middle East and Africa. Finally, Turkey provides various military facilities utilized by the United States and NATO in support of NATO-related missions."

It was with these words that a report entitled "*Turkey's Problems and Prospects: Implications for U.S. Interests*", published by the U.S. Congress on March 3, 1980, just before the military coup d'état in Turkey, drew the attention to the strategic and military importance of this country.

Though Turkey had been a loyal ally of the United States in the region since the end of the Second World War, the relations between the two countries had been deteriorated since the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1973. Disapproving this intervention, the US Congress had imposed an embargo on arms deliverance to Turkey. In retaliation, the right-wing Demirel Government, in 1975, had unilaterally abrogated a previous defense treaty and closed all US military bases and installations in the country except for a strategic NATO air base at Incirlik.

Although social-democrat premier Ecevit reopened in October 1978

four key bases when the US Congress lifted the arms ban on Turkey, a permanent status for all US and NATO bases and installations had been confronted with a strong opposition of democratic forces, including the left wing deputies of Ecevit's own party, CHP.

Following the restoration of the right-wing coalition headed by Demirel at the end of 1979, the representatives of the US Government rushed to Turkey and, thanks to the Army Generals' ultimatum to political parties on January 2, 1980, initialled the *Turco-American Defense Cooperation Agreement (DECA)*.

Expressing the satisfaction with the initialling of the *DECA*, the US Congress report said: "In summary, Turkey and the United States still have important issues to resolve between themselves in the important area of defense cooperation. Turkey's value as a NATO ally and partner of the United States in helping stability and security in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East has been accentuated by the recent upheaval in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Successful resolution of these matters would permit Turkey to assume once again an effective role in protecting the vital security interests of NATO and the free world in an increasingly volatile region of the globe. The most immediate threat to US interests would appear to be the current political and economic problems facing Turkey."

"A successful resolution" of these matters necessitated first of all the elimination of anti-USA opposition in the country and the restoration of po-

DISCLOSURES ABOUT THE U.S. INSTIGATION TO THE COUP D'ETAT

Although General Evren, the author of the 1980 military coup, claiming during his first public declaration that the Armed Forces had been obliged to intervene in politics because of the inability of successive governments to halt political terror, this argument does not seem so convincing for many observers, because prior to the coup, the Army was indeed in power in the most sensitive areas of Turkey for 20 months and the martial law commanders had all the authority to curb the political violence.

Mr Süleyman Demirel, the prime minister at the time of the coup, finds it suspicious that the military brought about amazing peace within a matter of weeks after taking power, while it had been apparently helpless to curb the violence for two years. According to Demirel, who was interviewed by Arthur Miller five years later, the generals deliberately allowed the chaos to expand until the intervention would be gratefully accepted. (*The Nation*, May 1985).

A book published five years after the military coup made many revelations about the preparation of the coup and the U.S. involvement in this intervention.

This book, written by *Mehmet Ali Birant*, the Brussels correspondent for the daily *Milliyet*, is based on both General Evren's red-covered personal diary and the author's conversations with those people who were somehow involved in the latest developments preceding the coup.

litical stability. The report added: "Against the backdrop of chronic political instability in Turkey, the military has been traditionally viewed as a force for order and stability. Twice in recent history, the military has intervened in the political system. The January 2 (1980) warning from the Armed Forces to the country's political parties again raised the prospect of a military coup.

"According to some observers, the prospect for such a development have increased because of the troubles in neighbouring Iran. The objectives of a military coup at this time would be to avert chaos similar to that of Iran, to stem Turkish separatism, and to respond to the impotence of the political parties." (Full text of this report was reproduced in another pamphlet: *U.S. Interests in Turkey*, Info-Türk, 1982, Brussels).

AMERICANIZING OF THE TURKISH ARMY

As a matter of fact, during the period of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the predecessor of the present Republic of Turkey, the Turkish Armed Forces was one of the principal motivating forces of the Turkish society. For example, a progressive "*Young Turks*" movement in the 19th century found its most ardent supporters and militants among the young army officers. This was because the army officers represented an important part of

Some excerpts from these articles are reprinted below:

"In Washington there was a growing feeling of anxiety. The warning letter was the first sign of a military intervention. But, although several months had passed since that letter was handed over, no movement could be observed within the army. From Washington, the necessity of a military intervention had appeared early in 1979. The first forerunners of this intervention had been noted during 1979. Furthermore, by September of that year, when Paul Henze, in charge of Turkish affairs at the White House, came to Istanbul for a conference, he had not deemed it necessary to go to Ankara. He was aware that in any case the Army was to seize power.

"But, given that the warning letter was not causing a stir, both the CIA and the Pentagon began to envisage as a hypothesis, at some committee meetings in Washington, that maybe the Generals were afraid of seizing power. In their view, such a situation might leave the field clear for an attempt by the colonels. However, the consequences of such an attempt might degenerate into any direction. During the first four months of 1980, all these fears and anxieties had been brought to the U.S. Embassy's attention in Ankara. But the Embassy was always replying in the same way: 'Our contacts inside the Turkish Armed Forces inform us that there is no movement nor meeting taking place outside the supreme commanders' control.' (...)

"From May 1980 onwards, Washington decided to increase signals aimed at Ankara. The first message was handed to *General Evren* and the second to *General Sal-*

the well-educated élite of the population and because they considered the Ottoman Empire's "sickman" position a shame for the traditionally conqueror Turkish Army. Their primary concern was to strengthen the State and to prevent territorial losses. This concern led them to an anti-imperialist attitude on the one hand, and on the other, to a bourgeois-revolutionary stand.

The *bourgeois revolution* of 1908 (Mesrutiyet), the *National Liberation War* (1919-1922), and the *proclamation of the Republic* (1923) all have been led by army officers.

Thanks to this leading position, the Army generals, after the foundation of the young Republic, became the political rulers of the country and the most distinguished one among them, General Mustafa Kemal, was elected life-term President of the Republic and later on named *Atatürk* (Father of the Turks).

Although the main burden of the National Liberation War was on the shoulders of workers and peasants, the military, with the purpose of granting all possibilities to the developing local bourgeoisie, took every measure to prevent the working class from gaining conscience, organizing political parties and trade unions and being represented in Parliament.

ik in Brussels. On May 11, 1980, following the meeting of the NATO Military Committee, General Rogers, SACEUR, got involved in a talk with General Saltik, Deputy Chief of the Turkish staff, about problems raised by the control over the Aegean area and the possible reintegration of Greece into NATO's military wing. As they touched on the situation in Turkey, SACEUR asked: 'The Turkish Army, does it intend to face the rampant disorder in your country?'

"Saltik anticipated this question. He replied straight away: "We execute our duties, as we have always done.' (...)

"During a cocktail party offered in honor of the chiefs of staff who had taken part in the meeting, it was Evren's turn. US Chief of staff *General Jones* was talking with his Turkish counterpart: 'We're watching with anxiety the latest development in Turkey. It is very difficult to understand everything that is going on there. For months your politicians have proved unable to elect a President of the Republic.'

"General Evren was quite embarrassed by this question. Indeed, during the same meeting several chiefs of staff had asked him the same question. After replying briefly, he had left the party...

"Admiral Sherer, US Commander of NATO South-Eastern Headquarters, came to Istanbul in the spring of 1980 to give a lecture at the Military Academy. After dealing with some other subjects, he touched on the problems of NATO's south flank and the latest developments in that area. Next he commented on the situation in Turkey: 'In view of the fact that Turkey's inflation rate has reached 100%, a powerful defense cannot be ensured. The economic stabilization program which has been implemented (i.e. the austerity measures in the economic field which were imposed by th IMF on January 24, 1980) is of great importance. It has to be implemented safe from unrest. The point is that fierce anarchy and instability is rampant in this country. In the face of so

Besides, adopting a chauvinist ideology which was corresponding to the ambitions of the rising local bourgeoisie, the military put the Kurdish nationality of Turkey under a permanent repression.

After the Second World War, the grand bourgeoisie which had grown up thanks to the support of the Armed Forces, found then a new powerful ally: the United States of America which intended to include Turkey and Greece in their military block. On May 22, 1947, the Law on *Aid to Turkey and Greece* and on July 12, 1947, the Accord on *Aid to Turkey* came into practice. Later the *Foreign Aid Law* of 1948 and the *Mutual Aid for Defense Law* turned the Turkish Armed Forces into mercenaries in charge of defending the US interests in the area. And one more step in this way was the Turkish affiliation with the *NATO Alliance* in 1952.

Despite this dependence on the USA, some officers in the Army maintained a critical position against US domination. The great majority of army officers than had a poor peasant background and considered themselves betrayed by the collaborating bourgeoisie who ignored the welfare of its former ally and even caused the army officers to be poorer than ever.

great a danger, I would like to ask you: 'What are you doing? What do you intend to do?'

"This message was repeated more clearly in the June 1980 issue of *US Armed Forces*, a periodical which is followed with keen interest by the Western world's military circles: 'The latest developments in Turkey have reached such dimensions that there is no other solution left than an intervention by the Turkish Armed Forces... The Armed Forces are to intervene, but they will be unable to improve the situation in the long term.'

"On July 1, 1980, at a cocktail party in Ankara, the US Force military attaché made the same remarks to a former member of the National Unity Committee, i.e. the junta which in 1960 made the first military coup: 'These economic measures are of paramount importance. If they are to be implemented, Turkey needs a 4 to 6-year period of stability.'

"On September 10, in Washington., US Chief of Staff J. Allen offered a dinner in honor of *General Tahsin Sahinkaya*, Commander of the Turkish Air Force, who had ended a tour of the United States to buy new aircraft. Sahinkaya was in good spirits. After the dinner, when they were having coffee, *Mr Paul Henze*, in charge of Turkish Affairs at the US National Security Council, approached Sahinkaya who was due to leave the next day. He was anxious to give him one last signal: 'I hope you'll not allow the situation in Turkey to get out of control.' Sahinkaya replied in Turkish with a smile: 'Don't worry! And he left the dinner.'

"September 11, 4 p.m. All air and naval bases in Turkey were put on the alert. At the head of the US Aid Delegation (JUSMATT) was *General Thompson*. He said to himself: 'At last THIS time we've got it!' The official reason of the state of alert was that security measures had to be taken in the US bases in connection with the start of

It was under these circumstances that the Turkish Armed Forces, being encouraged by the popular mass resistance against the authoritarian regime of the center-right *Democrat Party*, carried out the May 27th, 1960 coup d'état and put into force a new constitution guaranteeing human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as some social security measures.

NATO military manoeuvres. The American general first sent his message to the Pentagon, before informing the US Ambassador: 'The Turkish Armed Forces have just been put in alert. It is very likely that the intervention which has long been expected has been triggered of:

"JUSMATT had a very close relationship with the Turkish Armed Forces. It was very well informed of the state of their equipment and was able to sound out the Army's feelings. In order to take on this task, JUSMATT staff included US officers able to speak Turkish as their mother tongue. The most important function of these officers was to establish a friendly relationship with the Turkish officers. For, from he outset, they had been able to closely watch any trouble inside the Turkish army. In the military bases, the US officers were informed of it and also warned not to go on the streets for a stroll, themselves nor their families, until further notice.

"September 12, 3.30 a.m. (8 p.m in Washington)... *Paul Henze* just came back home. He phoned the 'Situation Room' at the White House.

"- Paul, your boys have done it...

"- Who are 'my boys'? What are you speaking about?

"- Your Generals, they've made a coup in Turkey.

"- Well, well! I'm very pleased. Where does this news come from?

"- From JUSMATT... Do you want us to tell the President about it?

"- Wait a minute. Don't hurry. Today explosive charges are said to have been placed in Ankara. On the other hand, there were NATO manoeuvres going on. Maybe our men were mistaken by seeing some soldiers patrolling the streets. Tell them to check it on more time.

"After half an hour the confirmation came in.

"- A short while ago, the Turkish staff apparently informed JUSMATT. On the other hand, we have informed Zbig (*Zbigniew Brzezinski*, President Carter's adviser in charge of national security affair).

"President *Carter* was attending a performance of 'Fiddler on the Roof' at Kennedy Center. The telephone nearby his box rang. The switchboard operator in the White House said that Foreign Secretary *Muskie* wished to speak to the President. The President came and picked up:

"- The Command of the Turkish Army has just taken over in Ankara. There's no reason to worry. Those who are worthy to intervene have done it....

"President Carter thanked him, wished him good night and went back to his box.

"The BBC as well as the news agencies were spreading the news with reference made to the spokesman of th US State Department.

"Meanwhile, in Ankara, people in the studios of Radio Ankara were still waiting until the antennas warmed up to put on the air the communique announcing the coup." (Mehmet Ali Birant, *12 Eylül-Saat 04.00*, Karacan Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1984).

A SUI-GENERIS MILITARY HOLDING: OYAK

But just after the coup, the US advisors, with a view to taming army officers, imposed on the *National Unity Committee (MBK)*, military junta at the time, a sui-generis project.

At the beginning, this project seemed very innocent and it was impossible to notice the notorious trap behind it. In accordance with the law adopted by the junta on March 1st, 1961, all Army officers and NCOs have been obliged to contribute 5% of their salaries to the new created *Armed Forces Mutual Aid Fund (OYAK)*. The declared objective of this fund was to carry out some social activities such as supplying the officers with cheap consumer goods and services, providing credits with low interest rates and constructing low-cost residences for army officers and NCOs who had materially suffered very much during the 10-year rule of the Democrat Party.

Considering that the compulsory cotisations of Army officers had created enormous accumulation of capital, the generals managing the OYAK decided to use these funds for profit-making investments in industry and commerce. They have never hesitated to collaborate with foreign investors such as Renault, International Harvester and Good Year. Already in 1975, the OYAK, with an annual turnover of 142 billion \$, was holding the 6th rank among the biggest companies of Turkey. The army officers and NCOs have become shareholders in this giant holding company and began to get extra profit shares from it in addition to their salaries. Thus, the military have become not only the guardian of big capital but also an integral part of it.

Army officers' turning into capitalists in uniform has created an economic and social gap between them and the labouring population. The growing contradiction was reflected first during the mass strikes of industrial workers on June 15-16, 1970, in Istanbul and after the March 12th military intervention in 1971.

SINISTER ROLE OF THE COUNTER GUERILLA ORGANIZATION

It is during the period of OYAK's growing that a conspiring institution within the Army began to stage sinister plots to provoke instability in the country. This organization was the *Special War Department*, commonly known as the *Counter-guerilla Organization*, which had been set up under a bilateral military agreement concluded in 1959 between Turkey and the United States. Concerned with developments in Lebanon, the USA had proposed to give Turkey special aid designed to prevent "communist infiltration".

The apparent aim of this department was to set up resistance forces in case of "uprising" or foreign aggression. But the application and training directives show that the organization could function against the domestic movements of social awakening. In various written official regulations of

the Department, "uprising" was defined as "political and social opposition against the established order in the country."

The Special War Department had its headquarters in the building of the *US Military Aid Mission* in Ankara. The training of the officers of this department was carried out by the US Intelligence Services in Texas.

According to the official documents of this department, unveiled later by a former military judge, *Emin Deger*, "the social development in its natural trend will lead to an inevitable result. Thus it is necessary to infiltrate the ranks of social opposition and, through the activities of the provocateurs, to lead opposition to terrorism and end up in military takeover."

The tools for these provocative actions were already on the political scene: *The Grey Wolves*, the activists of the neo-fascist movement led by Ex-colonel Alparslan Türkeş.

Both the military interventions in 1971 and 1980 have been justified by the terror acts and political instability provoked by the Grey Wolves. On September 12, 1980, Evren justified the military takeover as the means of preventing political violence which claimed 5,355 lives since 1975.

DISCLOSURES ABOUT THE COUNTER-GUERILLA ORGANIZATION

In the main text we are referring to the existence of a covert organization within the Turkish army which over the past years used to provoke bloody incidents with the view of clearing the ground for a military coup. It is the Counter-Guerilla Organization, officially called the Special War Department. Prior to the September 12, 1980, military coup, many democratic organizations in Turkey had called for disbanding this illegal organization, demanding an investigation into all its activities such as torture, provoking bloody incidents and supporting fascist groups. The very existence of such a covert organization has for the first time been admitted by a journalist known for his close links with the military, in a book published in 1984. Even though several details on this subject have been censored by the military, the facts disclosed in this book are sufficient evidence to confirm the baleful part played over the past years by this organization operating under the Turkish army's umbrella. Hereafter we reprint some excerpts from this book:

Another reason why relations (between Ecevit and the Army commanders) were deteriorating, was the controversy on the Counter-guerilla Organization launched by the People's Republican Party (CHP) by the spring of 1978. For this reason the General Staff viewed Ecevit unfavorably. The Special War Department was charged with the task of commanding a special guerilla force in order to send it, in case of war, behind the hostile forces.

Did such an organization really exist? If it existed, was it used in domestic affairs? The controversy focused on both these questions and the General Staff was very sensitive to it. Besides, its sensitivity to it was generally known. As these polemics developed the army commanders felt increasingly uneasy. They were convinced that Ecevit, as head of the government, had been long in intervening to halt this controver-

Whereas, behind this violence was none other than the Army itself. The Armed Forces were already in a position of controlling the most sensitive areas of Turkey, thanks to the martial law proclaimed in 20 provinces since December 1979. But the military did not move for preventing the rising political violence. It is this "wait and see" position of the army commanders and the provocations carried out, in complicity with Grey Wolves, by the Counter Guerilla Organization that gave rise to political terror and which would later on become the justification for the military takeover.

U.S. SATISFACTION WITH THE 1980 MILITARY COUP

A visit just before the coup was very significant. The Commander of the Turkish Air Forces, *General Sahinkaya* (a graduate of a U.S. Air Force School) had left for the United States only a few days prior to September 12, 1980. After consulting with US officials, General Sahinkaya returned home on the 11th and a couple of hours after his press conference at the airport re-

sy... Moreover, they got the feeling that Ecevit deliberately delayed his intervention with the view of weakening the Army's prestige.

As a matter of fact, this gave Ecevit cause for anxiety. In 1974, after the People's Republican Party came into office, the General Staff one day asked for money belonging to secret state funds. On the other hand, as the Special War Department had its headquarters at JUSMATT (the US military aid mission), it was ordered by the Americans to move out.

The Prime Minister did not understand anything at all. He had an investigation carried out. Officially, there was no such organization. In the state budget no expenses had been provided for this end. He ordered his cabinet to hold a briefing on this subject. The briefing took place at the Prime Minister's office in the presence of Ecevit and Defense Minister Hasan Esat Isik. Prior to the meeting, the whole office had been checked with electronic devices in order to find out whether a microphone had been smuggled in.

The Special War Department had been set up under a bilateral military agreement concluded in 1959 between Turkey and the United States. Concerned with developments in Lebanon, the US had proposed to Turkey special aid designed to prevent communist infiltration. The Special War Department, set up by that time, was an organization exclusively made up of civilians.

- What is the role of this organization?
- To fight against subversive activities. It is also charged with the task of organizing a resistance movement either against possible foreign occupation or against forces which might infiltrate the country.
- How does it fulfil this mission?
- It is made up of patriots. They are in possession of a secret arms dump. They're not doing this job to earn their living. There is not a single military in uniform among them.

In Ecevit's view, such an organization was not consistent with the rules inherent to democracy. That day, the money that had been asked for was secured and handed over the General Staff, but Ecevit kept on watching this affair very closely.

On May 6, 1977, he talked about this matter with President of the Republic Fahri Korutürk: "It is unacceptable that such an organization whose very existence is known to no one except for a few persons at the General Staff, can go on operating in this way. Someone could infiltrate this organization, initially with patriotic feelings, but afterwards use this organization to other ends. This organization should be put under control." Thereupon, Korutürk asked Ecevit to note any subject giving him cause for anxiety. Subsequently he handed Ecevit's notes to Demirel, the then Prime Minister. The latter publicized this matter in an ambiguous way. But nothing changed.

After these talks with Korutürk, Ecevit, alluding to the Special War Department, had voiced the same remarks in a public speech delivered in Izmir on May 7, 1977: "If a handful of adventurers devoid of any sense of responsibility, were in a position to stage the Tandogan incidents in Ankara and the incidents at Taksim Square in Istanbul (1) and, subsequently, to get off, we'll come to the conclusion that in Turkey the state has no more authority. In my view, certain organizations which secured a pace inside the state and which hold their positions thanks to the state -thus getting out of control of the democratic state- are the instigators of these incidents. I'm convinced that each of the two wings of the Government (2) are trying to take advantage of these organizations instead of taking requisite measures against them.

"Concrete evidence of the existence of such organizations and plots had already been disclosed during the March 12 period (3). Today, as the election is drawing near, the evidence which is coming to light becomes more abundant and more ominous.

"An important task falls on the Ministers of Justice and of the Interior, and on the non-governmental members of the National Security Council whom I greatly trust. It is necessary to put under control, without delay, certain forces and organizations whose signs of existence came to light, for the first time, during the March 12 period and which are today out of the control of the democratic state. During the short period we've been in charge of government affairs we have proven that such control is possible. But nowadays both wings of the Government are making efforts to take advantage of these organizations and forces instead of putting them under control."

When he came back into office in 1978, Ecevit discussed this problem with the Chief of Staff as well: "I'm very worried about it; suppress this civilian organization or turn it into a body consistent with the criteria inherent to a democratic state. No one can guess what a youth who is relied upon now, might do in 20 years."

Evren replied by merely saying: "There's nothing to worry about. Take it easy (Mehmet Ali Birant, *12 Eylül-Saat 04.00*, Karacan Yayinlari, Istanbul 1984, p.88).

-
- 1) *On May Day 1977, about forty people had been killed during disturbances caused by gun shots fired by unidentified agents-provocateurs (See: Info-Türk Bulletin, May 1977).*
 - 2) *The then coalition government was made up of four right-wing parties, the Justice Party (AP), the National Salvation Party (MSP), the Republican Reliance Party (CGP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP).*
 - 3) *The period following the March 1971 military coup.*

lating his "very positive meetings with US officials," the coup operation began in Ankara.

When the military overthrew the civilian government on September 12, 1980, *Philip Kaplan*, a general at NATO's Southeast Headquarters, said (as reported in the daily *Günaydin*): "I think the political change in Turkey was expected by NATO and by all other countries."

In a statement given to *Newsweek*, Turkey's counselor at the United Nations, Coskun Kirca said: "Turkey contributes to the interests of the West in the Middle East and strengthens the US presence in the region."

The very first communiqués of the military junta made it clear that the main reason behind the coup lay not only in the internal instability of the country, but rather in the instability of the Middle East region. In his personally delivered message on the day of the coup, *General Evren* pledged Turkey's continued loyalty to NATO and this loyalty was confirmed later on in all texts issued by the new regime.

The Times of September 13th said: "The message and its timing were well received by the Allies who had become increasingly worried about the chaotic political situation in this exposed but vital area on NATO's south-eastern flank."

The International Herald Tribune of the same day shared this opinion: "Military coups rarely contribute to international stability, but Turkey may prove to be the proverbial exception... One of the key leaders, *General Haydar Saltik*, who was named secretary general of the new ruling security committee, has attended numerous seminars and planning sessions of the NATO Command and was described by one NATO source as a *familiar figure*. NATO officials also said the manoeuvres in Turkish Thrace by 3,000 soldiers from six NATO countries would proceed as planned. The manoeuvres, code-named *Anvil Express 80*, are scheduled for later this month and are designed to test NATO response to a possible attack on Western Turkey from Warsaw Pact forces in Bulgaria."

In fact, all Western countries and the United States welcomed the coup. West German Chancellor Schmidt and the US Under Secretary of State Warren Christopher agreed to continue the aid-loan program to Turkey.

GROWING TURCO-AMERICAN COOPERATION

Just after the military coup d'état, on October 17, 1980, a communiqué issued following the high level Turco-USA talks in Ankara said: "The talks which were held in a friendly atmosphere gave a clear indication of the concrete prospects for the advancement of Turkish defence industry through mutual efforts and that the progress to be made in this area would contribute to enhancing cooperation on bilateral as well as multilateral levels, particularly within the framework of the NATO alliance."

One of the immediate consequences of the military coup was the ratifi-

cation, by the 5-man junta, of the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DECA) between Turkey and the United States. This agreement which had been confronted with the opposition of the majority of the pre-coup Parliament laid down the basic principles of bilateral defence relations and assured continuing operation of the key US bases in Turkey.

Benefitting from the restored "stability" in Turkey, General Rogers, Commander of NATO Forces, visited Turkey twice and had talks with General Evren. The immediate result of these contacts was Greece's surprise return to the military wing of NATO.

The second step in the direction of developing Turco-American military cooperation was the establishment in December 1981 of a *Joint Defence Council* charged with defining the common military needs and finding solutions and also with deciding the US contribution to the Turkish war industry. On that occasion, US Defense Minister Caspar Weinberger, during his visit to Turkey on December 6, 1981, said: "The Turkish military government has fulfilled our highest expectations since assuming power. We particularly admire the way in which law and order have been restored in Turkey." That is to say, an admiration for mass arrests, tortures, life imprisonments, executions, press censorship, suppression of the right to collective bargaining and strikes.

During a press conference held in January 1982 by US State Secretary Haig following the NATO meeting, in Brussels, a British journalist suggested that there was a double standard in sharply criticizing the Polish regime while not criticizing military rule in Turkey and other pro-Western states.

On this question, Mr Haig virtually exploded in anger at the British journalist and praised the Turkish generals. This double-faced defence of Turkish generals was reflected in the pro-junta Turkish press with great appreciation and the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Türkmen regretted that other allies of Turkey cannot take such a far seeing stand.

In a world-wide TV show on Poland produced by the United States on February 1, 1982, Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ulusu was presented as the defender of freedoms despite that the fact that his military-backed government carried on a brutal repression in his own country. Even the International Herald Tribune said: "It was neither entertainment nor intelligent propaganda. 'Poland be Poland' – a phrase whose actual emptiness expressed the political as well as moral vacuum at the center of the enterprise. The presence of the military dictator of Turkey, deploring the existence of a military dictatorship in Poland, notably contributed to this aspect of the affair."

At the General Assembly of the United Nations in February 1982, the Turkish delegation abstained from voting for the resolution condemning the annexation of the Golan Heights by Israel. Foreign Minister Türkmen said that this abstention was due to a phrase in the resolution which accuses also the United States. On this vote, the head of the Political Department of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Mr Kaddumi postponed his visit to Turkey.

RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE AND TURKEY

US Secretary of State Haig, in another diplomatic offensive, confirmed his government's support to the Turkish military regime during his visit to Ankara on May 14, 1982. But the Gulf War and the Middle East appeared to have been the principal issue discussed at his talks with General Evren. It was emphasized at the end of the visit that all the discussions were held inside a NATO context, implying that Turkey did not deal bilaterally with the United States in this affair. But a few days later, the Ministerial Council of NATO, held on May 17-18, 1982, in Luxembourg, declared in its final communiqué that "Some members of the NATO can take certain measures for defending any region out of the NATO zone". This is was green light for bilateral cooperation between Turkey and the USA to station the *Rapid Deployment Force* in Anatolia.

The summit of NATO held on June 10, 1982, in Bonn, declared a "common interest in the security, stability and sovereign independence of the countries outside the NATO area" and readiness of the members of the alliance to "contribute either directly or indirectly" to ensuring them. Having taken the US Rapid Deployment Force under its aegis, the NATO Summit has authorized Turkey to open her territories to this force.

In order to accelerate the preparation for the stationing the RDF in Anatolia, General Rogers, Supreme Commander of NATO Forces in Europe, Admiral Crow, Commander of Southern European Allied Forces visited Turkey in June and July 1982.

Within the spirit of "cooperation", the military junta has permitted the flights of U-2 spy planes and of AWACS from air bases in Turkey.

More than 250 Turkish and American businessmen met in Istanbul on October 3-6, 1982, to discuss in panels the prospects of boosting Turkish-American economic cooperation. "Turkey is capable of becoming the breadbasket of the Middle-East," Burke McCormack, an American banker, said in an interview. "Investors in a foreign country are primarily interested in the durability of the administration of that country." The president of the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, Ali Kocman announced that "Turkish businessmen offered the Americans numerous projects to develop jointly. American businessmen are considering using Turkey as an economic outpost to produce here and export to the Middle and Near East area."

On October 7, 1982, it is the first time that the US *Rapid Deployment Force* took part in the NATO manoeuvre code-named "Determination 82" carried out in Turkey and landed troops from the air in the area of Kesan of the Turkish Thrace.

Just before the referendum on the new Constitution, CIA Chief William Casey made a 36-hour visit to Turkey and held talks with Turkish authorities. Responding to a question, Turkish Premier Ulusu declared that he could not reveal the subject discussed with the CIA chief.

MODERNIZATION OF MILITARY AIRFIELDS IN TURKEY

On October 31, 1982, Turkey and the United States reached an agreement to improve and modernize the facilities of an undisclosed number of Turkish air bases for use by US Forces "in time of major crisis or war." Turkish Defense Minister also disclosed that cooperation in the military field was being contemplated with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Tunisia. A few days later, on November 4, 1982, Egyptian Foreign Minister Kemal Hasan Ali, during his visit to Ankara, announced that Egypt was ready for a strategic cooperation with Turkey.

On November 15, 1982, US Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupe told the Turkish Press that there were plans for stockpiling military equipment at Turkish airfields which were to be modernized under the new Turco-American agreement.

What is most important, two big chiefs of the NATO Alliance, US President Reagan and West German Premier Helmut Kohl announced in a joint communiqué issued on November 17, 1982, in Washington that both countries would support the Turkish Government's efforts "to return to democracy".

The issue of Turkish support to the Rapid Deployment Force gained a new dimension with the signing of a new agreement between Turkey and the United States on November 29, 1982, in Brussels. This agreement stipulated building new airfields in Turkey and modernizing the existing ones, and gave the US the right of military storage on Turkish soil. In the meantime, it was announced in Washington that the US had set up a new military command in the Middle East for defending US interest in the Gulf Area and Indian Ocean.

On April 17, 1984, the Turkish daily *Hürriyet* reported that, for making suitable to NATO standards, the military airfields were being built in Gaziantep, Dalaman and in Erzurum. When these works were completed, the most sophisticated aircraft of the NATO Alliance would be able to land in and take off from these airfields. The cost of all these works is estimated at 16 million dollars.

Another facility provided by the Turkish side is that the maintenance and repair of AWACS planes flying over Turkey are carried out by the Turkish maintenance workshops at the Yesilköy Airport in Istanbul. These workshops are charged also with the maintenance of other military planes in NATO's service such as C-5, C-141 and A-4. (*Hürriyet*, October 25, 1984).

In September 1985, a military report submitted to the US Congress revealed the following facilities given by Turkey to the United States:

- All underground and surface nuclear experimental explosions of the Soviet Union are listened to by the US installations in Turkey.
- 25 percent of intelligence on the Soviet regions where missiles have been installed are controlled via Turkey.
- Listening to SS-18 and SS-19 missiles can be carried out only by the US installations in Turkey.



TURKEY ON THE NUCLEAR FRONTLINE

Since the fall of the Shah of Iran knocked out Trackman 2, the sharpest US eye on Soviet missile and satellite launches, Turkey has become a key strategic site for the US and NATO to monitor the USSR.

The only NATO member other than Norway to share a border with the USSR, Turkey controls a choke point coveted by the USSR—the Dardanelles strait that provides the entrance to the Mediterranean. And the world's largest known oil reserves lie just beyond its borders.

Like other Third World countries, Turkey finds it difficult to resist pressure for further involvement in superpower politics, even if it risks turning the place into "a nuclear cemetery," as a Radio Moscow commentator once put it. Not only is Turkey dependent on the industrialized capitalist countries for markets, it gets a strong handshake from the US by way of military aid, which has risen to US \$755-million in 1985.

Because of its strategic location, Turkey is deeply involved in the nuclear buildup. There are more than 60 military installations controlled mainly by the US and employing more than 5,000 people, where around 500 US nuclear warheads are stored. At present these are Honest John missiles with a 64 km range, which the US is planning to replace with medium-range Pershing Lance-2 missiles. It is also considering giving Turkey 72 new F-16 fighters equipped with nuclear missiles.

While the missiles and bases are the most dramatic signs of Turkey's ties to nuclear strategy, the country bristles with communications and spy stations. The largest of these, the US combat and missile base at Incirlik on the southern border with Syria, also doubles as a main communications and command facility linked to nuclear weapons, according to the listing of US facilities in Turkey in *Nuclear Battlefields*.

Further east, at Pirinçlik, where a surveillance squadron is based, detection and tracking radars probe missile tests in the Soviet Union and satellite activity is monitored.

Interception-eavesdropping stations began to mushroom in Turkey in the late

- 20 percent of the fuel provision of the US 6th Fleet is made in the Turkish ports.

- US military presence in the Mus and Batman bases constitute an obstacle against any Soviet intervention to the Middle East and the Gulf Area.

On February 1, 1986, *The Wall Street Journal* reported that Turkey's strategic importance has grown since the construction of new pipelines which start from Iraq and run to the Mediterranean Sea by passing through Turkey's south-eastern territories. These new pipelines have also decreased the strategic importance of the Iranian Gulf. While 41 percent of the oil exported to Western countries were being sent from the Gulf ten years ago, today this has fallen to 15 percent. The newspaper also described these new pipelines as "the major supply line of NATO."

On February 5, 1986, the daily *Cumhuriyet* reported that NATO aircrafts used the Konya Air Base in Turkey for their training flights. Among them were US planes taking off from the 6th Fleet.

On February 24, 1986, Turkey and the United States signed a bilateral agreement obliging Ankara to keep secret all information concerning Turco-American military cooperation and the high technology transferred to Turkey by the USA.

On the other hand, an American analyst, William M. Arkin, claimed, in his article which appeared in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, that

1950s, mainly around the northern coasts and north eastern Anatolia. In 1963-64, the first long-range radar station for monitoring Soviet missile bases and Syrian military activities was installed in Diyarbakir.

These activities continued to flourish until 1975 when, after the US arms embargo on Turkey over the invasion of Cyprus, Turkey demanded to share the intelligence collected from US bases in Cyprus and established some control over US and NATO activities. But observers believe the reassertion of Turkey's role is more rhetorical than real.

The US lifted the embargo in 1978, preparing the ground for a close relationship.

The envelopment of Turkey in US global and regional designs proceeded at a dizzy pace. After the Rapid Deployment Force was established in 1980, Turkey signed a secret defence agreement with the US Reports that is allowed the use of Turkish bases by the RDF were confirmed by the launch of the ill-fated Iran hostage rescue from the base in Incirlik. The 1981 establishment of a mutual defense pact with the US meant Turkey became the first NATO country to enter into a bilateral agreement with what is essentially a multilateral military pact. A year later, discussions started on yet another deal under which US bases in Erzurum and Batman will be modernized, a new base will be built in Mus and 10 military airports will be enlarged and modernized. Turkey will also increase access to aircraft carriers of the Sixth Fleet.

Turkey's enhanced role fits in well with NATO's new military strategies which, according to Arkin and Fieldhouse, "are focusing more and more on areas to the south of Europe -North Africa, the Middle East and beyond- moving farther and farther away from NATO's traditional battlefields." (*South*, March 1986).

the United States already placed its nuclear forces in Turkey on a stand-by alert status, similar to that of landbased missiles and B-52 bombers at home.

As evidence, the Institute for Policy Studies researcher cited an *Munitions Bulletin* dated October 1983 and published by the Headquarters of US Air Forces in Europe.

The publication said the US nuclear weapons mission in Turkey "is in an aggressive growth stage" and that its four munitions support squadrons "are actively pursuing resumption of alert."

The article said the United States stores "some 500 warheads in Turkey, and as many as 300 of them are bombs for aircraft."

"US nuclear bombs are stored at four Turkish airbases –Eskisehir, Mürted, Incirlik and Balikesir– for use by four Turkish Air Force units. Resumption of "alert" in Turkey means that aircrafts there are loaded with nuclear bombs in peace time and are ready to strike targets in the Soviet Union."

Arkin added that operations at the only US combat airbase in the country, at Incirlik, "have increased significantly since the signing of a 1980 Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement... allowing an increase in the number of aircraft assigned to Incirlik from 18 to 36."

FIVE AREAS OF TURCO-AMERICAN MILITARY COOPERATION

According to the daily *Cumhuriyet* of November 2, 1986, the Turco-American military cooperation was becoming concrete in five areas:

1. Nuclear Posts:

Turkish and American soldiers, in the context of NATO work, have already concluded an accord relating to the modernization of nuclear posts in Turkey. The four military airports and the Incirlik airbase where nuclear bombers are stationed are equipped with new nuclear arms systems. These systems allow the nuclear bombers to take off more quickly. Of these systems, 30 will be installed at the Incirlik air base, five at Balikesir, six at Erhac (Malatya), six at Mürted (Ankara) and six at Eskisehir.

2. The F-16 at Incirlik:

Up to now, all the American bombers stationed in Turkey were F-4s (Phantoms) and F-104s. At the end of long negotiations, the Turkish Chief of Staff accepted replacing the F-4 at Incirlik by F-16 bombers. While the F-4 squadrons are each composed of 18 bombers, the new F-16 squadrons each contain 24 bombers.


3. Turkish support to American units:

In case of war, Turkey will be responsible for providing all the logistic support to the American units stationed on its territory. According to an agreement plan titled "Agreement of support by the host country", all the reinforcement squadrons will have at their disposal all the necessary services and material as soon as they arrive at their base. According to a Pentagon

spokesman, the two parties have already been in agreement on 95% of the text.

4. Airport destined for co-utilization:

This concerns the airports of Mus and Batman, which respectively cost 21 million and 8.3 million dollars. A fifth of the construction of the Mus airport is already done. The construction at Batman will begin very soon.



5. Enlargement of the Incirlik base:

The largest air base of the Western Mediterranean is in the process of being enlarged by the United States. This work costs a total of 29 million dollars.

Moreover, according to the daily *Milliyet*, the number of nuclear warheads in Turkish territory has risen to 489 and the number of nuclear infrastructures to 22.

The German weekly *Der Spiegel* reports that the USA will also place chemical arms in Turkey starting 1987.

CONTROVERSIAL US MILITARY "AID" TO TURKEY

In return of all these facilities, the United States have considerably increased its military "aid" to Turkey in the years following the coup d'état. While its annual sum was 204.9 million dollars in 1980, it was raised up to 251.7 million dollars in 1981, to 403 millions in 1982, to 402.8 millions in 1983, to 718.1 millions in 1984 and to 703.1 millions in 1985.

Has this "aid" been sufficient to cover the military expenditures that Turkey has been obliged to make during all these years for reinforcing the US control over the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

First of all, Turkey is obliged, due to her engagements in the NATO Alliance, to spend 11.68 percent of her Gross National Product for military purposes, while this percentage was 4.54 percent for Greece, 3.57 percent for Portugal, 1.64 percent for the Great Britain, 1.20 percent for the United States and 0.79 for the FRG.

According to a report from the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency which appeared in the press on May 16, 1984, the total military spending of Turkey for 1982 was 3.4 billion dollars.

Turkey assigned 19.8 percent of the State budget to military expenditures, while the percentage was only 8.7 for education services and 2.7 percent for health services.

But neither the Turkish military nor the United States consider this sacrifice sufficient for the armament of Turkey.

A Middle-East specialist in the United States estimated in his survey published by the *Orbis Magazine* that the Turkish Army needed at least 18 billion dollars over a 13-year period for reaching NATO's minimum armament standards (*Hürriyet*, December 24, 1983).

Although the United States raised the sum of military "aid" to Turkey after the military coup d'état, it was very far from financing the needs of modernization and rearmament of the Turkish Army.

With a view to persuading the United States to give a higher contribution to the military expenditures of Turkey, Sükrü Elekdağ, the Turkish ambassador to Washington, illustrated the strategic importance at the Conference of Turkish and American Businessmen held on September 5, 1984 in Istanbul, as follows:

"- Turkey is the only NATO country which shares a 1200-mile frontier with the Soviet Union (300 miles in the East and 900 miles at the Black Sea).

"- The Turkish Straits are the only means to control the passage of the Soviet Navy from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea.

"- Turkey constitutes the only barrier between the Communist world and the Arab Peninsula. She is in a position of preventing a Soviet penetration to the Eastern Mediterranean.

"- Turkey defends 33 percent of the frontiers between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

"- The US Forces in Turkey take advantage of using data gathering stations in this country.

"- Turkey assures good relations of Arab countries with United States and plays the role of shield protecting the State of Israel.

"- The Turkish Army, with its available force of 820,000 men, is the second most powerful NATO army behind the US Army. The force of the Turkish Army is superior to the total of the armed forces of Greece, Great Britain, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and Canada." (*Cumhuriyet*, September 16, 1983).

Despite all "lobbying" of the Turkish representatives, the United States began, from 1986 on, to make drastical cuts in the sum of the military "aid" granted to Turkey. This sum fell to 618.1 million dollars in 1986, to 493.2 million dollars in 1987 and to 490 million dollars in 1988.

TROUBLES IN THE TURCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Mainly due to the cut in the military "aid" and to the critical stand of the US Congress as regards the Turkish regime, Turco-American relations have not developed evenly.

First of all, while U.S. presidential elections were drawing near in 1984, the relations started to take a turn for the worse as a result of some Congress resolutions. Although the 1980 Coup was encouraged and supported enthusiastically by Washington, and Turkey had distinguished herself over the past four years as the USA's most reliable ally in the Middle East, critical remarks made by US legislators regarding Ankara's human rights policies and the Cyprus issue aroused, for a certain time, growing anger in Ankara against the United States.

In 1984, the Appropriations Committee of the US House of Representatives, while approving a 17.8-billion dollars foreign aid bill for 1985, called for a cut of 215 million dollars worth of "assistance" to Turkey. The Reagan Administration had proposed a 755-million dollars "military aid" package to Turkey. The House panel approved 540 million dollars for Turkey and the amount cut from the Turkish assistance was appropriated to the economic aid extended to the Philippines. Furthermore, it included in its decision a statement saying Congress hopes Turkey will be able to use its influence with the Turkish community on Cyprus in moving toward a settlement in finding a solution to the problems that have divided the island for 10 years.

But the major blow to Turco-American relations was a US House of Representatives resolution designating April 24th, 1985, as "national day of remembrance of man's inhumanity to man," in connection with the massacre of Armenians.

On September 10, 1984, the US House passed by voice vote the afore-said resolution, which was followed by a Senate Foreign Relations Committee decision calling for Armenian claims to be considered in the conduct of US foreign policy and referring to parts of Turkey as Armenian homeland for the past 2,500 years.

Despite the fact that more than one million Armenians had been massacred or deported in the late 19th and 20th century by the Ottoman Empire's rules, the successive governments of the new Republic of Turkey have persisted in denying categorically this fact.

Following the Congress resolution, Turkish Premier Özal warned the

United States that "friendly" bilateral relations could suffer damage "difficult or sometimes impossible to repair".

Özal's statement appeared to have been prompted by the uproar in Turkish press and parliament over the US Resolutions. "We submit to world opinion that these resolutions lend support to international terrorism, aimed also at US citizens, including in particular the criminal acts of ASALA and other similar terrorist organizations."

On the contrary, the supporters of the Resolutions claimed that it was international indifference to the Massacre of Armenians that gave way to growing violence by young Armenians and the Congress resolutions were likely to stem this escalation.

ÖZAL CALMS DOWN ANTI-AMERICAN MOVE IN PARLIAMENT

On the Congress' resolution, the Populist Party (HP) demanded an extraordinary session of the Turkish Parliament immediately to discuss the subject. A motion tabled by this party said the decisions of the US Congress cannot be just swept aside with a mere condemnation by the Turkish Foreign Ministry and recommended that "this decision, which has deeply hurt the Turkish nation, should get due reply."

However, Necmettin Karaduman, the Speaker of the National Assembly declared on September 14, 1984, that there would be no extraordinary session in Parliament to discuss the US Congress decision.

In fact, in spite of the uproar in the Turkish press and political parties, General-President Evren and his Prime Minister Turgut Özal preferred to follow a "wait and see" policy. In their view, the US Congress Resolutions were merely maneuvers of some politicians who were seeking support of Armenian and Greek lobbies for the coming US elections. The Government's spokesmen stated their confidence in Reagan's policy and claimed that after the elections all these initiatives "out of narrow and short-term political considerations" would be brushed aside.

This moderate response of Turkey's rulers became the subject of varying comments in the Turkish press.

One of Turkey's most influential daily newspapers, *Günaydin*, claimed on September 19, 1984, without daring to allude to General Evren, that Özal's "wait and see" policy resulted from fear:

"Özal does not wish to make himself a target for the USA," the newspaper said; "Therefore, he acts cleverly. He knows well enough that whoever got into a scramble with the US lost in the end. Rumors that blackmail by the chairman of the Democrat Party was what underlay the May 27, 1960, incident, which sent former prime minister Adnan Menderes to the gallows in 1961 for crimes against the State. When the USA in the late 1950's refused to give him the 350 million dollars he had requested, Menderes said, 'If you don't give it to me, I'll get it from the Soviets'. The extension of Sümerbank

plants and the setting up of Cayirova Glass Industries were two of the things achieved, thanks to progress he made during that period. Menderes said that he might even visit the Soviet Union. Özal is careful and cautious, he wants to get out of this matter in good time without harming our higher interests. That is the reason for his cool-headedness."

Despite some troubles appearing from time to time, Turco-American relations have gained an impetus during the rule of Evren-Özal tandem. It is the United States that have been the main supporter of the military regime. Both Evren and Özal are very well aware of the fact that without US support their anti-democratic and anti-popular policies could never have been enforced and applied and that they would have been doomed to total isolation in the international arena.

In this respect, the military regime has already paid the price of this US support by concluding a lot of both military and commercial bilateral agreements with the United States. The reopening of the US military bases, modernization of Turkish air fields so as to enable their possible use by the US spy planes and AWACS radar planes to fly over Turkey, US participation in Turkey's war industry, purchasing of 160 F-16 aircraft from General Dynamics at an overall cost of 4,200 million dollars and a 300 million dollars order for a new electronic telephone system from ITT are the main items of the enlarged collaboration program with the US.

As for the development of Turco-Soviet economic and commercial relations, the US have no objection to their extension as far as Turkey complies with the restrictions imposed by COCOM (Coordination Committee for the Multilateral Control of Strategic Exports). As seen in the case of US pressure on the Belgian export of boring and milling machines to the Soviet Union, many restrictions likewise have already been imposed by COCOM on Turkish export of strategic items and materials to socialist countries, and all Turkish governments have obediently accepted these restrictions.

For all these reasons, it would be very naive to claim that the said tension in Turco-American relations results in a radical change in Turkish foreign policy.

ÖZAL'S VISIT TO THE USA

In fact, after President Reagan's reelection, Premier Özal made a very "satisfact-ory" visit to the United States in April 1985.

This first official visit of a Turkish Premier after a 13-year interval, was an occasion for President Reagan to express his admiration for his guest: "*You are, he said, a loyal friend and an important ally.*" The chief of the White House also promised Özal to assign to him for the next fiscal year \$ 939 million in aid and credits: \$ 785 million for the military and \$ 150 million for Turkey's economic needs; an amount which was higher than the aid decided by the US Congress for all African countries suffering from hunger.

Özal had hoped for at least \$ 1.2 billion in order to modernize the Turkish Armed Forces. The promised aid, according to the Belgian daily *Le Soir* of April 6, 1985, was rather small in comparison with US aid to Israel and Egypt, particularly if one takes into consideration the strategical importance of a country which was labelled by State Secretary Schultz as a "natural barrier against Soviet expansionism" guarding a third of the borders of NATO countries bordering on Warsaw Pact countries.

Nevertheless, the same newspaper reported that, in view of the Greek threat to close down the US military facilities on Greek territory in December 1985, at the expiry of the contract signed in 1983, in the event of Papandreu winning the anticipated general election (which was expected to be held in June 1985), the Reagan administration might not hesitate for a long time between Turkey and Greece.

According to the Turkish press, Özal gave President his guarantee that, in the event of Greece persisting in its intentions, Turkey would be ready to welcome the US military installations and the maintenance facilities of the US Sixth Fleet. In return, the US President promised Özal to counter the US Congress' tendency to protectionism for preventing an increase in Turkish exports to the United States.

After this visit, the military presence of the United States and NATO gained impetus. The following press excerpts give a better idea on this escalation:

The German review *Stern* announced in its July 1985 issue that a British spy plane, "Black Bird SR-71," had been fueled on military air base in Diyarbakir, Turkey, for its reconnaissance flight over Soviet aircraft carries and naval arsenals at the Black Sea.

However, Despite Reagan's promise Congress set the military "aid" to Turkey for 1986 at 618.1 million dollars and opposed any change in the parity (7 for Greece and 10 for Turkey) in distributing US military aid to these two "hostile" allies.

NEVER ENDING BARGAININGS ON THE REVISION OF DECA

At the end of 1985, the Turkish Government, with a view to obtaining more military aid and to increasing the volume of Turkish exports to the United States, asked for a revision of the DECA. In spite of a big opposition in the country, in March 1987, Ankara agreed to extend for five years without obtaining a concrete advantage from the United States. American Secretary of State George Schultz's letter to his Turkish counterpart, Vahit Halefoğlu, of March 16, 1987, said: "DECA is a solemn commitment on the part of the United States to assist in strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces as well as the economy of the Turkish Republic," and it pledged to propose to the U.S. Congress annually a high level of support to Turkey.

During the negotiations, the United States pressured Turkey to provide more emergency facilities for its Armed Forces. In return, the Turkish side, reminding that Turkey's trade deficit with the United States reached 700 million dollars in 1985, asked for the lifting of obstacles put before Turkish textile export by Washington and for a raising of U.S. "aid" up to 1,200 million dollars, which totalled 703.1 million dollars for defense in 1985.

But after the exchange of letters, the United States has shown once more its disrespect to its commitments. Instead of increasing the aid, the U.S. Congress lowered military "aid" for Turkey to 490 million dollars. It further proposed that the American aid must not be used for the Turkish troops in Cyprus.

Main opposition Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP) leader Erdal İnönü immediately declared that the "negative developments" seen in the Congress should result in the DECA being totally abrogated. İnönü had already applied to the "President of the Republic" and the Speaker of the National Assembly for postponement of the signing. He said Turkey should have tried to achieve concrete guarantees from the United States and the establishment of Turkey parliamentary control of Turco-American military bases and installations in Turkey.

He said Turkey was paying the price for credits and "aid" it was receiving from the United States, and that if the Congress insists on placing conditions on them, then Turkey should stop receiving them. "Turkey should get credits from other countries as well and should not be dependent on the United States," he added.


In fact, the military "aid" in the form of FMS (foreign military sales) constitutes a very heavy burden for the Turkish economy. In the period of 1972-1986, the USA gave Turkey FMS credits of 3,528 million dollars in total. Turkey has already paid back 594 million dollars of this sum. Until the year 2015, Turkey will pay back the rest of the debt totalling 2,934.7 million dollars as well as the interests of 3,585.1 million dollars, that is 6,519.9 million dollars in total.

U.S. MADE SCENARIO FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

While the tension was growing in Turco-American relations, an article appeared in *the International Herald Tribune* of November 1st, 1986, reveals some new sinister plans of Washington in which the top role is attributed to the Turkish Army. The article reads:

"Turkey borders the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union supports Syria, while conducting a war in still another Moslem country, Afghanistan. Turkey's two other neighbors, Iran and Iraq, are in the sixth year of a pitiless war. 'What other country has neighbors like ours?' a Turk asks.

"Turkey's insecurity is real, as is its interest in alliance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United States. It maintains a half-



million-man army (in a population of 52 million), the largest NATO military force outside the United States. It is justified in doing so.

"But insecurity and dependence produce a sense of victimization as well, which takes as its object the United States, this indispensable ally which —Turks say— nevertheless does too little in support step for which Turks will have to pay the price.

"Earlier this month, a commando from Iran, apparently acting with help from autonomy-minded Kurdish tribesman, raided the Kirkuk oilfields in Iraq. These fields are roughly equidistant from Iran and Turkey, some 150 miles (243 kilometers) into Iraq. Turkey, gets much of its oil from Kirkuk, has a substantial pipeline income from the oilfield, fears Kurdish autonomy, and has a historical claim to the Kirkuk region, which is peopled by Turks.

"The Iranian raid prompted what a leading Turkish daily called 'a scenario being discussed in the diplomatic and political lobbies of Ankara.'

"The scenario goes as follows:

- "1. Iran's forthcoming offensive breaks through Iraqi defenses.
- "2. Turkey invades Iraq to take Kirkuk before Iranian forces arrive.
- "3. The Soviet Union threatens Turkey.
- "4. The United States sends its Rapid Deployment Force, ostensibly to defend the Turks, actually to support their pre-emptive seizure of Kirkuk and its oil for the West.

"The Turkish opposition replied 'this scenario looks as if it is cooked up by the United States'; America, opposition figures said, wants to punish Iran as well as to deny Kirkuk's oil to Iran and its ally, Syria. The outcome,

these Turks say, would be US forces permanently in Turkey, and 'Turkey's independence reduced to zero.'

"On October 16, the Turkish foreign minister denied that his country had any intention of invading Iraq and restated Turkey's neutrality in the Gulf War."

However, that same day, the daily *Milliyet* referring to reliable sources, publicized the "national motives" for Turkish intervention:

"More than one million Turks live in Mosoul and Kirkuk regions. At the beginning of the National Liberation War of Turkey (1919), these regions figured inside the borders claimed by the national liberation movement. But, after the war, this question could not be resolved in a favorable way because of Turkey's weakness at the time, and the Mosoul and Kirkuk regions were left to Great Britain. However, Turkey historically has right to these regions.

"♦ Turkey imports a large part of its oil needs from Iraq. Most of Iraqi oil comes by way of a pipe-line. Furthermore, Turkey annually receives \$300 million in exchange for the location of this pipeline to third parties. Ankara cannot accept a threat to its economic interests.

"♦ In case of the collapse of the rule of Saddam Hossein, Iraq could fall apart. By profiting from this situation, the Kurds could obtain a more advantageous position in northern Iraq. They have already been strengthened thanks to the lack of power in this country. Moreover, the separatists of Turkey are based in this region."

In another article, *Milliyet* reported that the amount of petroleum transported from Kirkuk in Iraq to Yumurtalik in Turkey by means of the pipeline annually rises to 46.5 million tons. This exportation of petroleum furnishes Iraq with an annual revenue of six billion dollars. The length of the pipeline crossing Turkish territory is 641 kilometers. Turkey has already ordered the enlargement of the pipeline by an association of Turkish and Italian companies. After the realization of this project, the volume of petroleum to transport will rise to 70 million tons and Turkey's annual location revenue will climb to \$500 million from the present 300 million.

According to another report, Turkey also has vital interests on the Ha-bour-Baghdad route which assures Turkish exportation to Middle East countries. This route is also well exposed to threat from Kurdish partisans supported by Iran.

On August 15, 1986, the Turkish army, without taking account of Teheran's possible reaction, bombarded Kurdish villages, and some days later, a unit of the special forces entered Iraqi territory with the aim of arresting Kurdish militants taking refuge in this region.

This air operation was done as a "hot pursuit", affirming that one country can send its armed forces into another "in the case of compelling necessity."

Although the Turkish Constitution requires parliamentary consultation before any military action be undertaken outside national territory, this "hot

pursuit" operation was decreed by the government using its "special powers" without consulting Parliament.

This *fait accompli* was the subject of a parliamentary debate two weeks later and the government on September 3, 1986, introduced in the National Assembly a motion aimed at making deputies approve this operation.

During debates on the motion, it was warned that reference to the right of "hot pursuit" was a very risky blunder in the international arena, because this right could only be used on the high seas. According to experts, recourse to this principle in air or ground operations can justify a possible hit back from the neighboring country and can drag Turkey into an unforeseen war.

US PLANS ON THE FUTURE OF THE TROUBLED CYPRUS

Pentagon has been seeking for years to use not only Turkey, but also Cyprus, as a springboard for possible military action in the Persian Gulf area and in the Arabic peninsula. Even though the "*Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus*" does not belong to NATO, it is -from a geographical viewpoint- favorably located opposite the critical Near East area.

The island of two nations had already been divided in two since the Turkish military occupation in 1974. Within the framework of the Turkish military's expansionism, the proclamation of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" in 1983 made official this division. Under Denktash's rule, the economic and social situation of northern Cyprus is getting worse and worse in comparison with the southern part. The creation of the "TRNC" serves only the US interests in the region.

Near the locality of *Gecitkale* (Lefkonikos), north-east from Nicosia, the Turkish Armed Forces are building a huge military airport equipped with all auxiliary facilities (preparations which are being kept half-secret, are going on for a rather long time).

This is all the more noteworthy since, after the 1974 invasion, the occupation forces had already built an airport at Ercan, north from Nicosia, which fully covers their military needs.

According to the West German weekly *Die Zeit* of October 25, 1983, the day the airsupport base at Gecitkale is ready, it will belong to the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". Despite their official indignation following the proclamation of the "republic", the USA may then embark on negotiations to secure utilization rights. But, first, Washington should, of course, recognize the new state. Consequently, the foundation of the "TRNC" could be interpreted as the proclamation of independence of an air base surrounded by the land it needs. This would offer yet another advantage. Three support bases are located in the Greek sector of Cyprus and practically belong to NATO: the British bases of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, and the US radar station located in the Troodos mountains. The Greek Cypriots are constantly

using these support bases as a trump card, by threatening off and on to close them down. However, the day Gecitkale starts operating, this asset will no longer be of any use.

On the other hand, the Turkish daily *Cumhuriyet* published in its November 22, 1983, issue, an article from the *New York Times* in which the United States and the Republic of Cyprus were reported to have signed an agreement in August 1982, whereby US military aircraft were allowed to use the airport facilities at Larnaka for US intervention in the event of a possible confrontation in Lebanon.

According to *Die Zeit*, "It is known that for three years Pentagon has been trying to persuade Turkey to allow it to use her territory, even in situations like the invasion of Lebanon in 1958. So far this has been systematically refused by Turkey, seeing that such a move is likely to put her in a very awkward position with respect to the Arab countries, which in turn, would undermine Turkish plans of economic penetration into Asia, which presently constitute one of the basic lines of Turkey's development strategy. Consequently, building a US base in the occupied sector of Cyprus may very well be a solution to that sort of problem from the moment that this base would actually imply a concession from Ankara, while - on a formal level - it would be the business of an independent state, and Turkey herself would not be committed in her relations with Arab countries."

As reported by the Italian daily *La Repubblica* of January 17, 1985, ground installations work at Gecitkale airport has cost \$ 450 million.

So the complete failure of all efforts to reunite both communities cannot only be ascribed to the Turkish military's expansionist ambitions and to both sides' intransigent leaders, but, first and foremost, to the instigations, provocations and manipulations by US circles who never hesitate to set one people against another with the view of defending and preserving their own political, economic and military interests.

The "state" headed by Denktash is probably not a legitimate child of the United States. However, as *Die Zeit* put it, nothing prevents it being the Pentagon's illegitimate one.

Beside the problem of Cyprus, Turco-Greek conflict on the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea often gives rise to the tension in the region. Recently, just after the bombing of Kurdish area in Irak by the Turkish aircrafts, Turkey reached, at the end of March 1987, the verge of an armed conflict with Greece in the Aegean Sea.

The still unadjusted demarcation of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea was the formal cause of the latest flare-up between Greece and Turkey. A Greek-based international consortium, North Aegean Petroleum Co. announced that it would start searching oil in international waters in the east of Thasos Island. Thereupon, Turkey sent the survey ship *Sismik 1* into the Aegean, flanked by warships.

The danger of war was averted when Turkish Prime Minister Ozal declared in London that the Turkish naval and research ships would not enter

the disputed areas provided Greek ships remained within the 6-mile Greek territorial waters.

This tension was a very real threat that international security would be upset in the highly sensitive Eastern Mediterranean region. This naturally caused anxiety in the Soviet Union and other neighbouring states. Moscow urged the Greek and Turkish governments to avoid any action that could complicate the situation.

It will be recalled that the U.N. Security Council suggested taking the expertise of the International Court of Justice into consideration, when in August 1976 it debated a similar Turco-Greek incident over the rights of the two sides to exploit the natural wealth of the Aegean Sea's continental shelf. Turkey refuses this proposal on grounds that the sharing of the Aegean waters between two neighbour countries is so complicated that any solution can only be found between Greece and Turkey before going to international jurisdiction.

In his March 27, 1987, statement the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu directly charged the United States with responsibility for the crisis.

In fact, the United States has shown increasing dissatisfaction with the independence Athens has been displaying in foreign policy, notably with Papandreu's unequivocally advocacy of disarmament and the preservation and amplification of arms control treaties. Finally, it was angered by Athens' refusal to provide guarantees for the continued presence of U.S. bases in Greece, its demand for the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons, and its unwillingness to participate in military preparations of the West.

MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

The declared objective of the military junta, author of the coup d'état of 1980, was not only "establishing law and order", but also strengthening the military power of Turkey. This has also been the objective of the United States which earlier had lost, due to the Islamic revolution in Iran, a very important strategic position in the Middle East. A Turkey to be politically stabilized and militarily strengthened was the only chance for the United States to maintain its control over the region. However, as seen in the preceding chapters, the United States wish to strengthen the Turkish Armed Forces by forcing the people of Turkey to make more sacrifices under an authoritarian regime rather than attributing more military "aid" to this most loyal ally.

According to a survey made by SIPRI in 1987, Turkey rose to the first position among 25 European countries as regards the increase rate of military expenditures. This rate rose to 14.6% in 1986, while it was 4.8% in 1985.

Already in 1972 a special law had been adopted for an additional expenditure of 5 billion dollars for implementing the Army's reorganization and modernization program (REMO). After a 5-year rule, the aim of strengthening the military power of the country has already been achieved to a great extent. The army chiefs have reached "satisfactory and pleasing levels" by using all financial and material possibilities of the State and by exploiting a man-power deprived of the right to defend itself by the means of collective bargaining and strike actions.

Strengthening the military power of the country, in fact, was not only the affair of the army chiefs. Behind them were also NATO (particularly its two major partners, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany) and big business, looking for fabulous profits in the creation of a *military-industrial complex* in this under-developed country.

The daily *Cumhuriyet* of September 17, 1980, reported that "after the military takeover, the efforts for creating a *military-industrial complex* with the participation of public and private sectors have been intensified. This complex aims to produce military equipments and also to export high quality steel, integrated circuits and castings."

What was the status of Turkey's military forces before the coup d'état? Were these forces capable of defending the country? If not, what were the reasons? And one more critical question: In the case of rearmament of the Turkish Armed Forces, who would be the real beneficiary: Turkey or the United States and NATO?

We can find the answer to this question again in the report of the US Congress issued just before the military coup in 1980: "The Turkish Armed Forces are equipped almost totally with US equipment, they were and still are heavily dependent upon access to US spare parts and supplies. Much of the Turkish military hardware is of World War II and Korean War vintage. Increasingly, older items in the Turkish inventory are becoming difficult to support because US spare parts for these items are, or will be, unavailable. US officials have estimated that nearly 50 percent of Turkey's military equipment is badly in need of repair and is difficult to operate, making Turkish combat effectiveness fairly low. Cannibalization of some major weapons systems to keep others operational has become widespread, especially in the Turkish Air Force. Maintenance difficulties have become severe and training of crews has suffered, leading to additional losses of equipment through accidents. Currently, the Turkish Armed Forces have been weakened to the point that they would find it difficult to fulfill their NATO responsibilities.

"A remedy for Turkey's military problems noted above have been outlined by former SACEUR, General Haig, by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C. Jones. Turkey, they have argued, needs spare parts sufficient to maintain and improve the readiness of military equipment currently in its inventory and requires a modernization program to enable the Turkish Armed Forces to ful-

fill their NATO missions. The modernization program would include improvements to existing communications equipment, anti-aircraft ordnance, antiarmor weaponry, field artillery, munitions and mechanization. It would include some replacements of obsolete aircraft and qualitative improvements to the rest of the Turkish Air Force and Navy. The program would also involve expanded training in the use of the more modern types of weapons systems that have been introduced into Turkey, such as the UH-1H helicopter; RF-4 and F-4E aircrafts equipment; Asroc and Harpoon missiles.

"The costs of the United States of providing military assistance to Turkey in order to upgrade her military forces have not been detailed by American officials. General David C. Jones has noted that a figure of 4,5 billion dollars over a 5-year period has been discussed as a possible amount involved. Such an amount would not provide Turkey with "large amount of new equipment, the current generation," but would mainly improve the equipment Turkey has at present. Although General Jones did not wish to speculate on what specific Defense Department requests might be made of Turkey in future years, he acknowledged that 'obviously, Turkey is going to require some continuing assistance.' It seems apparent that if history is guide the United States will be requested to provide the largest share of that assistance." (Info-Türk, *US Interests in Turkey*, 1982, p.13)

The military-industrial complex in Turkey is composed mainly of four components:

1. Turkey's defense budget.
2. The military foundations for strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces.
3. Turkish big business including the Army Officers' finance holding company OYAK.
4. The US and other NATO countries' war industries.

First of all, since the military coup of 1980, the share of military expenditures within the Turkish national budget has sharply increased by climbing from 15% to 19.8% in 1986. In comparison with the 1985 Fiscal Year Budget, military expenditures increased by 51.8% to 1,300 billion TL. As for the military expenditures' share in the GNP, it was 11,68% in 1984. It should be remembered that in the national budget the sums allocated to national education and to health and social services are respectively 8.7% and 2.7%.

The second axe of the military-industrial complex is the three foundations for strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces. The military has been moving towards creation of a local war industry since the Cyprus crisis in 1974 which was followed by a 3-year US embargo on military sales to Turkey.

The assets of the three foundations amounted to 110 billion TL (200 million dollars) in 1985.

TURKISH AIR FORCES

The leading one among them is the Foundation for Strengthening the Air Force (THKGV). It owns 34 percent of the shares of the Turkish Aeronautic Industries (TUSAS), founded for the task of modernizing the Turkish Air Force and manufacturing war planes. The Turkish aeronautic industry cooperates with more than 170 local firms for the production of different pieces.

The THKGV itself is also contemplating the production of photographic film and paper to be used at reconnaissance activities of the Air Force.

The major step towards the realization of the Turkish aeronautic industries has been the foundation of the aircraft factory, on November 30, 1984, with the purpose of assembling and co-manufacturing Turkey's first F-16 fighters.

"We will be overwhelmed in the near future when these planes start flying through our skies," a jubilant Evren told the guests at a special ceremony at Murted Air Base only a few kilometers outside the capital.

The initial accord had been signed on May 2, 1984, after US aviation company General Dynamics won the stiff competition against McDonnell Douglas and Northrop.

According to this initial accords, the Turco-American joint venture for the assembly and co-manufacture of the F-16 fighter is to be carried out by "TUSAS Aerospace Industries Incorporated". This new corporation was set up by the Turkish parent company, TUSAS (Turkish Aeronautic Industries) on the one hand, and on the other, by the General Dynamics. TUSAS has a 49 percent share in the new company. The Turkish Aviation Institute (THK), has a 0.1 percent share and the Foundation for the Strengthening of the Turkish Air Force (THKGV) 1.9 percent. The remaining 42 percent of the share go to General Dynamics and 7 percent to the engine supplier, another US company, General Electric.

Under another agreement signed in 1984, General Dynamics will meet through the offset arrangements 1.5 billion dollars of the 4.5 billion dollars estimated total cost of the aircraft project. Turkey is to provide one billion dollars from its own resources and the rest is to be met by US military grants and credits.

Turkey plans to buy eight F-16 aircraft to start with and then assemble and later co-produce 152 more planes over a period of 10 years at the Murted plant.

On November 9, 1984, Turkey and General Dynamics concluded a new accord for financing the project. Besides its direct participation with 1.5 billion dollars, General Dynamics promised to assure an offset deal including export of spare parts produced in Turkey as well as other Turkish products of 1.27 billion dollars.

According to the daily *Cumhuriyet* of October 31, 1984, 1,500 qualified personnel will be employed in the aerospace industry plants. These

plants however will produce only 5,000 out of 120 thousand parts of a F-16 plane; the rest will be imported from the United States and assembled in Turkey.

As for the engines of the aircrafts, General Electric will furnish F-10 motors which will be assembled in another plant to be set up in Eskisehir.

For the electronic parts of the aircraft, another Turco-American company has already been founded in Turkey. 51 percent of the shares of this company, named Havelsan-Aydin, belong to the Foundation for the Strengthening of the Turkish Air Forces (THKGV), 38 percent to the US company Aydin Corporation and the rest to another Turkish company, TESTAS.

The assembling of first F-16 planes began at the end of 1986. From January 1987 on, the Turkish aerospace industry started to produce certain parts of the aircraft. And on October 3, 1987, the first co-produced F-16 flew over Turkey's skies.

Expecting the realization of this project, the Turkish military have decided to replace the aging Korean War F-100 jet fighters of the Turkish Air Force by more advanced aircraft.

According to the daily *Milliyet* of August 22, 1984, Turkey plans to buy as soon as possible 34 Phantom fighters from Egypt, 15 Phantoms and five F-5 from the United States, 170F-104 fighters from the Federal Republic of Germany. The Turkish Defense Minister, Mr Yavuztürk, announced that until the production of the F-16 in Turkey, the Turkish Air Force will be equipped with at least 100 Phantoms and 170F-104.

On November 24, 1984, Pentagon announced that the United States decided to grant 12 F-5 jet fighters to Turkey despite objections from Greece.

The FRG promised to hand over to Turkey 75 F-104 aircraft until the end of 1984, 45 fighters in 1985 and 50 fighters in 1986. All these F-104 fighters are being replaced in the German Air Force by Tornado jet fighters, manufactured by a British, German and Italian Consortium.

Canada too has announced that it would grant secondhand F-104 fighters to Turkey. 20 out of these fighters will be delivered after being repaired at a cost of 6 million dollars; the rest, 34 other F-104 will be used by the Turkish Air Force as the spare parts for the repair of 20 fighters.

Great Britain proposed to Turkey, during the visit of Turkish Defense Minister Yavuztürk to London, the sale of 40 Tornado jet fighters, each costing 22 million dollars. But the proposal of British Defense Minister Michael Haseltine was later deadlocked by the veto of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson. British Prime Minister Thatcher also announced on December 13, 1984, that she does not believe Turkey is a suitable market for Tornado planes.

Another new project of the Turkish Air Force is the replacement of the aging World War II vintage C-47 transport planes with modern planes. Turkish officials announced that they also aim to secure a deal whereby Turkey will be able to co-manufacture the transport planes and their spare parts. Thereupon, transport aircraft manufactures and officials from Canada, Spain

BRIBERY CONCERNING F-16 PURCHASES

Allegations of bribery concerning the F-16 jet fighters purchases have gone around in connection with Ex-general Tahsin Sahinkaya, former member of the military junta and commander of the Turkish Air Force.

After a long period of bargaining, the Turkish government had decided on September 7, 1983, to select the F-16 Flying Falcon as the fighter it will co-manufacture with General Dynamics. The contract covers assembling and co-manufacturing 160 planes at an estimated cost of 4.2 billion dollars. The losers of the race were F-18 of McDonnell Douglas and F-20 Tigershark of Northrop.

On June 25, 1985, General Evren laid the foundation for the F-16 jet fighter engine plant in Eskisehir and the first co-produced F-16 flew over Turkey on October 13, 1987.

A few weeks after the laying the foundation of the F-16 plant, the former vice-president of General Dynamics, Mr Takis Velotis, revealed in interview with the Turkish Milliyet of July 11 that the company had given a bribe of TL 12.5 billion to some top officials in Turkey in order to get the deal but he did not give the names of the bribed persons.

However, the American magazine Time, on November 13, 1983, had already mentioned the name of General Sahinkaya as one of the bribed persons and qualified him as the "one of the ten richest army generals of the world."

Although opposition circles asked the State Council of Inspection as the highest authority in this fields, to take up the matter, Provisional Article 15 of the Constitution drawn up by the military junta forbids any legal investigation or action against any decisions or measures whatsoever taken by the Council of National Security (the military junta).

Justice Minister Necat Eldem said that allegations of bribery concerning the F-16 issue may be investigated if Parliament decides to lift Provisional Article 15.

But Parliament, because of the pressure coming from General Evren, cannot act accordingly and the bribed General Tahsin Sahinkaya still keeps his title of "Member of the Presidential Council.

F-16 fighters are the object of serious criticisms from the viewpoint of security. According to the press reports of December 28, 1987, 76 out of 1,200 F-16 fighters of the US Air Forces have had accidents during flights.

and Italy have invaded the Turkish capital for this half a billion dollar plane deal. The Canadians have offered their DCH5-Buffalo or Gash-8 Twin Atter planes, while the Italians their GG-222. The unit price of the 52 new transport planes to replace the C-47 varies between 5.5 to 12 million dollars. Turkish Defense Minister Yavuztürk said on September 12: "We are looking for a partner. Any of the planes of Spain, Italy and Canada is acceptable to us. But our condition is to set up a joint venture."

Turkey has concluded another accord with the US with the view of co-manufacturing UHH helicopters in Ankara under the licence of US Textron. 10 out of 27 helicopters will be delivered immediately by the United States, the rest will be assembled in Turkey.

The Turkish military also aim to reinforce the Turkish Armed Forces with the installation of new missiles. During the Spring 1984 meeting of

the NATO Defense ministers, Turkish minister Yavuztürk called upon his colleagues to support the Turkish project of buying Harpoon missiles to be deployed in Turkey's Aegean region. Despite the fact that this demand was considered acceptable by NATO circles, the deal has been suspended due to the opposition of the Greek side which claims that the installation of these missiles of 90 kilometer-range in Turkish territory will upset the balance of forces in the region, because the French-made EXOCET missile in the possession of the Greek Army have only a 50-kilometer range.

Thereupon, Turkish Minister have started a new bargaining with the British Minister Heseltine for the installation in Turkey of the British anti-air missiles RAPIER. According to the daily *Milliyet* of August 22, 1984, Turkey has ordered 36 Rappier missiles to Great Britain.

Besides, Turkey also ordered from the United States Super Side Winder and Sparrow missiles. The United States announced also its intention to deliver to Turkey Maverick missiles which are used from air to land.

Another Turco-American joint venture project concerns co-production of land based anti-aircraft radars in Turkey: The US company Westinghouse offered an immediate cash inflow of 2.5 million dollars and another 1.5 million dollars in equipment, parts and technical know-how. Westinghouse has also offered to modernize the radars currently in use in the Turkish Air Force's F-4 Phantom fighters. The Corporation is also the manufacturer of the radars for the F-16s which Turkey will co-manufacture in the future.

Although the government claims that the production of Turkish F-16s will save the country from being subjected to the menace of US embargo, the populist deputy Cüneyt Canver revealed on December 14, 1987, that the United States can prevent any time the utilisation of the F-16 fighters in a military conflict, because the computer system of combat functions of these fighters is under the monopoly of the US Air Forces. So, the Turkish Air Force cannot use even these home-made F-16s without the US approval.

TURKISH LAND FORCES

The first step towards the building up of a war industry to produce materials and equipment for the Land Forces has been the establishment of the Foundation for the Strengthening of the Land Forces (KKGV) which has registered a very rapid development after the military coup d'état of 1980. At the General Meeting of the Foundation, held in 1983 in Ankara, General Nurettin Ersin, Commander of the Land Forces and member of the 5-man military junta, said that the Foundation had made important improvements during 1982 and its assets reached 5,310 million TL (27 million dollars). Half of this amount was reportedly donated by Turkish workers abroad. Those donations have been collected at Turkish consulates and border check points either by

exploiting nationalist sentiments of the Turkish workers or by forcing them to pay it. The KKGV owns investments in many enterprises and founded ASELSAN (Military Electronics Industry) to produce electronic pieces and wireless equipment, and later ASPILSAN to produce batteries for military equipment.

At present, the main objective of the Land Forces is to modernize 600 M-48 tanks with more powerful guns and better engines. Modernization of 170 M-48 tanks (transforming in diesel) was already realized at the end of 1983. The US Defense Department announced on August 4, 1984, that the Turkish Army plans to buy "conversion kits" to upgrade its more than 30-year old M-48 tanks at a cost of 129 million dollars. They will be re-equipped with 105-millimeter guns, replacing 90-millimeter weapons.

In addition to the modernization of these tanks, Turkey concluded an agreement in 1980 with the Federal Republic of Germany for the co-production of 77 Leopard tanks in Turkey. Profiting from a 600-million DM Special Military Assistance, this project also envisages the supply of other types of weapons, including 2500 Milan missiles.

These talks turned also to the co-production of a more advanced type of tanks, Leopard-2. But the realization of this project has been suspended by the FRG for financial reasons. But the press reports that the real reason for this suspension was rather the objection of Israel which considers the production of these tanks in Turkey as a threat to its security. The Turkish Defence Minister Yavuztürk said on September 12, 1984, that "This argument is not serious. If the Arabs can't buy the tanks produced in Turkey, they will buy them from Great Britain or from the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact there are claims that in some Arab countries there are also Israeli-made tanks." He expressed the hope that the talks with the FRG will be resumed in the near future.

Turkey has concluded another agreement with the United States for co-producing anti-tank missiles in Turkey. US General Defence Corporation participates in this joint venture with 30.8 million dollars. It is reported that the co-production of these FP-105 missiles will start at the end of 1985.

On the other hand, within the framework of NATO Projects, a tank pallet factory was opened on November 9, 1985, in the province of Adapazari (Arifiye) in Turkey. The FRG granted Turkey 29.5 million DM for the financing of this project.

As for the Machinery and Chemical Industry Corporation of the Armed Forces (MKE), its Çankiri plant was to start from the spring of 1985 producing twin-barrel 20 mm anti-aircraft field guns with the corporation of the Swiss Oerlikon Company.

The Kirikkale plant of the MKE too has concluded an accord with the FRG for co-producing, from 1986 onwards, 105-mm canons. The Leopard-I tanks will be equipped with this cannons.

TURKISH NAVAL FORCES

The Foundation for Strengthening the Navy is the parent company heading creation of naval industry. Thanks to the donations collected from Turkish inmigrant workers abroad, this foundation first constructed two speed boats named "Gurbet-I" and "Gurbet-II" (Exile-I and Exile-II).

According to a survey of *Jane's Defence Weekly*, reported by the daily *Hürriyet* of August 23, 1984, Turkey is among 24 countries which are able to produce their own submarines.

The Gölcük dockyards of the Turkish Navy have been developed since the coup d'état to produce Dogan (Lurssen) class missiles armed gunboats, landing craft and even tankers.

In fact, one of the six submarines of the type 209 given by the FRG is being assembled at Gölcük dockyards. It is reported that Turkey will be able to assemble 8 more submarines at the same dockyards. The Turkish Navy has bought from the FRG 4 "MEKO-200" escort boats. The first two will be delivered in 1986, the two others will be assembled at Turkish dockyards.

On the other hand, 13 LCT landing boats are being constructed in the dockyards of Taskizak with FRG collaboration. Three of these boats and one

INVENTORY OF THE ARMAMENTS OF THE TURKISH ARMY

The Turkish Armed Forces today constitute the second of the most powerful armies of NATO. Their strength rises to 711,000 (of which 80,000 are permanent). In the case of military mobilization, 833,000 reserve troops can be called to arms. For those conscripted, the duration of service is 18 months.

Land Forces

They are composed of 4 armies which have their headquarters in Istanbul, Malatya, Erzincan and Izmir.

- The First Army is responsible –on the operational plan– for Eastern Thrace and mainly composed of armoured unities and those of mobile operations.

- The Second Army is responsible for Central and Northern Anatolia, the Dardanelles and furnishes the Turkish forces in Cyprus with supplies.

- The Third Army controls the Eastern Anatolia and is integrated, like the First and Second Armies, in the operational command of NATO.

- The Fourth Army is responsible for the Aegean region. It was created in 1975 and is not incorporated into the operational command of NATO.

The four armies consist of 10 corps, 2 mechanized infantry divisions, 6

armored brigades, 4 mechanized brigades, 14 infantry divisions and 11 infantry brigades, 1 brigade of paratroopers and 1 brigade of commandos. There are also 4 battalions equipped with 54 "Honest John" sol-sol missiles and 48 independent units (8 of Reconnaissance, 32 of artillery and 8 anti-air artillery).

The strength of the Land Forces goes to 470,000 (of which 50,000 are permanent). In the case of military mobilization, 700,000 reserve troops can be called to arms.

The armament of the Land Forces in different sectors:

ARMoured FORCES: 100M-26,50 Leopard 1A3; 500 M-47; 3,000 M-48 MBT; 2,000 M-113; 1,200 Commando APC.

ARTILLERY: 95 guns M-116A1 of 75 mm; 140 M-101A1 OF 105 mm; 150M-59 and 400 M-11A1 of 155 mm; 116 M 115 of 203 mm; 400 M-7/M-108 of 105 mm; 210 M-46 of 155 mm; 48 M-100 of 203 mm. The artillery has at its disposal also 1,750 guns of 60,81 and 107 mm; howitzers of 120 mm; 18 "Honest John" sol-sol missiles and M-44 guns of 155 mm.

ANTI-TANK ARMS: 1,200 guns of 57 mm; 390 of 75 mm; 800 of 106 mm; also 85 Cobra missiles, SS-SS-11 missiles. TOW guides missiles. Besides, 2,500 Milan guided missiles have been ordered.

ANTI-AIR ARMS: 300 twins of 20 mm, 900 guns of 40 mm as well as M-51 guns and 75 mm and M-117/8 guns of 90 mm.

AIRCRAFTS OF THE ARMY: 18 U-17, 2 DHC-2; 6 Cessna-206; 3 Cessna 421; 15 Dornier-27; 9 Dornier-28; 20 Baron; 5 T-42; 40 Citabria 150S training planes; 156 Augusta-Bell 204/5 Helicopters. 20 Bell 47G; 48 UH-1D and 30 TH-300G. Besides, 27 UH-1H helicopters have already been ordered.

Air Forces

Their strength is 53,000 men (of which 20,000 are permanent). 66,000 reserve troops can be called to arms in the case of mobilization.

The Air Force is composed of 4 commands (2 tactical, 1 administrative and 1 training).

13 SQUADRONS OF BOMBARDIER, of which 2 are equipped with 42 F-5A and 12 F-5B, 2 with 40 F-100C-DF, 6 with 82 F-4E and 8 RF-4E, and 3 squadrons with 50 F/TF-104G.

2 SQUADRONS OF CONTAINMENT, equipped with 30 F-104S.

1 RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON, equipped with 20 RF-5A and F-5B.

6 TRANSPORT SQUADRONS: 2 equipped with 7 C-130E and 20 C-160D, 3 squadrons equipped with 30 C-47A and one squadron with 3 "VIP", 2 Islander, 12 helicopters UH-D1/H and 5 UH-19D.

9 BASIC FLIGHTS SQUADRONS: They have at their disposal 40 T-33A, 2 C-47A and 2 UH-1H helicopters.

3 TRAINING SQUADRONS: Equipped with 24 T-34, 25 T-37, 60 T-38 and 30 T-41.

There are also SPECIAL MISSION SQUADRONS which have at their disposal 36 F-100F and 20 F-104 and another VIP fleet with 2-C47A.

AIR-AIR MISSILES: 750 Super Sidewinder AIM-9P3 as well as Sidewinder, Sparrow, Falcon and Shafrir missiles.

AIR-SOL MISSILES: AS-12, Bullpup and Maverick.

There are also 8 SOL-AIR squadrons equipped with 36 Nike-Hercules and 36 Nike Ajax.

Naval Forces

The strength of the Navy is 46,000 men (of which 10,000 are permanent), 70,000 on reserve troops can be called to arms in the case of war.

There are 5 naval bases in Turkey: Gölçük, Izmir, Istanbul, Ereğli and Iskenderun.

SUBMARINES: 5 type 209, 10 ex-US Guppy, 1 Tang, 1 ex-US Balao.

DESTROYERS: 9 GEARING (2 LEASED, 5 with 1x8 ASROC), 4 Fletcher, 2 Sumer, 2 Carpenter and 2 frigates Berk (each carrying 1 helicopter).

PATROL BOATS: There are 13 patrol boats with missiles and 8 with torpedos. In detail: 4 type Dogan (Lurssen FPB-57) with 2x4 Harpoon SSM; 9 Kartal (T 141 Jaguar) with 4 Penguin-2SSM; 7 boats with Jaguar torpedos and one with type Girne.

MINELAYERS: 1 Type Nusret and 9 coastal minelayers.

MINESWEEPERS: 12 type US Adjutant, 4 ex-Can MCB, 6 ex-Vegesack coastal, 4 ex-US Cape.

There are also 72 landing ships of different types, G6 auxiliary ships (of which 9 tankers) and 25 patrol boats.

Other ships have already been ordered: One submarine Type 209, 4 frigates Meko-200, 2 Lursen carrying missiles, 13 landing ships as well as Harpoon missiles.

The fleet is also comprised of one anti-submarine unit, equipped with 18S-2E aircraft and 7 AB-204B and AB-212 helicopters.

The Marines Brigade is a 5,000-man unit which is composed of a headquarter, 3 operation battalions, and artillery battalion and a unit of support.

Forces in Cyprus

To the list above it should be added a Corps comprising 2 infantry divisions (total strength: 17,000) which is charged with maintaining occupation regime in the northern part of Cyprus. This corps has at its disposal 150 armored tanks and vehicles (M-47/48 and M-113) as well as 212 guns of 105 and 155 mm. It has also Howitzers of 203 mm and anti-air guns of 40 mm.

(Sources: *Turkey Almanac 1983*, Ankara; IISS, *The Military Balance 1983-1984*, London, 1984. It must be underlined that the data given above do not include the last orders of arms which are explained in the other pages.)

coast-guard boat have already been launched on July 27, 1984. A few weeks later, on September 9, the first tank landing boat, equipped with two 20-mm Oerlikon guns and 12.7-mm Vikers guns, were launched at the naval dock-yards in Izmir.

It was recently announced that the Turkish Navy decided to build a new naval base in the zone of Aksaz in the region of Marmaris of the Aegean Coast. This new installation to be named "South Western Anatolian Naval Base" costs about 2,772 million Turkish Liras.

TURKEY, A NUCLEAR FORCE?

Turkey's neighbors are already observing with anxiety the level attained by the Turkish war industry, although this level is very far from the minimum standards of NATO. The Turkish military occupation of the northern part of Cyprus and the Turkish Army's penetration into the territory of Iraq in 1983 and 1984 have already been alarming to Greece and Islamic countries of the Middle East; even for Israel.

On February 27, 1984, a Greek newspaper, *Idisis*, reported that Turkey was planning the construction of a giant military base in Corlu, 75 miles far from Bulgaria and 85 miles from Greece. The US sources claimed that this base, which costs about 16 million dollars, would be under NATO control. But both of these western neighbors of Turkey see this new base as a menace to their security.

Another Greek newspaper, *To Vima*, announced in its issue of May 13, 1984, that Turkey would have nuclear arms as well within a 10-year period. The origin of this alarm is the fact that Turkey is still bargaining with some countries for building her first nuclear power plant at Akkuyu in the province of Mersin. The three foreign companies which have given their letter of intent for this project were the US based Westinghouse Company, the Canadian AECL and the West German Kraftwerke Union. The Turkish Government announced that it will sign the contract with the one that accepts transferring the power plant to Turkey after having constructed it.

What are the real perspectives of the Turkish war industry? Can it attain the level of the war industries of other NATO countries? It has already been disclosed that European countries set up consortiums to manufacture new arms jointly. And there is a project that has been going on for years to standardize NATO arms. Can Turkey take part in this process?

Turkish Defense Minister Yavuztürk replied to these questions in an interview with the *Turkish Daily News* of September 13, 1984:

"Turkey has an established capacity in regard to the Defense industry.

We need to properly utilize this capacity. Today we have a good foundation even working only in single shifts. We can increase the shifts and boost our capacity. This could also help ease the unemployment problem. Turkey has to break away from the tradition of being a country that always buys arms. We have the know-how and the necessary technology. We should not be regarded as underdeveloped in this field. The NATO defense ministers discuss the new generation of weapons for the 1990s. With the current pace of technological developments, the arms in use today become outdated very quickly. We want to have a part in the manufacture of new weapons systems and modernizing air forces. Turkey should be able to sell arms while also buying them."

OYAK: A NEW INDUSTRIAL GIANT

There is no doubt that the lion's share of the war industry belongs to the finance holding company of the Army officers: OYAK.

The *Armed Forces Mutual Aid Fund (OYAK)* had been founded in 1961, with the aim of supplying army officers and NCOs with cheap consumer goods, providing credits with low interest rates and construction low-cost residences for Army officers. But over a 10-year period, this fund has turned into a giant finance holding company, distributing profits to Army officers and NCO's and has developed its collaboration with foreign capital in different fields of investment.

Only one of its joint ventures, OYAK-Renault which produces French-licensed cars, had place among the 30 biggest industrial firms of Turkey with an annual turnover of 112.72 million dollars.

According to the financial report presented to the 25th General Council meeting of OYAK, held on May 31, 1985, the foundation's profitability climbed to 130% in 1984, and all its military shareholders received a profit-share of 42.4% in the same year.

In 1985, OYAK and the three army foundations owned the following industrial and commercial firms:

1. Türk Otomotiv Endüstrisi A.S. (automobile)
2. Motorlu Araçlar Tic A.S. (automobile)
3. OYAK-Renault (automobile)
4. Motorlu Araçlar A.S. (automobile)
5. Ağır Döküm Sanayii A.S. (iron casting)
6. Good-Year A.S. (tire)
7. Çukurova Çimento A.S. (cement)
8. Mardin Çimento A.S. (cement)
9. Bolu Çimento A.S. (cement)
10. Ünye Çimento A.S. (cement)
11. Otomarsan (automobile)

12. Koytas
13. Sidas
14. OYAK-Kutuluas A.S.
15. OYAK-Kutuluas Insaat A.S.
16. OYAK-Kutuluas Pazarlama A.S. (marketing)
17. OYAK-Kutuluas Prefabrik A.S. (pre-fabricated houses)
18. Isbir
19. Aspilsan (military battery)
20. Mustas
21. Netas
22. Havelsan (military electric)
23. Hava Uzay Sanayii (aeronautic)
24. OYAK-Insaat A.S. (construction)
25. TUSAS (tourism)
26. Aselan (military electric)
27. DITAS
28. Turgutlu Konservecilik (Canned food)
29. Eti Pazarlama ve Sanayi A.S. (marketing-industry)
30. Hektas
31. Petkim-Petro Kimya (petro-chemical)
32. Petlas
33. TESTAS Elektronik A.S. (electronic)
34. OYAK Yatirim Holding (Investment holding)
35. OYAK Sigorta (Insurance)
36. Omsan Nakliyat A.S. (transport)
37. Tam Gida Sanayii A.S. (food)

OYAK and three army foundations also have joint ventures with the following local and foreign firms:

- | | |
|----------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. General Dynamics | 16. Gama Holding |
| 2. General Electric | 17. Cukurova Holding |
| 3. ITT | 18. Has Holding |
| 4. Philips Dodge | 19. Türkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi |
| 5. Northern Electric | 20. Is Bankasi |
| 6. Renaud | 21. Vakiflar Bankasi |
| 7. Good Year | 22. Ziraat Bankasi |
| 8. Mobil | 23. Cimento Sanayii A.S. |
| 9. International Harvester | 24. DITAS |
| 10. Shell | 25. MKE |
| 11. General Motors | 26. Elektronik Sanayii |
| 12. Koç Holding | 27. Petkim |
| 13. Kutlutas A.S. | 28. Etibank |
| 14. Sabanci Holding | 29. PTT |
| 15. Yasar Holding | 30. Türkiye Petrolleri A.S. |

WAR INDUSTRY'S NEW BOOST

Turkey's defence industries, already the largest in the Middle East, have been given a further boost by a governmental move.

Defense Minister Zeki Yavuztürk, opening Turkey's first military arms fair (*IDEA-'87*) in Ankara on April 27, 1987, said the country now plans to start its own armaments industry. The fair was participated by 403 armaments companies from 21 foreign countries, such as *General Dynamics, Dassault, British Aerospace, Crauss-Maffel, Colt Industries International Inc., Dornier GmbH, BMC, Helicopter Textron, Marconi, CASA, Westinghouse Defense, Euromissile, SAT, General Defense International Division, RLM Defense Engineering, Oip Optics NV-SA, Hall and Watts Ltd., Pilatus Aircraft Ltd, E. Lacroix.*

Yavuztürk claimed that share of industrial goods in Turkish exports had risen to over 70 percent and this would contribute to the development of war industry.

Turkey has already started to produce F-16 fighters at the end of 1987. This is a co-production of the U.S. *General Dynamics* and the *TUSAS Aerospace Industries Inc. of Turkey.*

The sum to be attributed to the war industry is estimated at 7.500 billions TL (9.4 billions dollars).

The Defense Industry Development and Support Administration (DIDA), coordinator of different armament industries, already had talks as well with Turkish private sector as with foreign companies. The foreign companies which participated in the *IDEA-'87* have forwarded proposals for cooperation in Turkish war industries.

Founded in 1986 by law, DIDA is based on free and liberal economic principles. Managed by a Supreme Coordination Board composed of Prime Minister, certain ministers and army chiefs, DIDA is charged with encouraging new investments through the reorganization of existing industries and integrating modern technology into the forces.

Besides, with the purpose of collecting financment, *the Foundation of Support for the Defense Industry* has been established under the authority of DIDA. By law, this fund receives considerable sums from the taxes put on alcoholic drinks, tobacco, lotteries and fuels.

Moreover, a law adopted on July 5, 1987, stipulates the transfer of the funds of the three foundations set up by Land, Air and Naval forces to the new foundation of DIDA. The proper funds of this new foundation has already risen to 200,000 million TL (250 millions dollars).

The social-democrat opposition comes against the project of creating a war industry by means of private enterprises. Deputy Chairman of the SHP Parliamentary Group, Mr. Cahit Tutum said: "It would not be proper for the establishment of a national defense industry structure in which the domestic

and foreign private sectors dominate. We must not forget the embargoes we have faced in the past. It is dangerous to rely on foreign countries and capital on this issue. What is appropriate is the establishment of a defense industry with the support of the government."

Turkey, to the detriment of his people's welfare, has been placed on the way of being a military power in one of the most agitated regions of the sphere. The Turkish Army, in the service of the Pentagon strategists, constitutes a permanent menace not only against the peoples of the neighboring countries, but also against Turkey's own peoples.

However, after a 7-year period of repression, democratic and progressive forces of Turkey, using all legal possibilities, have begun to raise their voice against the pro-American policies of the Evren-Özal tandem.

U.S. FEAR OF GROWING ANTI-AMERICAN MOVE IN TURKEY

Taking into consideration the opposition in the Turkish public opinion against the US Congress' decisions, on October 22, 1987, the Heritage Foundation addressed to US policymakers a detailed report suggesting to adopt a more realistic approach to Turkey.

The report, reminding that Özal's period is the most favourable one of the US interests in Turkey, says:

"At a time when war and chaos in the Persian Gulf remind policymakers how difficult it is to deal with Middle Eastern states, Turkey remains a rock of stability and reliability in the eastern Mediterranean. The U.S. clearly has strong reasons to maintain the closest possible working relationship with Turkey. Yet cracks are appearing in the Turkish-American relationship. In early May Turkish President Kenan Evren canceled a scheduled visit to the US to signal growing Turkish doubt about American sincerity and reliability because of anti-Turkish actions taken by the US Congress.

"The 1980 Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) between the U.S. and Turkey limits American use of Turkish facilities to NATO defense purposes. This condition was imposed by Turkey to avoid being drawn into a regional conflict with NATO backing. Yet Turkey still could play a role in deterring a Soviet move to the Persian Gulf. In 1982 the United States began to modernize ten Turkish air bases, several of them in eastern Turkey, on the flank of possible Soviet invasion routes through Iran. These air bases could enable U.S. warplanes to interdict the supply lines and slow the momentum of a Soviet invasion force attacking Iran.

"To their credit, the Turks did not threaten to terminate American access to their bases, as has Greece's Papandreu. The Özal government was criticized by its political opposition for agreeing to renew the DECA without binding US commitments.

"Prime Minister Özal, trained as an engineer in the U.S., is dedicated to free market economic reforms. He has been praised by Ronald Reagan as 'a real Reaganite in economic terms' because of his determined efforts to prod Turkey toward free enterprise. Since 1980, Özal has rationalized the price system by abolishing subsidies and lifting price controls, overhauled the tax system, and slashed income taxes by 20 percent for most workers. He has opened up the economy by liberalizing currency exchange rules and expanding access by Turks to foreign imports, credit, and investment. By encouraging Turkish industry to shift toward exports rather than import substitution, Özal hopes to harness fully Turkey's comparative advantages, especially its large, skilled workforce and its geographic proximity to both Europe and the Middle East.

"Despite Özal's success in stimulating economic growth, his centrist Motherland Party is losing ground politically because of its austerity program and a persistent unemployment rate of 20 percent. Moreover, Özal's efforts to protect Turkey's credit rating by assiduously meeting its foreign debt commitments (\$4 billion in principal and interest was paid on Turkey's \$25 billion foreign debt in 1986) have left him open to opposition charges that he serves Turkey's foreign creditors better than his own people.

"Turkey is a steadfast ally and should not be taken for granted. The Özal government's strong commitment to NATO, modernization, free enterprise, and free trade make it one of the most pro-American Turkish governments ever to hold power. Özal's opposition derides him as Amerikanci and criticizes him for not securing firmer U.S. aid commitments in the DECA signed earlier this year. Washington should help Özal demonstrate the benefits of a close U.S. connection. It should avoid giving help Özal's critics on the left and the right issues that can be used to discredit him and the rising generation of U.S.-educated technocrats.

"Long-term U.S. goals should be to facilitate Turkey's transition to a stable democracy, to a free market economy, and to full integration into Western Europe's economy as well as its defense alliance. To accomplish these goals:

"1) Washington must meet its DECA obligations to help modernize Turkey's armed forces and enable the Turks to fulfill their NATO responsibilities. Military aid to Turkey is one of the most cost-effective means of deterring Soviet aggression in the eastern Mediterranean as well as southwest Asia. While it costs the U.S. \$60,000 to outfit and station one American soldier in Turkey, the cost for one Turkish soldier is roughly \$9,000. (Testimony of Ambassador Parker Hart, cited in Bruce Kuniholm, "Rhetoric and Reality in the Aegean: U.S. Policy Options Toward Greece and Turkey", SAIS Review, Winter/Spring 1986, p.153)

"2) Congress should stop linking Turkish aid levels to diplomatic progress on the Cyprus Question. The U.S. arms embargo proved to be a blunt instrument that hardened Turkey's position instead of encouraging compromise.

"3) The arbitrary 7 to 10 Greece/Turkey aid ratio should be scrapped.

"4) The Reagan Administration should invoke the 1986 amendment to the Defense authorization act that allows the Administration to transfer surplus military equipment to Turkey, Greece and Portugal.

"5) Washington should press its allies to increase foreign aid to Turkey and to consider favorably Turkey's application for full membership in the European Economic Community.

"6) The U.S. should open its markets to Turkish textile exports as much as possible under the Multifiber Arrangement.

"7) The U.S. should encourage Ankara to open the Ottoman archives to allow a full, open review of the Turks' treatment of Armenians. While the Armenians unquestionable suffered grievous wrongs, there is no incontrovertible proof of a systematic genocide campaign by the Turks against them. A full-scale investigation of the matter, using the old Ottoman archives, could clear up the issue. Congressional resolutions on the Ottoman Armenians would only reopen old wounds and disrupt Turkish-American relations without resolving anything.

"Given the steady drift of Papandreu's Greece away from the Western alliance, the U.S. must strengthen its ties to Turkey, not weaken them. For if Prime Minister Papandreu chooses to oust US bases from Greece, Turkey is the obvious candidate to provide substitute facilities."

AFTER THE GORBACHEV-REAGAN SUMMIT

However, the latest developments on the international arena lead the Turkish political circles and mass media to review the Turkish military policies in general, the Turkish Army's dependence on Washington, in particular.

When Gorbachev and Reagan signed an agreement to eliminate INF weapons on December 8, 1987, the attention of the public opinion has switched to the possible consequences of this historical event.

For the first time an entire missile family is being destroyed, and not an outdated family, but on the contrary, a particularly devastating one - the pride of military technology.

Several years ago the prospect of such an accord seemed to many people hopeless. In the past few years the Soviet Union has put forward a number of new peace initiatives. On January 15, 1986, it advanced a carefully worked-out programme for the phased abolition of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

Moscow has also advanced proposals to ban the militarization of outer space. These proposals have been approved by the U.N. General Assembly.

At the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, the Soviet Union has submitted thoroughly elaborated proposals for the prohibition of chemical

weapons and destruction of existing stockpiles. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty allies have urged the NATO countries to reduce the armed forces of the two military blocs by roughly a quarter. All these proposals have been backed up by a carefully devised system of on-site-inspection.

Lastly, the Soviet Union has advanced the idea of establishing a comprehensive system of international security. The treaty signed by Gorbachev and Reagan stipulates the elimination of a whole class of modern nuclear armaments ranging from 500 up to 5,000 Kms. This is a practical step towards a nuclear-free world.

However, this peaceful success is not appreciated by the extreme right and conservative circles of the West. According to the hawks in Pentagon, by signing the new arms treaty with Gorbachev, President Reagan has lost his senses, sold out to the Russians and is plunging headlong into another Munich for the sake of "peace in our time." For them, the INF treaty is "a tragic mistake", "a Pyrrhic victory", "a challenge".

The conservatives have not only devised labels and swear words like "denuclearization of Europe" and "nuclear Finlandization." They have also proposed "compensation" plans which include the deployment in Europe of B-52 bombers carrying air-launched cruise missiles and of additional F-15E and F-111 planes capable of carrying nuclear weapons, submarines and surface ships with cruise missiles on board, "modernization" or, in plain words, the creation of new generations of medium and shorter-range nuclear weapons, particularly in Britain, France and Turkey.

As a matter of fact, all the nuclear missiles installed on the Turkish territories are those of short range and they do not enter in the framework of the Washington Treaty. In addition to them, Western militarists and their Turkish collaborators have immediately begun to claim that NATO should reinforce its conventional arsenal in order to be able to riposte to the conventional arms superiority of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Treaty countries.

They propose also to deploy in Turkey short range Lance missiles, to increase the nuclear warheads in this country, to equip F-16 fighters with nuclear arms and to increase armaments of the Turkish Armed Forces.

This campaign coincides very well with the ambitions of the military-industrial complex of Turkey which resorts to every way in order to turn all Turkey into an infernal arsenal and to push the Pentagonist Turkish generals to "conquests" in the Middle East.

Unconditionally submitted to Washington policies, Özal Government seems ready to accept whatsoever proposal to be raised by these circles.

But, the last general elections showed that Özal has the support of only a third of the population. Despite all repressive measures, democratic opposition is getting stronger and stronger throughout Turkey.

Just after the elections, the signature of the Treaty to eliminate INF weapons has been a new stimulating event for the democracy and peace forces of Turkey.

CONTENTS

Turkey's importance to the USA	3
Disclosures about the U.S. instigation to the coup d'état	4
Americanizing of the Turkish Army	5
A sui-generis military holding: OYAK	9
Sinister role of the Counter Guerilla Organization	9
Disclosures about the Counter Guerilla Organization	10
U.S. satisfaction with the 1980 military coup	11
Growing Turco-American Cooperation	13
Rapid Deployment Force and Turkey	15
Modernization of Military Airfields in Turkey	16
Turkey on the Nuclear Frontline	17
Five areas of Turco-American Military Cooperation	19
Controversial US Military "Aid" to Turkey	20
Troubles in the Turco-American Relations	22
Özal calms down anti-American move in Parliament	23
Özal's visit to the USA	24
Never ending bargainings on the revision of DECA	25
U.S. made scenario for the Middle East	26
U.S. plans on the future of the troubled Cyprus	29
Military-industrial complex	31
Turkish Air Forces	34
Bribery concerning F-16 purchases	36
Turkish Land Forces	37
Turkish Naval Forces	39
Inventory of the Armaments of the Turkish Army	39
Turkey, a nuclear force?	42
OYAK: A new industrial giant	43
War Industry's new boost	45
U.S. fear of growing anti-American move in Turkey	46
After the Gorbachev-Reagan Summit	48